MANAGING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE
MANAGING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

AN EXAMINATION OF STRUCTURAL LINKAGES IN THE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP

Jeffrey W. Hornung

SASAKAWA USA
Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA is a 501(c)3 non-profit located in Washington, D.C., involved in U.S.-Japan relations, providing conferences and seminars, think tank analysis, people-to-people exchanges and coordination of high-level dialogue between the two countries through our in-house and collaborative programs.


Printed in the United States of America

© 2019, 2017 by Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA

Sasakawa USA does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views expressed herein are the authors' own and do not necessarily reflect the views of Sasakawa USA, its staff, or its board.

No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from Sasakawa USA. Please direct inquiries to:

Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA
1819 L St NW #300
Washington, DC 20036
P: +1 202-296-6694
E: info@spfusa.org

This publication can be downloaded at no cost at https://spfusa.org/. 
### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACG</td>
<td>Alliance Cooperation Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACG-D</td>
<td>ACG-Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACG-DG</td>
<td>ACG-Director General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACG-ES</td>
<td>ACG-Executive Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACM</td>
<td>Alliance Coordination Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMM</td>
<td>Alliance Management Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARFOR</td>
<td>Army Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASD APSA</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASDF</td>
<td>Air Self-Defense Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASO</td>
<td>Air Staff Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATLA</td>
<td>Acquisition, Technology &amp; Logistics Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATOP</td>
<td>Alliance Transformation Oversight Panel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCM</td>
<td>Bilateral Coordination Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BJOCC</td>
<td>Bilateral Joint Operations Coordination Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLC</td>
<td>Bureau of Local Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOCC</td>
<td>Bilateral Operations Coordination Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C7F</td>
<td>Commander, 7th Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCC</td>
<td>Component Coordination Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCC-A</td>
<td>Component Coordination Center-Air</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCC-G</td>
<td>Component Coordination Center-Ground</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCC-M</td>
<td>Component Coordination Center-Maritime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTRIX-J</td>
<td>Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange-Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CinCSDFLT</td>
<td>Commander in Chief Self-Defense Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COCOM</td>
<td>Combatant Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COS-JSO</td>
<td>Chief of Staff-Joint Staff Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DASD</td>
<td>Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATT</td>
<td>Defense Attaché</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDG</td>
<td>Deputy Director General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>Director General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRI</td>
<td>Defense Policy Review Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSCA</td>
<td>Defense Security Cooperation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAP A/S</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Foreign Area Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLO</td>
<td>Foreign Liaison Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOGO</td>
<td>Flag Officer/General Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRAGO</td>
<td>Fragmentary Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>Ground Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOJ</td>
<td>Government of Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSDF</td>
<td>Ground Self-Defense Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSO</td>
<td>Ground Staff Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSOMIA</td>
<td>General Security of Military Information Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HNS</td>
<td>Host Nation Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IB</td>
<td>Internal Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III MEF</td>
<td>III Marine Expeditionary Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPD</td>
<td>International Policy Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC</td>
<td>Joint Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-NSC</td>
<td>Japan’s National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSO</td>
<td>Joint Staff Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARFORPAC</td>
<td>U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDAO</td>
<td>Mutual Defense Assistance Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSDF</td>
<td>Maritime Self-Defense Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSO</td>
<td>Maritime Staff Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAAB</td>
<td>North American Affairs Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOFORN</td>
<td>No Foreign National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>Operational Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTE</td>
<td>Organize, Train and Equip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUSD (AT&amp;L)</td>
<td>Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACAF</td>
<td>U.S. Pacific Air Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACFLT</td>
<td>U.S. Pacific Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>U.S. Pacific Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Defense Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;TF</td>
<td>Science and Technology Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCC</td>
<td>Security Consultative Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDC</td>
<td>Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDF</td>
<td>Self-Defense Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCOM</td>
<td>Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCPAC</td>
<td>Special Operations Command Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOFA</td>
<td>Status of Forces Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSC</td>
<td>Security Subcommittee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCO</td>
<td>Theater Campaign Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TJFCC</td>
<td>Theater Joint Force Component Commanders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USARJ</td>
<td>U.S. Army, Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USARPAC</td>
<td>U.S. Army Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USFJ</td>
<td>U.S. Forces, Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USFK</td>
<td>U.S. Forces Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US-NSC</td>
<td>U.S. National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VTC</td>
<td>Video Teleconference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWII</td>
<td>World War Two</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Preface

Back in the spring of 2015, I had the opportunity to visit then-Commander of the Ground Self-Defense Force’s Western Army command in Kyushyu, Lieutenant General Koichiro Bansho (now retired). I was there as part of a research project examining Japan’s burgeoning amphibious capabilities. In a chance conversation with Lieutenant General Bansho, I asked him who his U.S. counterparts were, the people with whom he interacted on a daily basis, which begot a long list that included U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps units throughout Japan and beyond. Intrigued but wanting more details, I subsequently started to look for published research on the topic, assuming someone had already published a nuts-and-bolts review of how the U.S.-Japan alliance functions on a daily basis. Surprised that none existed to the level of detail I was looking for, I realized an opportunity existed. Thus began the origins of this report, Managing the U.S.-Japan Alliance: An Examination of Structural Linkages in the Security Relationship. A year later, while a Fellow for the Security and Foreign Affairs Program at Sasakawa USA, I was fortunate to finally make my research idea a reality.

Researched and written as a practical reference source for a better understanding of the structure of the U.S.-Japan security alliance, my intention was to explain the complex nature of the institutions, offices, and individuals that manage the U.S.-Japan alliance. While there have been a few minor changes to organizational charts since this report was first published in April 2017, the primary roles and responsibilities of the organizations, how these organizations coordinate policies and security-related issues, and where lines of responsibilities interact remain the same.

Since its initial publication, I have been pleasantly surprised to both hear and see for myself copies and downloads of this report in U.S. commands and defense and diplomatic offices in Washington, Hawaii, and Japan and read by people directly responsible for the U.S.-Japan alliance. That was always my intention. When Sasakawa USA told me they were interested in republishing this original version of my 2017 report, I agreed on the necessity, as an understanding of this critical alliance remains as true today as it did only a few years ago.

The Indo-Pacific region’s security environment has not improved since this report was published, making the management of the U.S.-Japan alliance a continuing critical factor in the region’s security. It is my hope that this report continues to serve a purpose of contributing to a better understanding of how that important security relationship works.

Jeffrey W. Hornung
The RAND Corporation
November 2019
Introduction

Recent changes on both sides of the Pacific Ocean have helped make the U.S.-Japan alliance the strongest it has ever been. In the United States, President Barack Obama pursued a rebalancing strategy to the Asia-Pacific that significantly elevated Japan’s strategic value. In Japan, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe passed a set of security laws on September 19, 2015, to ensure Japan will be able to play a more proactive contribution to peace. And on April 27, 2015, the allies released new Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. Much like the heightened expectations of a more proactive Japan that followed the revised National Defense Program Guidelines in 2004 and the completion of the Defense Policy Review Initiative with the United States in 2006, the passage of the security legislation and revision of the Defense Guidelines has once again raised expectations that the alliance will be more effective and proactive in addressing security issues throughout the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.

This is unlikely to change, even under the Donald Trump administration. Visits by Secretary of Defense James Mattis to Japan and Prime Minister Abe to the United States in President Trump’s first month served to reinforce the positive trajectory of security ties by reiterating past commitments to the alliance. What is more, even if the Obama administration’s ‘rebalance’ strategy to the Asia-Pacific is eliminated, or drastically changed, the Asia-Pacific will remain of crucial consequence to U.S. national security. This is a function of the region’s economic and security importance. Central to successful U.S. engagement will be Japan.

Successful engagement, in turn, depends on the effectiveness of structural linkages in the U.S.-Japan alliance among the institutional actors—both policy and operational—that communicate and coordinate with one another. If the United States and Japan are not communicating and coordinating effectively, their ability to engage the region on military and security issues will be constrained.

Below is an examination of structural linkages in the U.S.-Japan alliance aiming to answer the central question: Are the existing structures of communication and coordination optimized for managing alliance relations? It seeks to provide insight into the black box of bilateral decision-making by examining all the relevant actors in the national security sphere, how they interact, and any inherent structural challenges that may exist. Following a presentation of key actors in the national security sphere in both Japan and the United States is a description of how these actors communicate and coordinate with one another. The report finds that while the existing structures of communication and coordination are generally effective,

1 2:18 am (Japan time).
they are not optimized for managing alliance relations. Alliance managers face an array of challenges. This report divides these challenges into situations of peacetime and crisis and conflict. The report concludes with policy recommendations meant to overcome these challenges. An overview of the report’s research methodology is presented in Appendix 1.
World economic growth depends heavily on stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Not only do the economies of the Asia-Pacific drive today’s global economy and are vital to prosperity of the United States, the region is a vital thruway for global commerce. According to the 2015 Department of Defense’s (DOD) *Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy*, two-thirds of the world’s oil shipments transit the region, eight of the world’s ten busiest container ports are in the region and almost thirty-percent of the world’s maritime trade transits the South China Sea annually, including approximately $1.2 trillion in ship-borne trade bound for the United States.\(^2\) Economically, therefore, regional stability is paramount. Just as it has been true for the past seventy years, preventing regional civil wars and small-scale warfare from threatening regional peace and stability will depend on a committed U.S. regional presence.

This is particularly true given the region’s three dominant security challenges risk escalation and conflict. North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technologies is destabilizing as these directly threaten North Korea’s neighbors, U.S. troops stationed in the region, and in time, the U.S. mainland. China’s rapid military buildup, coupled with aggressive land reclamation efforts in the South China Sea and overtly provocative behavior vis-à-vis Japan in the East China Sea, add to regional tensions. A growing question for the United States is whether China’s growing military might will result in a reduction of America’s freedom to operate throughout the region. Finally, while concerns over Russia have largely focused on actions taken by the Russian military in Eastern Europe to undermine regional security directly or through proxy forces, its actions in East Asia are increasingly becoming confrontational. In addition to fostering seemingly closer relations with China in the military sphere, Russia continues to engage in provocative behavior vis-à-vis Japan over a set of disputed islands while bolstering its naval presence and air defense systems in the region.

Given these challenges, U.S. military presence in the region will continue to play a role in undergirding regional peace, stability, and security, as it remains the only country able to project and sustain large-scale military operations over extended distances. Yet, as post-Cold War strategic documents have recognized, the United States cannot manage regional developments alone. It is necessary “to share the burdens of maintaining global security and prosperity.”\(^3\) This is in U.S. interests and the interests of U.S. allies. America’s “closest partners


and allies will remain the cornerstone of [U.S.] international engagement.”⁴ This is exactly why the importance of allies has been prioritized in an increasing array of official strategies released by the United States over the past two decades. This includes the 2015 Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, every Quadrennial Defense Report (QDR) since 2006,⁵ and National Security Strategies issued by every president since the George H.W. Bush administration.

America’s “alliances in Asia underwrite security and enable prosperity throughout Asia and the Pacific.”⁶ One reason is because alliances are force multipliers. Through multinational cooperation and coordination, the sum of the actions taken by the United States and its allies will always be greater than if they act alone.⁷ And they will act because alliances’ raison d’ etre is the defense of common interests. Working in concert enables the United States to respond more effectively in defense of those interests. Another reason has to do with forward presence. In order to credibly deter potential adversaries, the United States must maintain its ability to project power in areas in which access and freedom to operate are challenged.⁸ Because of the tyranny of distance, effective power projection and sustainment of military operations, therefore, will continue to depend on forward-deployed and rotationally deployed forces, capabilities, and assets. Thus, as has been true in the past, America’s national security will continue to depend on vibrant alliances.

America’s closest allies “will be, as they always have, other democratic states.”⁹ Amongst this finite universe, in the Asia-Pacific there is no ally more important than Japan. Not only is Japan home for approximately 50,000 forward deployed U.S. military personnel, it also hosts the Navy’s Seventh Fleet and the world’s only forward-stationed Carrier Strike Group, the Marine Corps’ III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF), and significant Air Force (AF) assets, including the 18th Wing, the largest combat wing in the U.S. AF. Unlike U.S. forces that are tethered to South Korea, forces based in Japan are able to be deployed outside of Japan. Japan complements America’s forces with the region’s most advanced armed forces coupled, in recent years, by a soft relaxation of legal restrictions to enable its armed forces to play a greater—albeit still limited—force provider role. Importantly, Japan shares U.S. goals for the Asia-Pacific region. This is why Japan’s importance to the United States in addressing regional challenges has grown in recent years and has been specifically mentioned in every QDR since 2006, the 2015 National Security Strategy, and the 2015 Asia-Pacific

---

⁴ Ibid.
⁵ The 1997 and 2001 QDR included allies, but the emphasis was largely how U.S. forces could assure allies and deter aggression against them. Unlike later QDRs, these were not focusing on what the U.S. and its allies could or should do in concert.
Maritime Security Strategy. Together, not only does the U.S.-Japan alliance assure regional friends and deter potential foes, it improves America’s ability to rapidly act in the region to defeat potential challengers should a situation arise. This makes it crucial to ensure the basic structures of the U.S.-Japan alliance are robust so that alliance handlers communicate and coordinate effectively to meet today’s challenges. It is for this reason that a focused examination of structural linkages is important, as they form the connective communicative tissue in this critical security relationship.

A study such as this is long overdue. Despite an entire genre of alliance-related literature focusing on foreign policy and defense issues, there is a paucity focusing on the alliance’s structural linkages.10 Scholars have instead focused on individual aspects of the alliance and decision-making processes. One group of scholarship focuses on the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), but these are studies of the individual organization with no structural analysis to linkages to the United States (let alone other Japanese agencies).11 Another group examines Japan’s national security infrastructure as a whole but also fails to extend the analysis to linkages with U.S. counterparts.12 A third group examines the increasingly powerful nature of the Prime Minister’s office—particularly in crisis management—but these works focus largely on the office’s power vis-à-vis the vast Japanese bureaucracy, only occasionally providing a fleeting glimpse into interaction with the United States.13 Still, because of the nature of these studies, those “glimpses” come as case studies of important events but examine only the highest levels of decision-making. In fact, the best examples available of interaction between the allies are contained in a fourth group of

scholarship, in-depth works focusing on various events in the history of the alliance, such as overseas operations led by the United States involving some level of Japanese support. These, however, suffer from an almost exclusive focus on the highest echelons of the foreign policy and defense establishments, giving no sense of the complex nature of communication and coordination taking place at lower levels of government.

None of this is to suggest these works are unimportant. They provide in-depth analysis and understanding of how specific parts of the alliance function and associated policy challenges. In other words, they “offer a peeping window into the often opaque Japanese national security policy infrastructure.” What this scholarship lacks, however, is a focus inside the bilateral black box of decision-making and how the alliance communicates and coordinates on a routine basis and possibly in a contingency. Importantly, the bulk of the existing scholarship does not cover how the changes over the past year affect alliance management.

Without a doubt, policymakers and scholars on both sides of the Pacific are well aware of the important role the alliance plays in regional security. This awareness has increased in recent years as small legal changes translate into possible new roles and missions. Because the regional challenges facing the allies are great, no aspect of the alliance relationship can rely on chance. This is particularly true of simple communication and coordination mechanisms. Seamless responses demand seamless communication. With the April 27, 2015, Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation indicating that the two governments will strive to ensure seamless and effective coordination, we have to ask whether the allies are communicating seamlessly. If not, why? Are there structural hurdles that frustrate effective communication? If so, how can they be mitigated? This project seeks to assess all the channels of communication the allies have with one another in the national security realm as an attempt to answer the central question: Are the existing structures of communication and coordination optimized for managing alliance relations?


15 Tatsumi, Japan’s National Security Policy Infrastructure, 10.
Structures

Without a doubt, change in an office’s authority or its relationship with other offices is a function of the specific person leading that office. After all, personalities matter. This study sought a more general approach, however, hoping to draw general conclusions based on the responsibilities of and interaction between individual departments and commands, rather than the people leading them. As such, to understand how alliance managers communicate and coordinate with one another, it was necessary to examine the discrete organizations responsible for policies in the defense, foreign affairs, and national security realm as well as the operational elements of the allies’ respective military establishments. It was necessary to delve into levels below organizational leadership to examine where routine management is performed throughout various agencies and commands. This first section presents a structural analysis of all the relevant organizations, both policy and operational, on both sides of the Pacific Ocean that are responsible for alliance management. Before we begin, two caveats are necessary.

For the purposes below, “policy” structures relate to those offices generally responsible for making security-related policies while “operational” structures relate to those offices engaged in military operations or implementing the relevant security policies created by the “policy” structures. This division is artificial, as there is significant overlap between the two realms. It is more effective than a simple civilian-military distinction, however, given the cross-cutting nature of civilians and military personnel in these structures. Because the objective of this report is to isolate structural actors for the purpose of simplifying the analysis, the policy-operational division should not be overanalyzed.

The author’s intention is to analyze daily management of the security aspects of the alliance. While this study began with an inclusion of how the alliance handles issues pertaining to Okinawa, it quickly became evident that alliance management of Okinawa-related issues includes a number of actors relevant only to Okinawa. This included, among others, the U.S. Consulate, the Okinawa governor’s office, the Okinawa Prefectural government, and MOFA’s Okinawa Liaison Office. Understanding their relationship and how these actors manage Okinawa-related issues is important, but it is beyond the scope of this report because it is much more focused than the author’s intent for this study. While the report does touch on how Okinawa-related issues are managed, that topic is largely on the margins and not the report’s focus.

16 This is not to suggest a study on specific personalities is unimportant but that it is just beyond the scope of this study.
United States: Policy

The U.S. organizations responsible for policy relating to managing the alliance are fewer than those in Japan. This is understandable. The United States is a global power with interests spanning the globe. Within those interests, Japan is but one, albeit an important one. Nevertheless, it means that outside of the American Embassy in Tokyo, the extent of U.S. organizations responsible for national security issues with Japan refers to two main “Japan Desks” and two other offices.

Department of State

In the Department of State (DOS), the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs is responsible for U.S. foreign policy and U.S. relations with all countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Headed by the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP A/S), this individual serves as the principal advisor to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs and the Secretary of State on foreign policies relating to the Asia-Pacific region. Under the Assistant Secretary sit four to six Deputies, although there is no hard-and-fast rule on this and numbers and titles change depending on the administration. For the Barack Obama Administration, there were six, with the focus of these Deputy Assistant Secretaries being: (1) China/Mongolia/Taiwan; (2) Japan/Koreas; (3) Australia/New Zealand/Oceania; (4) Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), regional affairs; (5) Mainland and maritime Southeast Asia; and (6) Public affairs/public diplomacy in East Asia. It is the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Japanese and Korean Affairs who is responsible for overseeing the formulation and implementation of diplomatic policies relevant to Japan. The Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs itself is divided into thirteen distinct Offices, with the Office of Japanese Affairs handling all relations with Japan. Headed by a Director who reports directly to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Japanese and Korean Affairs, the Office oversees a broad span of political, economic, consular, and public diplomacy issues bearing on the bilateral relationship with Japan. Japan comes up occasionally with other Offices, depending on the topic. For example, if DOS is pursuing trilateral initiatives with the South Korea, then the desk responsible for South Korea would also be involved in communication with Japan.

Department of Defense

In the DOD’s Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs (ASD APSA) serves as the principal advisor to the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense on international security strategy and policy on issues of DOD interest that relate to the nations and international organizations of the Asia-Pacific, its governments and defense establishments, and for oversight of security cooperation programs in the region. Under the ASD APSA sit three Deputies, one responsible for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia, one for South and Southeast Asia, and one for East Asia. It is this last Deputy who oversees the formulation and implementation of defense policy for Japan as well as for four other countries and Taiwan. Under this Deputy, the portfolio directly responsible for defense policies with Japan is that of the Director for Japan, who falls directly beneath the Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia. The Director oversees approximately five or six individuals focusing on the entire spectrum of bilateral defense relations.

U.S. National Security Council

The U.S. National Security Council (US-NSC) is the U.S. President’s principal forum for considering national security and foreign policy matters with his senior national security advisors and cabinet officials. As such, the US-NSC’s main function is to advise and assist the President on national security and foreign policies as well as coordinate these policies among U.S. government agencies. The US-NSC is chaired by the President, and statutory members include the Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and, since 2007, the Secretary of Energy. Statutory advisers include the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Director of National Intelligence. Other officials are invited to attend, and the President can add other members at his/her discretion. One regular, non-statutory member includes the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, who is the National Security Advisor. Underneath this individual sit three Deputy National Security Advisors and multiple Senior Directors covering both regional (e.g., Senior Director for Asia) and functional responsibilities (e.g., cyber, counterterrorism, and non-proliferation). Underneath these three Deputies are multiple Directorships, who are the staff-level machinery of the US-NSC. Included in this is the Director of Japan Affairs. While the Senior Director for Asia covers Japan, the main point of contact with Japan in the White House is the Director for Japan Affairs. As of this writing, despite President Trump’s changes to the National Security Council, this does not appear to have changed.

---

18 Other countries this individual is responsible for include China, Mongolia, and North and South Korea.
19 There are approximately twenty-five portfolios on Japan.
American Embassy (Tokyo)

When every Ambassador is posted to Japan, the President gives instructions that he or she is in charge of all members of the executive branch in Japan, with the exception of military who fall under a combatant command (COCOM). As such, the majority of military personnel serving in Japan do not fall under the Ambassador’s authority. Only the Defense Attaché (DATT) and some select liaison officers fall under the Ambassador’s authority. This means the Embassy is not the primary interlocutor with Japan on military and security issues. Yet, because of the influential role MOFA took on in defense and security matters after World War Two (WWII), the Embassy assumed a position of importance in security issues that the DOD could not. This meant that while alliance relations have not been run out of the Defense Attaché Office, the U.S. Embassy has utilized its Political-Military Affairs Unit as the Mission’s chief interlocutor to communicate with the host government on security-related issues. Headed by a Chief who falls directly beneath the Minister Counselor for Political Affairs, the Unit is composed of approximately twelve individuals who cover a broad range of security-related issues. Crucial to their success is the role played by foreign-service nationals who provide not only institutional knowledge and continuity across U.S. staff changes but critical linguistic skills to assist Embassy staff in their jobs.

---

20 Anonymous VV, E-mail message to author, February 10, 2017.
21 Japan’s immediate post-WWII anxiety with military meant that Japan did not have a Ministry of Defense; rather, it had a less powerful and less influential Japan Defense Agency. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs instead was the main driver of the alliance in Japan.
In MOFA, most issues are managed and policies are shaped primarily at the division level (課; ka); the divisions are headed by division Directors (課長; ka-chō). These divisions exist within larger bureaus (局; kyoku), which are each headed by a Director General (DG) (局長; kyoku-chō) and seconded by a Deputy Director General (DDG) (審議官; shingi-kan). As of this writing, as seen in table 1, MOFA is organized into twelve bureaus (seven functional; five regional), of which three (in bold type) are relevant to the focus of this study.22

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. MOFA Bureaus and Divisions.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian and Oceanian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>North American Affairs</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin American and Caribbean Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Eastern and African Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Functional:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister’s Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign Policy</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Legal Affairs</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consular Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence and Analysis Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North American Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First North America Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status of U.S. Forces Agreement Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Security Policy Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Legal Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaties Division</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

North American Affairs Bureau (北米局, Hoku Bei-kyoku)

More than any other bureau, the North American Affairs Bureau (NAAB) has an exclusive focus on the U.S.-Japan alliance. Prior to the creation of the Foreign Policy Bureau, the

---

NAAB had a long history of leading the Japanese government’s consultation with the United States on the alliance. In fact, prior to creation of today’s MOD, the NAAB was the preeminent bureau that did many of the policy functions the U.S. DOD was performing. Today, although the majority of the NAAB’s focus is the United States, the NAAB officially leads matters that include planning work connected with the formulation of policies concerning all North American countries, coordination of implementing such policies, and the political affairs concerning the North American countries. With the bureau’s exclusive focus on North America, it is no surprise that each of its four divisions serves as a custodian for different aspects of Japan’s relationship with the United States. Three of these divisions are relevant to this study.

North American Affairs Bureau: Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division 日米安全保障条約課 (Nichi-Bei Anzen Hoshō Jōyaku-ka)

Unlike in the MOD where the Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Division holds a preeminent position as a manager of alliance issues above other divisions, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division shares responsibilities for different aspects of alliance management with other MOFA divisions. For example, while the Status of U.S. Forces Agreement Division is responsible for interpretation of Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) implementation for incidents and accidents of U.S. forces in Japan, this division is responsible for steady state affairs as well as the long-term big-picture design of the alliance. This division, however, could be considered the main manager of the alliance given that it is responsible for alliance management issues, such as implementation of the Security Treaty and Defense Guidelines, as well as leading government negotiations with the United States on alliance issues. For example, this division focuses on issues like the U.S. realignment plans as well as trilateral cooperation with other countries alongside the United States. Most recently, when the Abe Administration worked to pass the security legislation, it was this division that led efforts in MOFA, working closely with its counterpart in the MOD—Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Division.

North American Affairs Bureau: Status of U.S. Forces Agreement Division 日米地位協定室 (Nichi-Bei Chii Kyōtei-shitsu)

As the name implies, the primary responsibility of this division is to handle SOFA-related matters. These include all issues that have to do with negotiation, conclusion, and interpretation of SOFA implementation, as well as related-issues, such as getting parts for

---

23 Tatsumi, Japan’s National Security Policy Infrastructure, 36.
25 The Second North America Division focuses on economic issues.
Japan’s F-35 through Japan’s import restrictions. While its responsibilities are therefore broad, it is primarily seen as responsible for incidents and accidents that arise involving U.S. military personnel living in Japan. Specifically, the division has the responsibility for coordinating bilateral efforts to respond to a situation involving U.S. personnel that includes facilitating communications between Japanese law enforcement and U.S. military police. 26 This complements the robust linkages between each major U.S. command’s Provost Marshal and Japanese law enforcement agencies as well as those between U.S. Forces, Japan and the Ministry of Justice, and law enforcement agencies. Via these linkages, the United States and domestic law enforcement agencies are able to discuss a broad array of issues that include crime and force protection.

North American Affairs Bureau: First North America Division

Japanese and U.S. law enforcement agencies work closely together, and the North American Affairs Bureau: First North America Division (Hokubei Dai-Ichi-ka) is responsible for overseeing these efforts. This division is the primary responsibility of this division is overseeing the political aspects of the alliance. While it includes economic issues, which are handled by the Second North America Division, but includes things like youth exchanges and visas. It does not focus on alliance management issues, per se; instead, these are handled primarily by the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division. Still, it is responsible for overarching foreign policy toward the United States. In this sense, it is broader than the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty Division by focusing more on the diplomatic side of the alliance, not simply the security aspect. For example, this division was responsible for organizing President Obama’s historic visit to Hiroshima in May 2015. As such, a large portion of this division’s work is assistance on arranging talking points for communications between Japan’s Foreign Minister or Prime Minister with the U.S. Secretary of State or President. Similarly, this division is responsible for networking with other U.S. allies, albeit strictly at a diplomatic/political level.

Foreign Policy Bureau

Created in 1993 to better synchronize overall policy coming out of MOFA, the Foreign Policy Bureau today is the most powerful Bureau in MOFA precisely because it is responsible for coordinating policies formulated by all of MOFA’s bureaus and is responsible for planning of basic and middle- or long-term foreign policy from a broader perspective. 27 That said, the Bureau is not responsible for maintaining bilateral contact with foreign states, including the United States. Instead, that responsibility is handled by divisions within specific

---

26 Tatsumi, Japan’s National Security Policy Infrastructure, 36.
geographically focused bureaus. For example, the NAAB oversees U.S.-related issues. The Bureau itself is divided up into twelve divisions and a Recruitment Center for International Organizations.

Foreign Policy Bureau: National Security Policy Division
安全保障政策課 (Anzen Hoshō Seisaku-ka)
The fact that the Foreign Policy Bureau does not reach out to states does not mean that it is completely free of the alliance. Quite the contrary: Because the Bureau puts an emphasis on national security issues, it provides input to other bureaus regarding policies—which could involve the United States—and also has the ability to veto division-level decisions if they are inconsistent with existing policy. Within its thirteen divisions, the relevant one for the alliance is the National Security Policy Division. This division’s responsibility is macro in scope, internally coordinating policy issues within MOFA to ensure consistency, disseminating information within MOFA gathered from other agencies, and disseminating Japanese security policy internationally. Even if an issue is narrowly bilateral in scope with one country, such as Australia, the National Security Policy Division is involved to ensure consistency with current and possible future policies with other countries.

International Legal Affairs Bureau
国際法局 (Kokusai Hō-kyoku)
The International Legal Affairs Bureau is the bureau that takes charge of the conclusion of treaties and other international agreements, matters of international law, and legal matters concerning foreign relations. It is the successor to the Treaty Bureau, which was replaced in 2004. The bureau’s essential responsibility is to ensure that international legal agreements signed by the government are consistent with Japan’s domestic laws. Additionally, the Bureau ensures that there are operative legal means to implement any obligations under international agreements.

International Legal Affairs Bureau: Treaties Division
条約課 (Jōyaku-ka)
The bureau is divided into four divisions: International Legal Affairs Division, Treaties Division, Economic Treaties Division, and Social Treaties Division. The responsibility for the

---

29 Ibid.
31 Tatsumi, Japan’s National Security Policy Infrastructure, 36.
International Legal Affairs Division is self-evident in that it deals with international law. Examples include law of the sea and international judicial proceedings, for which the division is sub-divided, but also any issue relating to customary international law, international humanitarian law, or the International Court of Justice. The Economic and Social Treaties’ Divisions are responsible for economic or social related treaties, such as the Transpacific Partnership Agreement or the Paris Agreement. The Treaties Division is relevant to this study, as it is responsible for synchronizing political and security-related treaties to Japan’s domestic laws. This includes the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, SOFA, defense equipment transfers, the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement, and the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). This means that the division works very closely with the NAAB—the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division and the Status of U.S. Forces Division—as they are both in charge of interpreting implementation of the Treaty and SOFA, respectively. They take the lead in communicating with the United States in their respective area, but it is the responsibility of the Treaties Division to provide legal advice to make sure that their work is consistent with the long-standing interpretation of the Treaty and SOFA.  

Ministry of Defense (Bōei-shō)

The MOD consists of an Internal Bureau (IB), Joint Staff, staff offices for each of the Self-Defense Force (SDF) services, and the Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA) as an external bureau. Like MOFA, in the MOD most issues are managed and policies are shaped primarily at the division level (課; ka); the divisions are headed by division Directors (課⾧; ka-chō). These divisions exist within larger bureaus (局; kyoku), which are headed by DGs (局⾧; kyoku-chō). In the Bureau of Defense Policy, this DG is seconded by two DDGs (次⾧; ji-chō) while in the Bureau of Local Cooperation (BLC), there is one. There are seven Councilors (審議官; shingikan) who belong to the Minister’s Secretariat and are designated to function as Deputies for specific items for all the Bureaus. As shown in table 2, the civilian component in the MOD is organized into five bureaus that exist within the IB. These civilian agencies exercise oversight over not just the SDF but the management of relations with the United States, including issues that arise from U.S. forces stationed in Japan. In the scope of this study, two (in bold type) of the IB’s bureaus play an important role in terms of the alliance: the Bureau of Defense Policy and the BLC. 

32 For example, when Japan and the U.S. negotiated the new Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division took the lead in the negotiation but the Treaties Division participated in these negotiations to ensure that the language of the Guidelines is consistent with the Treaty and other domestic law. Similarly, when Japan and the U.S. negotiated the Host Nation Support Agreement in 2015, it was the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division that took the lead in the negotiation and the Treaties Division closely advised and ensured legal consistency. 
Table 2. MOD Internal Bureau’s Bureaus and Divisions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal Bureau</th>
<th>Relevant Bureaus</th>
<th>Relevant Divisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minister’s Secretariat</td>
<td></td>
<td>Japan-U.S. Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bureau of Defense Policy</strong></td>
<td><strong>Bureau of Defense Policy</strong></td>
<td>Cooperation Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau of Defense Buildup Planning</td>
<td></td>
<td>Operational Policy Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau of Personnel and Education</td>
<td><strong>Bureau of Local Cooperation</strong></td>
<td>Strategic Planning Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bureau of Local Cooperation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>International Policy Division</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The IB is the most consequential MOD bureau for the alliance, given the concentration of responsibilities. Historically, the IB was established to closely control the SDF, with the head of the IB responsible for reviewing everything that went to the Director General of the Japan Defense Agency, the precursor to the current MOD. This function is still performed for the sake of conformity with legal restrictions, but it gives the IB a firm lock on all MOD actions. Within the IB’s five sections, the most important for the alliance is the Bureau of Defense Policy, which is responsible for developing a defense strategy that takes into account Japan’s broader national interest and national security policy goals. It is the direct domestic counterpart to MOFA’s Foreign Policy Bureau. As such, it sits atop the policy hierarchy in the MOD, as it is tasked with all issues of Japan’s defense. Within the Bureau of Defense Policy, four divisions hold portfolios responsible for different aspects of the U.S.-Japan alliance that are critical to its management.
Established as a full division in 2007, the Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Division is responsible for all aspects of Japan’s defense policy vis-à-vis the United States to include, but not limited to, roles and missions of defense cooperation, basic framework issues, and matters pertaining to U.S. forces realignment under the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) and the Special Action Committee on Okinawa. The division is the lead entity to handle basic framework issues, such as the defense guidelines. When changes occur in the SDF's mission domestically, they must be reflected in U.S.-Japan defense cooperation so that the allies are clear about what changes will occur in the execution of their responsibilities and duties. Phrased aptly by one defense official, “we need to be on the same sheet of music.” This is because any legislative change affects mission planning and training and exercises. Another responsibility, although one shared by the BLC, is negotiating a special measures agreement on Japan’s Host Nation Support (HNS) every five years. HNS is the U.S.-Japan agreement under which the Government of Japan (GOJ) pays large portions of yen-denominated expenses for U.S. stationing of personnel in Japan (e.g., Japan laborers on bases and utility costs). Because all the money that is earmarked and expended is part of the MOD budget, the MOD has a stake in how that money is spent and therefore works with the BLC in these efforts.

Domestically, the Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Division is the counterpart of MOFA’s Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division and the Status of U.S. Forces Division. Occasionally, it will even deal directly with MOFA’s National Security Policy Division in the Foreign Policy Bureau, although that usually only happens at a policy coordination level. Responsibilities shared with MOFA’s Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division are split along the military-diplomatic divide. The MOFA division deals with treaty-related issues that do not fall under the defense portfolio. An example would be interpretation of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty or the U.S.-Japan Environmental Agreement to supplement the SOFA. Mission planning or the specifics of the U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines, however, would fall under the MOD division’s authority simply because MOFA does not handle military-related issues (although, in principle, the counterparts keep each other informed of their discussions with the United States).

The Operational Policy Division is primarily in charge of the legal and policy aspects of SDF operations, both domestically and overseas. It interprets the laws passed by the Diet and then is responsible for the lower laws necessary for implementation. For example, after the passage

of the 2015 security legislation, new rules of engagement and weapons’ use standards for the SDF were required. These types of things are drafted by the SDF services, but this division has to check the drafts for legal correctness and provide input to the Defense Minister on whether flexibility exists within the legal mandate for political choice to be exercised.

Bureau of Defense Policy: Strategic Planning Division
戦略企画課 (Senryaku Kikaku-ka)

Like ATLA (below), the Strategic Planning Division was created on October 1, 2015. Prior to October 1, 2015, the Defense Policy Division handled both strategic planning matters and mid- to long-term policy planning. On October 1, however, the division was split into a new Defense Policy Division and the Strategic Planning Division. The responsibility of the new Defense Policy Division is primarily managing the various divisions within the Bureau, acting as the point of contact for the US-NSC, and developing policies like the MOD’s National Defense Program Guidelines and Medium-Term Defense Program. The responsibility of the Strategic Planning Division is to create mid- to long-term strategic planning on issues. This includes outer space policy, missile defense policy, and cyber policy. For example, in regards to missile defense, although the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) procures the Aegis ballistic missile defense system and the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile defense system, the division is responsible for developing the overall policy parameters within which these services use their systems. Of these three issues, the division is responsible for coordinating and taking a leading role on space policy and missile defense policy. When it comes to cyber policy, however, it plays simply a coordinating role with other members from MOD, MOFA, National Security Secretariat (NSS), and the National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity.

Bureau of Defense Policy: International Policy Division
国際政策課 (Kokusai Seisaku-ka)

Whereas the Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Division is responsible for Japan’s cooperation with the United States, the International Policy Division (IPD) is responsible for making bilateral defense exchanges and cooperation with countries other than the United States. With priorities based on the 2013 National Security Strategy and the National Defense Program Guidelines, the IPD is particularly targeting ties with partners such as Australia, South Korea, India, and ASEAN countries as well as trilateral cooperation with the United States and Australia. Because the security architecture in the region has moved away from the

35 The U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral is currently handled by the International Policy Division, but its official portfolio falls under the Strategic Planning Division.
traditional hub-and-spokes mechanism of the Cold War, this division is working to create linkages between the spokes by reaching out to countries like the Philippines and India with the hope to create other formal trilateral cooperative frameworks.

Bureau of Local Cooperation

If there are base issues with a local community, MOFA does not deal with the local communities directly, though it would be involved in SOFA-related issues with the United States via its Status of U.S. Forces Division. Instead, the BLC has the responsibility of directly reaching out to Japanese communities that have base-related issues, be they U.S. forces or Self-Defense Forces. Composed of ten divisions that are each responsible for different aspects of the relationship with U.S. Forces in Japan, the Bureau has as its key responsibility providing the facilities and areas for U.S. forces as called for under Article XI of the security treaty. Tangential to this, it plays a vital role in maintaining smooth communication with the United States on daily management issues as well as the occasional problems that may arise. Toward this end, the Bureau serves as a conduit to transmit local communities’ concerns that arise from the U.S. presence. There is overlap with MOFA’s Status of U.S. Forces Agreement Division in that they both are responsible for SOFA-related issues, but their responsibilities are distinct. MOFA’s Division, for example, is authorized to handle negotiation, conclusion, and interpretation of SOFA. The divisions within the BLC, however, cover SOFA implementation, including things like management and return of facilities and areas. Specifically, the BLC’s divisions, and their responsibilities, are:

- Local Cooperation Planning Division (地方協力企画課): Responsible for supervising all divisions in the Bureau and chairing U.S.-Japan meetings, when necessary.

- Local Coordination Division (地方調整課): Responsible for coordinating relations between U.S. forces and local communities other than Okinawa.

- Okinawa Coordination Division (沖縄調整官): Responsible for coordinating relations between U.S. forces and local communities in Okinawa. This includes issues related to defense facilities and infrastructure, construction, land return, noise, accidents, incidents, and pollution.

---

36 The hub-and-spokes mechanism refers to the network of formal bilateral alliances the U.S. maintained throughout the Cold War with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Under this system, the U.S. was the dominant “hub” maintaining strong ties with each of the three “spokes,” but the three “spokes” had no significant connections among themselves.


38 Anonymous HH, Interview with author, July 29, 2016.
• Living Environment Improvement Division (周辺環境整備課): Responsible for subsidies to local base-hosting communities from the GOJ.

• Soundproof Measures Division (防音対策課): Responsible for noise mitigation measures around U.S. bases.

• Compensation Division (補償課): Responsible for compensation for accidents and incidents stemming from actions by U.S. personnel.

• Facilities Administration Division (施設管理課): Responsible for administration of U.S. forces’ facilities.

• Facilities Improvement Program Division (提供施設課): Responsible for implementation of the Facilities Improvement Program budget.

• Labor Management Division (労務管理課): Responsible for addressing issues related to Japanese laborers working at U.S. facilities.

• Procurement Division (調達官): Responsible for procurement of goods and services for U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ).

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Agency 防衛装備庁 (Bōei Sōbi-Chō)

Until October 2015, defense equipment and technology cooperation between the United States and Japan was an ad hoc venture that generally required executive exceptions to authorize. In 2015, however, the ATLA was established in the MOD as an external bureau. This means that it is not one of the five units in the IB.

Although four of its five core missions are strictly domestic in nature, a fifth one is strengthening defense equipment and technology cooperation with other countries, including the United States.39 Under ATLA’s Commissioner, there are a Deputy Commissioner/Chief Defense Scientist who is responsible for technology affairs; four DGs for joint weapons, ground, naval, and air systems development; and an Assistant Commissioner who assists the Commissioner in general. Under them are a Secretariat, five departments, and research centers and test centers.40 The five departments are: Procurement Operations, Project Management, Equipment Policy, Technology Strategy, and Procurement Management. 41 While the

39 The other four are enhance technological capacity; enable more efficient acquisition of defense equipment; maintain and strengthen defense production; and reduce costs and strengthen inspection and audit functions. It is noted, however, that there are international aspects inherent in some of ATLA’s work. For example, the Buildup Planning Bureau’s mission was responsible for negotiations related to the choice and purchase of F-35s. Anonymous GG, Interview with author, July 29, 2016.


majority of the 1,800 personnel are dedicated to purely domestic issues, such as procurement policies or R&D programs, the Department of Equipment Policy is responsible for international defense equipment and technology cooperation. It is at this interface that ATLA is pertinent to the alliance, given that this department deals with issues like joint R&D and cooperation with partners.

Japan's National Security Council
国家安全保障会議 (Kokka Anzen Hoshō Kaigī)

Japan’s National Security Council (J-NSC) was created on December 4, 2013, with the expectation that it would become the "control tower" of national security policies to enable the Prime Minister to take a more comprehensive approach to security issues and improve crisis management. Prior to its establishment, security-related issues were primarily led by MOFA’s Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division and the MOD’s Defense Policy Division. Many times MOFA and MOD did not work as a team. In fact, inter-ministerial rivalries had the tendency to retard important national security decisions because the Prime Minister often lacked information from all the relevant ministries. The lack of coordination between the two agencies often frustrated the United States.

Frustrations and problems stemming from this lack of coordination were one of the motivations leading to the J-NSC’s establishment. The J-NSC is a consultation forum for relevant ministers to provide coordinated strategic advice to the Prime Minister. The core grouping of the J-NSC, called the Four Ministers’ Meeting, is the Prime Minister, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of Defense. Meeting approximately once every two weeks, this meeting discusses pressing security concerns. It can, however, be expanded to include more individuals, called the Nine Ministers' Meeting: the Deputy Prime Minister; the Minister of Finance; the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry; the Minister of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications; the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transportation; and the Chairman of the National Public Safety Commission.

National Security Secretariat
国家安全保障局 (Kokka Anzen Hoshō Kyoku)

Ensuring smooth operations of the J-NSC is the NSS, which was established on January 7, 2014. Legally speaking, the NSS’s portfolio does not overlap with what other ministries do.

---

43 Anonymous Y, Interview with author, July 26, 2016.
despite the apparent overlap in substance. This is because the NSS is meant to be an advisory and coordinating office, not a lead agency.\textsuperscript{44} The NSS has the authority to prepare meetings with the premier and ministers, an authority no other agency has.\textsuperscript{45} Additionally, the NSS is consulted about security issues by MOFA and MOD, which are the lead agencies in their relevant issues. If the Prime Minister deems a specific issue to be particularly important, however, the NSS intervenes to coordinate, guaranteeing the highest level of attention.

The NSS is staffed by about seventy individuals seconded from MOFA and MOD and is structured in a hierarchical pyramid.\textsuperscript{46} On the very bottom rest six divisions: Administrative, three Policy Divisions, Strategic Planning, and Intelligence. Each of these divisions is headed by a director called a Cabinet Counsellor (内閣参事官; naikaku sanjikan). Sitting atop of these six Cabinet Counsellors are four Director General-level individuals called Councillors (審議官; shingikan): two from MOFA, one from MOD, and one from the SDF. One MOFA Councillor is responsible for the Administrative Division and Second Policy Division. The MOD Councillor is responsible for the First Policy Division and the Strategic Planning Division. Finally, the SDF Councillor is responsible for the Third Policy Division and the Intelligence Division. The second MOFA Councillor, established recently on a temporary basis, is responsible for Russian affairs to address the recent developments in Japan-Russia ties. On top of these individuals sit two Deputy Secretaries General (次⾧; jichō), representing both MOFA and the MOD. Finally, sitting on top of the entire structure is the Secretary General (局⾧; kyoku-chō).

Japanese Embassy in Washington, D.C. 
在 ア メ リ カ 合 衆 国 日 本 国 大 使 館 (Zai Amerika Gashū Koku Nihon Koku Taishikan)

The Japanese Embassy in Washington, D.C., is divided into ten major sections devoted to policy. Only two of these are responsible for national security issues with the United States: Political Section and Defense Section.\textsuperscript{47} While the Ambassador and the head of the Political Section, called Political Minister, do play roles in alliance handling, the bulk of this responsibility falls onto two diplomats in the Political Section and one uniformed SDF officer in the Defense Section.\textsuperscript{48}

\textsuperscript{44} Anonymous X, Interview with author, July 26, 2016.
\textsuperscript{45} Anonymous Y, Interview with author, July 26, 2016.
\textsuperscript{46} Japan National Security Secretariat Staff, Documents given to author, July 26, 2016.
\textsuperscript{47} The other eight sections are: Ambassador’s Office; Management and Coordination; Economic; Congress; Science; Finance; Public Affairs; and Visa Section.
\textsuperscript{48} While it is true that other diplomatic sections in the Embassy play a role in the alliance, they do so indirectly. For example, the desk covering China works with the U.S. directly if the U.S. is interested in a China-related issue, but
The two diplomats in the Political Section are currently called Political Counselors (参事官, sanjikan), but in the past they have also been called 1st Secretaries.49 Regardless of title, one of these Political Counselors is drawn from MOFA, the other from MOD. They do not have the authority to make policy decisions. Instead, they focus on coordinating information and facilitating communication to minimize room for any misunderstandings privately so that the governments deliver similar messages publicly. Their duties can be explained by three broadly defined responsibilities: (1) communicate instructions/messages from Tokyo to their American counterparts in DOS and DOD; (2) provide Tokyo with a nuanced understanding of actions/policies by, or thinking in, the U.S. government, to include who is advocating what; and (3) coordinate delegations from Tokyo visiting the United States.50 Essentially, these two positions work to ensure smooth communication and information sharing by “always trying to fill the gaps between our countries…and reduce misunderstandings.”51

While the two Political Counselors are involved in discussions at a policy-related level, the Japanese DATT primarily focuses on strictly military aspects of the relationship with the United States. The DATT position is a dual-hatted one, serving as the DATT as well as the SDF service attaché to which he/she belongs. The DATT is supported by two other service attachés to ensure that all three SDF services are represented at the Embassy. The primary role for the DATT is to gather information on military and national security issues that pertain to Japan and the U.S.-Japan alliance and report this information back to MOFA. Different from DATTs at embassies from other countries who retain their affiliation with their national defense agency via their military service, the Japanese DATT resigns as a member of the MOD (which has strict civilian control over the SDF) to be seconded to the United States as a MOFA diplomat under the control of MOFA and Japan’s Ambassador to the United States. Although the DATT is able to use his/her SDF rank and continue to wear his/her uniform, the position itself is the same as that of the two Political Counselors.

---

49 Anonymous TT, Interview with author, November 21, 2016.
50 Anonymous SS, Interview with author, November 21, 2016; Anonymous TT, Interview with author, November 21, 2016.
Japan: Self-Defense Forces
自衛隊 (Jieitai)

Japan’s SDF, established in 1954, is the uniformed armed forces of Japan. While Japan’s Supreme Court found the SDF to be constitutional and Japanese governments have consistently upheld the policy that Japan can maintain a minimum amount necessary for an exclusively defensive purpose, the Japanese government does not legally call the SDF a “military.” During the Cold War, its primary mission was the defense of Japan. Today, even though its operations have expanded both regionally and globally, its primary mission remains the same. The SDF consist of three services: the Maritime Self-Defense Force, Air Self-Defense Force, and Ground Self-Defense Force. Each of these services is led by a Chief of Staff who, as a force provider, oversees force development and management of each particular service. Each of these individuals, in turn, serves as the highest-ranking military advisor to the defense minister from that particular service. Since March 27, 2006, the highest ranking military advisor in the entire SDF is the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Office (below).

While the SDF services are strong cooperative partners with the United States with varying avenues of communication that will be described below, traditionally, the SDF provided minimal input to the bilateral decision-making processes at the policy level. Instead, it was viewed as an organization to carry out military operations without participating in their formulation. That has changed over the past two decades. The SDF, while still strictly adhering to civilian control, provides input to many policy-level, bilateral decision-making processes, including having about a dozen SDF officers work in Japan’s NSS (with the highest-ranking officer being a two-star). As part of Japan’s strict civilian control over the SDF, however, the civilian institutions described above in the MOD’s IB supervise and control the uniform institutions by establishing policies, creating the budget, and controlling the personnel. 53 Sitting atop this civilian bureaucracy is the Defense Minister, who is supported by the IB and SDF Staff Offices.

---

52 For an excellent English overview of the three services, see Tatsumi, Japan’s National Security Policy Infrastructure.
53 Tatsumi, Japan’s National Security Policy Infrastructure, 34.
Joint Staff Office 統合幕僚監部 (Tōgō Bakuryō Kanbu)

The Joint Staff Office (JSO) is the staff organization for the Minister of Defense concerning the operation of the SDF. The highest-ranking uniformed officer is the Chief of Staff-Joint Staff Office (COS-JSO). According to Japan’s MOD, there are two primary roles for the COS-JSO: (1) develop a joint operations concept for SDF operations and centrally support the MOD on SDF operations from a military expert’s perspective and (2) the Defense Minister’s commands concerning the operations of the SDF shall be delivered through the COS-JSO and orders concerning operations of the SDF shall be executed by the COS-JSO. Additionally, like the U.S. Chairman, JCS, the COS-JSO is vested with advisory responsibilities to the Minister of Defense.

Reporting directly to the COS-JSO are the Chiefs of Staff of the three SDF services who, as force providers, lead their own service hierarchies. For operations, command travels directly from the Minister of Defense to the COS-JSO down to the major commands of the three SDF services, which execute the operational order from the Minister. The COS-JSO delegates operational authority to an SDF commander with operational control (OPCON) over his/her personnel and assets. Specifically, this means one of the Ground Self-Defense Force’s (GSDF) five regional army commanders, the Commander in Chief Self-Defense Fleet (CinCSDFLT), or one of the commanders of the ASDF’s Air Defense Command or Air Support Command. If a Joint Task Force (JTF) is needed to respond to an event, generally speaking the COS-JSO assigns one of these eight individuals to be the JTF Commander. Different from a U.S. JTF where mobility and words like “expeditionary” bear heavily in an assignment, being mobile or expeditionary does not have the same priority in a Japan JTF.

Maritime Self-Defense Force 海上自衛隊 (Kaijō Jieitai)

The MSDF is the smallest of the SDF services in terms of manpower, with 42,052 personnel. In terms of equipment, the MSDF has 137 surface and sub-surface ships, of which forty-seven are destroyers. It also has 180 aircraft, of which seventy-seven are P-1 or P-3C patrol

---

54 Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2016, 278.
55 Ibid., 279-80.
56 In non-contingency operations, such as a regional HA/DR operation, other commanders— for example, the two-star Force Escort Flotilla commander— could be assigned as JTF Commander.
58 Data on ships in service found in Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2016, 405. The other ships include seventeen submarines, twenty-seven mine warfare ships, six patrol combatant craft, eleven amphibious ships, and twenty-nine auxiliary ships.
planes. The MSDF is organized into one Self-Defense Fleet, five regional districts (Yokosuka, Kure, Maizuru, Sasebo, and Ōminato) that command six Minesweeper Divisions, an air training command, a training squadron, and a few other commands and training schools. Of particular importance is the Fleet, commanded by a three-star admiral, called the CinCSDFLT, who has OPCON over the MSDF. The Self-Defense Fleet is composed of Fleet Escort Force (four escort flotillas that include thirteen escort divisions), the Fleet Air Force (seven Air Wings that include four Air Patrol Squadrons and five Air Anti-Submarine Warfare Helicopter Squadrons), the Fleet Submarine Force (two submarine flotillas that include five submarine divisions), a Mine Warfare Force, and a few other commands.

Air Self-Defense Force
航空自衛隊 (Kōkū Jieitai)

The ASDF Chief of Staff oversees a modern air force with 43,027 personnel and 419 aircraft, of which 347 are fighters. The ASDF is managed through five functional commands: Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, Air Training Command, Air Development and Test Command, and Air Material Command. As the largest of these commands, the Air Defense Command is responsible for all tactical air operations, including Japan’s ballistic missile defense operations. Headed by a three-star general with OPCON in wartime, it commands four sector air forces (Northern, Central, and Western Air Defense Commands, and Southwestern Composite Air Division), an Airborne Warning and Control Wing, a Tactical Reconnaissance Group, and an Air Rescue Wing. It also commands six surface-to-air defense missile groups. Alongside the Air Defense Command, the Air Support Command also plays a vital role as it is responsible for coordinating any joint mission for the three SDF services and providing support for combat missions carried out by the Air Defense Command. Headed by a three-star general also with OPCON during peacetime, it commands three tactical airlift wings, an Air Traffic Control Service Group, Air Weather Service Group, a Flight Check Squadron, and a Special Airlift Group.

---

60 Uniformed ASDF Personnel found in Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2016, 408. Fixed-wing aircraft data found in Ibid, 405. The other fixed-wing aircraft include thirteen reconnaissance, thirty-six transport, six aerial refueling, and seventeen early warning/early warning and control.
Ground Self-Defense Force
陸上自衛隊 (Rikujō Jieitai)

The GSDF Chief of Staff oversees a modern ground force. It is the largest of Japan’s three services with 138,610 personnel.61 Unlike the MSDF and ASDF, the GSDF is divided into five regional armies (Western, Middle, Eastern, Northeastern, and Northern) and other specialized forces under command of the Central Readiness Force.62 The three-star generals in command have OPCON over their specific personnel and assets. A planned reform will see the creation of a Ground Central Command (GCC; 陸上総体: rikujō sōtai) by April 2018 with one commander to command the five regional armies, possibly resulting in a structure similar to the MSDF.63 Although the planned end state for this individual may result in having OPCON, the GSDF and Ground Staff Office are still defining the relationship between the GCC and the regional armies in peacetime situations. In addition to minor units and engineer brigades, nationally the GSDF has nine divisions and nine brigades spread throughout the five regional armies.64 Each regional army also has its own air wing and combined brigade.65

---

61 Ibid, 408.
62 The five districts of the MSDF differ from the five regional armies of the GSDF in that the latter have their own forces and assets. This differs from the MSDF, where all ships belong to the Self-Defense Fleet and airpower to the Fleet Air Force.
64 Divisions: 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th.
Brigades: 5th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, the Central Readiness Force’s 1st Airborne, 1st Helicopter, and Fuji Combined Arms School’s Combined Brigade
United States: Armed Forces

Before providing a description of the major U.S. operational structures involved in the U.S.-Japan alliance, it is necessary to briefly explain operational staff structure. U.S. military planners base their staff design on the nineteenth-century Napoleonic system. What this means is that staff directorates for different services generally follow a relatively similar structure, although the letter-prefix assigned to a staff position changes according to the formation’s element (Army=G; Air Force=A; Navy=N; and Marine Corps=G; Joint=J). Some services/commands have slight variations that are a function of that directorate’s specific role. For example, while the U.S. Army headquarters combines the G3/5/7 into Operations, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) shifted the J7 (Training and Exercises) into its J3 (Operations) while keeping the J5 separate (Strategic Planning and Policy). Table 3 provides a general understanding of the division of responsibilities among directorates, although it is not true of all commands.

This Napoleonic staff structure carries through all the headquarters for the four services in the JCS, PACOM, PACOM’s four component commands, USFJ, and each in-Japan service component. Understanding that this includes a large number of directorate staff offices responsible for various aspects of the alliance, most communications take place between the codes in these U.S. directorates. There is no general rule on how much communication occurs, however. Sometimes on very specific issues, there is limited interaction between directorates. 66 For other areas, frequent communication occurs. That said, most communication regarding Japan between staffs is carried out between the J5 directorates, which have a Japan desk in its Northeast Asia Policy Division. Importantly, this same staff structure is utilized in Japan. Yet, because the SDF is smaller than the U.S. military and has a sole focus on Japan’s defense, the staff directorates are fewer in number, limited to each of the three SDF services and the JSO reviewed above.

Joint Chiefs of Staff

The JCS consist of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the AF, the Commandant of the Marine

Corps, and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau. The Chairman is the principal military adviser to the President, Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council, although by law all JCS members are military advisers, and they may respond to a request or voluntarily submit, through the Chairman, advice or opinions to the President, the Secretary of Defense, or the US-NSC. The JCS has no executive authority to command combatant forces, nor does the Chairman have operational command of any forces. The Chiefs of Military Services act as force providers, responsible for organizing, training, and equipping. They do not command. These individuals assign forces under their jurisdiction to unified and specified COCOMS to perform missions assigned to those commands.

Table 3. Military Staff Structure Utilized by the United States and Japan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Military Staff Structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Manpower/Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Plans and Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Training/Exercising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Resource Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

U.S. Pacific Command and its Component Commands

U.S. Pacific Command

PACOM, headquartered in Hawaii, is one of six geographic Unified Combatant Commands which, in turn, is supported by four component commands—U.S. Pacific Fleet (PACFLT), U.S. Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), and U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific (MARFORPAC)—and two sub-unified commands, one of which is U.S. Forces Japan. In the past, Special Operations Command Pacific (SOPAC) was a third sub-unified command, but this moved to Special Operations Command (SOCOM) with OPCON still maintained by PACOM. PACOM’s area of responsibility (AOR) encompasses about half the earth’s surface, stretching from the Pacific Ocean west of the west

---

67 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, About the Joint Chiefs of Staff, http://www.jcs.mil/About.
68 Ibid.
69 The other one is U.S. Forces, Korea.
coast of the United States to the western border of India and from Antarctica to the North Pole. PACOM is a joint command, commanded by a four-star flag officer who is the senior U.S. military authority in the PACOM AOR who exercises command of assigned forces as the Joint Force Commander. The chain of command is clear: from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the PACOM Commander (or any combatant commander).

Each of the component commands is also commanded by a four-star, with the exception of the MARFORPAC commander (three-star). Also with the exception of the MARFORPAC commander, the other three component commanders are dual-hatted as Theater Joint Force Component Commanders (TJFCC) who have OPCON over their respective units: TJFMCC (PACFLT), TJFACC (PACAF), and TJFLCC (USARPAC) [In these acronyms, M is for maritime, A is for air, and L is for land]. Their AORs are identical to that of PACOM’s AOR. The main function of the components is to fulfill their Title X responsibilities to organize, train, and equip (OTE). The component commanders fulfill these functions reporting to their Service Chiefs but responding to the operation requirements of the COCOM. These Title X responsibilities, in turn, drive requirements that have significant impact on the U.S.-Japan alliance in areas such as basing, training ranges, personnel training, and bringing in new equipment like the MV-22.

U.S. Pacific Fleet

Commanded by a four-star admiral, PACFLT is the largest fleet command in the Navy, consisting of approximately 200 ships/submarines, nearly 1,100 aircraft, and more than 130,000 sailors and civilians. PACFLT reports to the Chief of Naval Operations to fulfill their service component OTE requirements and to PACOM for all operational matters under COCOM purview. Commands that are OPCON to PACFLT include “type” commands for surface ships, submarines and aircraft, regional commands that include Commander, Naval Forces Japan, and two operational commands, the Seventh Fleet in Japan and the Third Fleet in San Diego. PACFLT is also prepared to be assigned as a four-star JTF.

U.S. Pacific Air Forces

Commanded by a four-star general, PACAF is one of nine AF major commands. It consists of approximately 320 fighter and attack aircraft with approximately 100 additional deployed

---

73 In addition to Commander, Naval Forces, Japan, other regional commands include: Commander, Naval Forces, Korea; Commander, Joint Region, Marianas; Commander, Logistic Group Western Pacific; and Commander, Navy Region Hawaii.
aircraft rotating on Guam and approximately 46,000 military and civilian personnel serving in nine strategic locations and numerous smaller facilities. PACAF reports to the Chief of Staff of the AF to fulfill their service component OTE requirements and to PACOM for all operational matters under COCOM purview. Commands that are OPCON to PACAF include three Numbered Air Forces, including the 5th AF in Japan, and nine bases in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, including Kadena, Misawa, and Yokota air bases in Japan.

U.S. Army Pacific

Commanded by a four-star general, USARPAC commands Army forces in the Asia-Pacific region and includes approximately 80,000 soldiers. USARPAC is the assigned Army Service Component Command to PACOM which, in turn, provides OPCON for U.S. Army personnel throughout the PACOM AOR. The one exception to this rule is the Korean Peninsula, where OPCON is vested in the U.S. Forces, Korea (USFK) Commander. USARPAC reports to the Chief of Staff of the Army to fulfill their service component OTE requirements and to PACOM for all operational matters under COCOM purview. Subordinated units that fall directly under USARPAC include U.S. Army Japan as the directed Army Forces (ARFOR) to USFJ.

U.S. Marine Forces Pacific

Commanded by a three-star general, MARFORPAC is the largest field command in the Marine Corps and commands all U.S. Marine Corps forces assigned to PACOM. Combining forward deployed forces both ashore and afloat and forces stationed in the United States, the Commander is responsible for approximately 86,000 Marines and sailors. It is composed of two MEF units, including the III MEF in Okinawa (I MEF is in California) as well as Marine Corps Activity Guam and Marine Rotational Force-Darwin. MARFORPAC reports to the Commandant of the Marine Corps to fulfill service component OTE requirements and to PACOM for all operational matters under COCOM purview. MARFORPAC is also prepared to be assigned as a three-star JTF.

---

75 The other Numbered Air Forces include the 7th Air Force in South Korea and the 11th Air Force in Alaska. The other bases include the 15th Wing in Hawaii, Andersen Air Force Base in Guam, Eielson Air Force Base and Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Alaska, and Kunsan Air Base and Osan Air Base in South Korea.
77 Other subordinated units include the Eighth Army in South Korea, U.S. Army Alaska, and nine other units all located in Hawaii.
U.S. Forces, Japan and in-Japan Service Components

U.S. Forces, Japan

Located at Yokota Air Base, USFJ is a sub-unified command under PACOM with the primary duty to coordinate peacetime relationships among the U.S. forces stationed in Japan and the GOJ. Originally established on July 1, 1957, USFJ consists of approximately 54,000 military personnel, 42,000 dependents, and 8,000 DOD civilian employees with its U.S. Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and AF elements (broken down into approximations by service component below). The size of the USFJ staff, however, is approximately 180 personnel (military, civilians, Japanese nationals). Mirroring PACOM, USFJ has in-Japan service components—5th AF, U.S. Army-Japan, Commander, Naval Forces Japan, and Marine Forces Japan—nominally the Commander, III MEF. Other commands include U.S. Naval Forces Japan at the U.S. naval base at Yokosuka in Kanagawa prefecture; Marine Corps Installations-Pacific at Camp Foster in Okinawa prefecture; and U.S. Army Garrison Japan at Camp Zama in Kanagawa prefecture. These organizations are not covered in this research because their primary responsibilities are maintaining and operating bases and facilities. As such, they are mainly base/facilities managers. The AF analogue, Air Force Installation Management & Support Center, is located in San Antonio, Texas, and is responsible for providing centralized management of facilities and bases across the U.S. AF. As PACOM’s representative, USFJ is responsible for administering the Status of Forces Agreement, improving combat readiness, enhancing the quality of life of military and DOD civilian personnel and their dependents as well as war planning, and conducting joint/bilateral exercises and studies.

USFJ is commanded by a three-star AF officer who is dual-hatted as both Commander, USFJ, and Commander, 5th AF. In his capacity as joint force Commander, he has limited authority. His responsibility is largely confined to coordinating force posture initiatives and activities to ensure access among the service components in support of regional contingencies, conducting joint unilateral and bilateral operations and exercise, developing plans for the defense of Japan and representing the PACOM Commander in communications among U.S. forces, the U.S. Ambassador, and Japanese government agencies. This leads him to often act as a negotiator between disagreements that arise between PACOM and Japan’s JSO. While he does not have OPCON for U.S. forces in Japan, he must be prepared to assume OPCON of assigned and attached U.S. forces for the execution of war plans. Even in his capacity as the 5th AF Commander, he lacks OPCON of his own forces. Instead, that authority is vested in PACAF. While administering unilateral and bilateral defense issues, the

82 Anonymous WW, Interview with author, December 13, 2016.
Commander, USFJ is very much a communication and coordination window for all daily discussions with the Japan’s JSO and GOJ regarding U.S. forces in Japan. This is the USFJ Commander’s “full-time job.”

U.S. Seventh Fleet

The U.S. Seventh Fleet is the largest forward-deployed U.S. fleet. At any given time there are roughly fifty to seventy ships and submarines, 140 aircraft, and approximately 20,000 Sailors in the Seventh Fleet. Commanded by a three-star admiral, the Commander, Seventh Fleet (C7F) reports directly to PACFLT in an operational chain of command. The Fleet is organized into ten specialized Task Forces. As such, C7F has a role not confined to Japan.

U.S. Army, Japan / I Corps Forward

The Army’s presence of about 2,500 soldiers makes it the smallest of all U.S. service components in Japan. Commanded by a two-star general, U.S. Army, Japan (USARJ), is responsible for ARFOR related tasks in support of all Army assigned units, attached units, and augmentation forces in Japan. Additionally, USARJ maintains Senior Mission Command authority over all subordinate and tenant units in Japan. In March 2016, the headquarters at Camp Zama was split between USARJ and I Corps Forward (F), with the USARJ Commander dual-hatted as the I Corps (F) Commander as well. I Corps (F) is responsible for low operational and tactical engagement with the GSDF regional armies, while USARJ is responsible for high operational and strategic-level engagement with the GSDF Staff Office (e.g., bilateral training exercises and planning), serving as USARPACs proxy. Focusing on the operational/tactical level, I Corps (F) can concentrate on cooperation with regional armies in areas such as training and exercises. Toward this end, I Corps (F) will become part of a bilateral coordination element in April 2018 at Camp Zama.

---

83 Ibid.
85 These Task Forces include: CTF-70, CTF-71, CTF-73, CTF-74, CTF-75, CTF-76, CTF-78, CTF-79, CTF-7J, and CTF-77.
87 In 2005, both governments agreed to move I Corps to Japan. This was official U.S. policy. The Army reversed this decision in 2011. In reality, the U.S. Army cannot afford to have an entire Corps sitting in Japan.
88 Anonymous EE, Interview with author, July 28, 2016.
III Marine Expeditionary Force

With approximately 21,000 personnel forward-based in Japan, the Marine Corps is the largest service element in Japan. Under the operational command of MARFORPAC, the III MEF is headquartered at Camp Courtney in Okinawa. Commanded by a three-star general, who is dual-hatted as the U.S. Area Coordinator in Okinawa, III MEF reports directly to MARFORPAC in an operational chain of command. With a fully scalable Marine Air-Ground Task Force, the III MEF is capable of generating, deploying, and employing forces for crisis response, forward presence, major combat operations, and campaigns. Major subordinate commands of the III MEF include the 3rd Marine Division, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, 3rd Marine Logistics Group, the III MEF Headquarters Group, the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade, and the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit. Tactical units are divided between Okinawa, Iwakuni, Hawaii, and eventually Guam.

5th Air Force

Like USFJ, the 5th AF is headquartered at Yokota Air Base with 15,000 airmen and AF civilians assigned to it and its three main bases: Yokota, Misawa, and Kadena. It consists of approximately 130 aircraft, ninety of which are fighter aircraft. As noted above, the Commander of the 5th AF is also dual-hatted as Commander, USFJ. Unlike other Numbered Air Forces, and similar to other in-Japan service components, the 5th AF Commander does not have OPCON. Instead, that authority is held by PACAF. The designated 5th AF role under typical circumstances is to assume "specified" administrative control over units based in Japan. Depending on the type of crisis, it is possible that the 5th AF could be delegated OPCON of U.S. air assets in Japan.

---

89 III MEF HQ staff, E-mail message to author, February 6, 2017.
92 5th Air Force staff, E-mail message to author, December 9, 2016.
93 The 5th Air Force is responsible for the routine maintenance and training and administration of the equipment and personnel, but PACAF writes the Air Tasking Order that assigns missions to the aircraft, both for training and for crisis or conflict.
94 Anonymous F, Interview with author, June 29, 2016.
Understanding these discrete actors helps provide situational awareness of the universe of relevant stakeholders in the alliance as well as what responsibilities are housed in which offices. In turn, this helps set up an examination of how these stakeholders interact. It is to these structural interactions that we now turn.

**Policy**

At the very top of the agencies responsible for policy sits those agencies’ leadership, both political appointees and career bureaucrats. Table 4 shows these alliance counterparts in the diplomatic realm and table 5 shows these alliance counterparts in the defense realm. Because of the small number of offices responsible for the alliance in the United States, it is possible to identify specific, Japan-relevant leadership positions. In Japan, there is a much larger universe, as will be explained below. Generally speaking, however, a hierarchy of positions does exist within each organization.

**Table 4. Diplomatic Counterparts.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secretary of State</td>
<td>Minister for Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Secretary of State</td>
<td>Administrative Vice Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>*State Minister for Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>*Parliamentary Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under Secretary for Political Affairs</td>
<td>Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs</td>
<td>Director General of a bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Japanese and Korean Affairs</td>
<td>Deputy Director General of a bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Structurally equivalent positions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Beyond these senior positions, things become more complicated. This is because structural interaction among policymakers is asymmetric, with a large number of Japanese offices responsible for the alliance compared with two primary offices in Washington. These two main conduits of communication in the United States are the DOS's Office of Japanese Affairs and OSD's Japan Team. Their primary counterparts are MOFA’s Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division and MOD’s Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Division. Unlike its MOD counterpart, however, which focuses essentially on issues related to bilateral defense cooperation, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division looks more at managing the alliance in broader terms at the policy level. It also has a heavy influence on interpreting agreements with the United States, even those with military implications. Although simplistic, it is best to think of the MOD division handling specifics of military-related issues while the MOFA division focuses on security issues at a broader policy level. This tendency to stay at the broad, policy level leads to this division having a bigger voice in policy discussions with the premier.\footnote{Anonymous DD, Interview with author, July 27, 2016.}

While the DOS Director of the Office of Japanese Affairs and the OSD Director for Japan talk directly with their MOFA/MOD counterparts via video teleconference (VTC) or in-person, it is not daily. Instead, their staffs conduct daily communication. Importantly, the DOS-MOFA and DOD-MOD relationships are not strict linear relationships. The four heads of these offices, as well as their staffs, communicate regularly with one another in some manner, albeit ad hoc.

It is not the only link, however, for these four offices. The DOS’s Director for the Office of Japanese Affairs and OSD’s Director for Japan also communicate regularly with the two Political Counselors at the Japanese Embassy in Washington.\footnote{Contact with other offices in the U.S. government does exist, but it is not as regular or defined. For example, the MOD diplomat communicate occasionally with the Defense Technology Security Administration and the Guam Office in the DOD.} The MOFA diplomat’s...
primary counterpart is the DOS Japan Desk Director and the MOD diplomat’s primary counterpart is the OSD Director for Japan. These interactions occur daily, even multiple times a day via all forms of communication as well as physical meetings. They focus on sharing thinking in their respective governments on relevant issues “to get an insider’s sense” of what is occurring in the interagency process. This includes informally sharing unnegotiable stances of their home governments as a means of laying the groundwork for expectations. Cross-interaction also occurs (e.g., MOFA-DOD and MOD-DOS), mainly on large issues and on an ad hoc basis. In keeping with full transparency, these four individuals make an effort to keep each other in the loop on all communications.

These two Political Counselors, in turn, sit at a unique intersection in alliance management. Not only do they have counterparts in the United States, but they also have counterparts in their respective ministries. Communication between the Political Counselors and MOFA’s Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division staff and the MOD’s Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Division occurs daily. That said, the channel of communication is much stricter, with the MOFA division communicating with its MOFA representative and the MOD division communicating with its MOD representative, although communication between this MOD representative and MOFA is not uncommon.

Similarly, DOS’s Office of Japanese Affairs and OSD’s Japan Team also maintain regular communications with the Political-Military Affairs Unit in the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo. It is a unique arrangement because usually the DATT is utilized as a conduit for Washington to reach out to a country. In Japan, the DATT is not utilized as a conduit because of the presence of USFJ and three other flag officer/general officer (FOGO) level commands. The DATT structure works in countries without a robust U.S. military presence because the DATT is the Senior Defense Official for the United States in that country. In Japan (as in Korea), the existence of multiple senior military commanders keeps the DATT’s role minimized. The arrangement in Japan means the Directors in MOFA’s Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division and Status of U.S. Forces Agreement Division and MOD’s Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Division also communicate directly with the Chief of the Political-Military Affairs Unit. In addition to ad hoc meetings that are required to handle daily issues, these offices hold regular conversations to go over broad alliance issues. An example includes the Alliance Transformation Oversight Panel (ATOP), where the Directors of MOFA’s Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division and MOD’s Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Division act as ATOP Directors on the Japan side and, joined by the U.S. Embassy’s Chief of the Political Military Unit and the USFJ J5, as ATOP Directors on the U.S. side. These conversations are largely informative and issues are raised that need to be addressed. In turn, when the Political-Military Affairs Unit needs to transmit security-related information to

97 Anonymous TT, Interview with author, November 21, 2016.
100 MOFA’s Status of U.S. Forces Division Director attends but is not one of the four.
Jeffrey W. Hornung

Washington, the primary conduit through which this occurs is with the DOS’s Director for the Office of Japanese Affairs and OSD’s Director for Japan.

This is not the only conduit for information between Japan and the United States for military and security affairs. USFJ, PACOM, and OSD also communicate on a regular basis. While keeping PACOM in the loop sometimes proves to be challenging, regular correspondence occurs between the Assistant Secretary of Defense and the USFJ Commander; the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) and the Deputy Commander at USFJ; and the J5 and Senior Country Director. When SOFA-related matters arise that involve broader strategic considerations, all these actors work together. In these cases, it is not uncommon for the Political-Military Unit in the Embassy to work closely with USFJ, the in-country component commands (e.g. III MEF and the 5th AF), PACOM, and OSD to together engage the GOJ.

The network of alliance management extends from this nexus of core offices. For example, the First North America Division’s primary U.S. counterpart is the DOS’s Office of Japanese Affairs. Like the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division Director, the U.S. counterpart for the Director of this division is the DOS Director for the Office of Japanese Affairs. These two individuals do not speak regularly, however. Rather, most communication is done on an ad hoc basis. Occasionally, if an issue involves a broader foreign policy component linked to the United States, such as a multinational endeavor or trilateral framework, the Division Director will increase the level of his communications by reaching out directly to the Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

A similar dynamic exists with the MOD’s IPD. Although this division is tasked with Japan’s defense exchanges and cooperation with countries other than the United States, when working on Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral issues, its main counterpart is OSD’s Japan Desk. Their interaction is also conducted on an ad-hoc basis, essentially focusing on coordinating their policies. For example, they work on developing trilateral defense cooperation with Australia as well as exchange views on capacity building assistance to ASEAN countries.101

Given the wide scope of responsibilities today’s alliance has taken on, it is understandable that the two Japan Desks in the DOS and OSD cannot alone manage the alliance on the U.S. side. This contrasts with Japan, which has divisions to cover very specific aspects of the alliance relationship. Still, there are a wide range of offices throughout the DOS and OSD responsible for functional issues that communicate and coordinate with Japan, despite lacking a Japan-specific portfolio.

---

101 Anonymous II, Interview with author, July 29, 2016. On the military side of the alliance, Japan’s Joint Staff Office holds its own separate trilateral talks with Australia and the U.S. at the necessary staff directorate level. The IPD, however, is rarely kept in the loop with these communications, meaning that the communications at the policy level and military level are often kept separate.
MOFA's Treaties Division, for example, does not interact with DOS's Office of Japanese Affairs. Instead, communication occurs largely with DOS's Legal Advisors Office. These communications are on an ad hoc basis. The only regular discussions that take place between the agencies is an annual meeting between the Director General from the International Legal Affairs Bureau and the DOS Assistant Legal Advisor, who inform each other of work they have done since their last meeting. The two offices do not meet for any specific alliance purpose; rather the content of their discussions focuses on a broad range of issues, such as exchanges of legal practices, with the alliance but one of these issues.

Similarly, given the eclectic nature of issues that the MOD's Strategic Planning Division is responsible for, much of its communication with the United States is ad hoc and with offices not seen elsewhere in this study. For example, when working on issues of space, cyber, or missile defense, the division’s primary U.S. counterpart for space is the office of the DASD for Space Policy. The primary counterpart on missile defense issues is the office of DOD's Missile Defense Agency. Finally, the primary counterpart for cyber issues is the office of the DASD for Cyber Policy. While communication between the Director of the division and the senior leadership in these offices is infrequent and ad hoc, staff members communicate quite often, even daily on some issues. The focus of all these communications is primarily to coordinate their independent national policies.

Given its very specific focus on defense acquisitions, ATLA’s U.S. counterparts are different from other divisions in MOD. ATLA’s primary institutional counterpart is with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OUSD (AT&L)). At this level, discussions focus on government-government joint research and development of defense technology and technological cooperation. Yet, other key counterparts include the Mutual Defense Assistance Office (MDAO) at the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, the J4 at PACOM, and the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). On Foreign Military Sales issues, ATLA’s Department of Procurement Management interacts with MDAO and DSCA. On other issues of U.S.-Japan cooperation, such as joint R&D or cooperation with partners, ATLA’s Department of Equipment Policy takes the lead and interacts with MDAO, DSCA, and PACOM’s J4. MDAO’s function is to act in an advisory or assistance role to foster an atmosphere of cooperation between the MOD and DSCA and the service component security assistance offices. MDAO does not inject new policies or priorities. The most important framework regarding U.S.-Japan equipment-related cooperation takes place in the Science and Technology Forum (S&TF). Normally held once a year and chaired by the Japanese ATLA Commissioner and the Director General of the

102 Anonymous FF, Interview with author, July 29, 2016.
103 Anonymous GG, Interview with author, July 29, 2016.
104 There is also a Security Cooperation Consultative Meeting (SCCM) that is chaired by the ATLA Commissioner and the Director of DSCA that acts as a bilateral consultation body mainly related to FMS program.
Bureau of Defense Buildup Planning and the American OUSD (AT&L), the S&TF focuses on major equipment and technology cooperation and procurement issues.105

Because of the presence of U.S. forces in Japan and the primary responsibilities of communication falling on USFJ and the U.S. Embassy, it is not surprising that many policy-related offices in MOD and MOFA communicate regularly with both U.S. policymakers and operational representatives. Specifically, this means USFJ’s J5 and the U.S. Embassy’s Political-Military Affairs Unit. In MOFA, while the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division speaks with USFJ, the majority of SOFA-related discussions with USFJ for MOFA falls to its Status of U.S. Forces Agreement Division and its communication with USFJ and OSD’s Japan Desk. In preparation for bi-weekly Joint Committee (covered below) meetings, the personnel from MOFA’s Status of U.S. Forces Agreement Division communicate with the USFJ J5, Joint Committee Secretariat, Staff Judge Advocate, the Embassy’s Political-Military Affairs Unit, and other relevant staff sections. At these meetings, a variety of operational and administrative issues related to the SOFA are discussed, like the provisions of land return or the maintenance and joint use of a facility or area. One recent example includes being responsible for the language of the agreement to return the existing facility and area of the Northern Training Area to the GOJ. Also, if an issue gets highly political or extremely sensitive, the Division works with the USFJ J5 and U.S. Embassy’s Director for the Political-Military Affairs Unit to ensure the issue can be resolved with “political correctness.”106 For example, when a member of the U.S. military commits a crime or gets caught for drunk driving in Japan, the Division talks with counterparts in both USFJ’s J5 and the Political-Military Affairs Unit at the same time. If an issue arises that is deemed policy significant, D.C. based organizations become involved. There are also times that non-MOD, non-MOFA issues arise, such as environmental damage. In these instances, representatives from other Japanese ministries are invited to join the meetings as well. These are largely on an exceptional basis, however.

The same dynamic is at play in the MOD. While the MOD’s Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Division and Operational Policy Division have regular contact with USFJ’s J3 and J5, the MOD’s BLC communicates regularly with USFJ’s J4. Specifically, this includes the Okinawa Coordination Division, Local Cooperation Planning Division, Local Coordination Division, Facilities Improvement Program Division, and the Labor Management Division. The BLC plays an important role in ensuring a sustainable base presence, which includes maintaining peaceful relations between the U.S. presence in Japan and the local communities. Japanese nationals transmit U.S. force-related concerns to a

105 Working-level sessions also exist, but focus is the same. Unlike the Executive Session, the working-level sessions are normally convened on an as-needed basis, such as when the Executive Session cannot be scheduled in a timely manner. This working-level session is chaired by the Japanese ATLA Assistant Commissioner and the Director, International Cooperation (AT&L) in the U.S. The Capability/Coordination Group that serves as executive secretariat for the S&TF framework is convened at least once a year. Other Groups include: Equipment, Technology, and Program Development.

Regional Defense Bureau and, in turn, these concerns get transmitted to the relevant BLC division. These divisions, in turn, talk with relevant staff sections within USFJ.

Finally, the MOD’s Operational Policy Division is responsible for SDF operational planning. It is in this connection that the division interacts with the United States, as it is responsible for bilateral planning with the United States. While the Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Division, the SDF services, and the JSO are also involved, it is the Operational Policy Division that leads these efforts. This takes place primarily with PACOM’s J5, although PACOM also assigns USFJ as executive agent for some bilateral planning. The frequency of communication is a derivative of the plans themselves.107 If the security environment is unstable, then plans require a revision. As such, the division and the J5 would meet until a revision of the plans is concluded.

Over the past few years, a new conduit of communications opened between the allies’ executives with the establishment of Japan’s NSS. Beyond ad hoc communications that Cabinet Counsellors have with Political-Military Councilors at the U.S. Embassy, in Japan’s NSS there are essentially three main contact points at the Division level with the United States: Strategic Planning Division, First Policy Division, and Second Policy Division. Because the portfolio for the First Policy Division contains the United States, Canada, Europe, Australia, India, and ASEAN, its Cabinet Counsellor works regularly with the Japan Director in the US-NSC and occasionally the US-NSC staff dealing with Australia and India. Talking roughly once a week, these discussions essentially serve as information-sharing sessions where both sides update each other on respective issues and discuss pressing regional security issues. Still, this is one of the main conduits between the allies’ National Security Councils. The Second Policy Division’s portfolio contains Northeast Asia and Russia, so the Cabinet Counsellor for this division maintains frequent communication with the Japan Director in the US-NSC over regional-related issues. Given the portfolio, this individual also maintains contact with the US-NSC’s China Director and South Korea Director as well, though not regularly. Finally, the Strategic Planning Division focuses on specific policy areas, such as the National Defense Program Guidelines, National Security Strategy, and mid- to long-term national security policies. Unlike the previous two divisions, this division has no clear counterpart in the US-NSC. Instead, the Cabinet Counsellor reaches out to individuals in the relevant offices in Washington on an as-needed basis.

The four Councillors at the DG level all share the US-NSC’s Senior Director for Asia as their counterpart, dividing up issues based on their portfolio. These individuals have regular dialogues with the Senior Director about once a month that cover close to the same topics that the Cabinet Counsellors cover.108 During these meetings, the Councillors appear together in VTCs; the MOFA Councillor usually takes the lead, although it depends on the

108 If there is a need to talk about issues beyond the portfolio of the NSC’s Senior Director for Asia, the NSS reaches out to a Senior Director in charge of the issue at hand.
issue. Because these individuals are more senior, the discussions are narrowed in scope and shorter and have more potential to reach the ear of the executive in each country. Above the Councillors, the two Deputy Secretaries General talk with the U.S. Deputy National Security Advisor on an ad hoc basis. Like the interaction between the Councillors and the US-NSC’s Senior Director, these discussions are also usually led by the MOFA Deputy Secretary General, although it depends on the issue.

Operational

Unlike the policymaking structure, asymmetry in the structural interactions among operational personnel consists of a large number of U.S. commands facing a smaller number of SDF commands: three individual SDF services versus USFJ, in-Japan service components, PACOM, PACOM components, and the Joint Staff. As shown below, the Chiefs of Staff of the three SDF services and the COS-JSO have multiple counterparts that vary depending on the activity.

While communication varies at the Commander level through occasional VTCs or visits, the majority of communication and coordination is conducted at the staff level. The prevalence of many directorates on the U.S. side that interact with Japan is done via a decentralized communication structure. Generally speaking, while the matches are not perfect or even existing in some staffs, these directorates match up fairly closely between the allies.\textsuperscript{109} Additionally, when it comes to relationships between USFJ and in-Japan service components and the SDF, there are not always direct counterparts (e.g., three-star to three-star) simply because the U.S. military forces in Japan are not built for the purpose of ensuring similar ranking across the services.\textsuperscript{110} Instead, in an effort to ensure achievement of objectives, many times the United States is forced to match up lower-ranking officers with higher-ranking officers on the Japanese side.

Because the JCS is responsible for America’s global strategy and policies, and thus dealing with other militaries around the world, there is no exclusive focus on Japan. This does not mean, however, that the JCS staff does not interact with Japan. In the JCS J5 there is a Japan Desk (J51), where there is usually more than one person assigned to take on Japan-related responsibilities.\textsuperscript{111} The Japanese DATT at the Washington Embassy communicates frequently with the J51 (but is able to talk to anyone in the JCS directorates). Similarly, the SDF service attachés at the Japanese Embassy in Washington communicate with their counterparts in the individual U.S. service directorates—including the Marines—to exchange security-related information. On strategic or operationally relevant issues—both Japan-related

\textsuperscript{109} Anonymous E, Interview with author, June 29, 2016.
\textsuperscript{110} Anonymous WW, Interview with author, December 13, 2016.
\textsuperscript{111} Anonymous A, Interview with author, June 8, 2016.
and regional in scope—the JCS J5 defers these to the PACOM J5. The PACOM J5, in turn, can defer issues to its counterpart at the USFJ J5. The JCS’s J51 handles Japan-related affairs that do not get deferred to USFJ or PACOM, such as resource issues. Other directorates in the JCS have Japan-related responsibilities, but these tend to focus on very specific issues, like intelligence sharing or foreign military sales. This includes particularly the J2, J4, and sometimes the J3. The primary linkage point is therefore the JCS J5 with Japan’s JSO J5. At the action officer level, communication is conducted weekly. At the Director-level, communication occurs monthly, sometimes even quarterly.

At the level of Chairman, JCS, the primary counterpart on the Japanese side is the COS-JSO. Between these two senior military advisers, communication takes place once every six months up to a year. The same is true of communication between the service chiefs in both countries. The content of all of these discussions focuses on broad global issues where the two are able to exchange opinions about the world and sometimes also discuss issues like combined training, equipment requirements, and interoperability. In addition to these, discussions between the Chairman, JCS, and the COS-JSO also cover bilateral issues or coordinating activities outside of PACOM’s AOR. It is not uncommon for policy offices responsible for the alliance, such as the Japan Desks in DOS or OSD, to be kept informed of such high-level communications. Importantly, efforts are made to keep the J5 offices in PACOM and USFJ informed, particularly PACOM’s J5. Otherwise, the JCS defers constant communication with Japan to PACOM as do the service chiefs to PACOM components.

This has two implications. First, while the Chairman, JCS and the four service Chiefs in the United States have counterparts in Japan (table 6), they have a low frequency of communication. The reason is simple: the JCS are responsible for a global military force and military-military relations with a large number of militaries around the world, not just Japan. The second is that the content of their communications tend to stay relatively general. While Japan’s COS-JSO and the U.S. Chairman, JCS do discuss specific bilateral issues in some depth, their meetings usually focus on exchanging opinions about broad, global issues. Likewise, when the SDF service chiefs meet with their U.S. counterparts, they do sometimes discuss specific force issues, but their discussions tend to stay fairly general, focusing on broad global or strategic issues and policies.

---

*One individual noted that the one exception to this rule is the Joint Staff’s involvement via its J5 with PACOM’s J5 due to it being policy-related. Anonymous K, Interview with author, June 30, 2016.*
Table 6. National Level Operational Counterparts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Content of Communications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Office</td>
<td>Broad global issues; Some discussion on bilateral issues/perceptions; Coordinate activities outside of PACOM AOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Naval Operations</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Maritime Staff Office</td>
<td>Broad global/strategic issues and policies; force development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Air Staff Office</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Staff, U.S. Army</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Ground Staff Office</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commandant of the Marine Corps</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Ground Staff Office</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Japan has moved to become more operationally connected with PACOM, relations between the SDF and PACOM have grown. PACOM today engages in weekly—even daily—communication with Japan’s JSO via PACOM’s J5s and the JSO’s J5. It is an important means by which the allies can discuss operational coordination, exercises, upcoming engagements, unexpected regional pop-ups, as well as complaints and requests. At the desk officer level, communication is weekly. At the directorate Director level, communication is roughly once every two weeks. Importantly, the actual secured link between PACOM and the JSO goes through USFJ, which is on all of these meetings as the host. This PACOM-JSO link is crucial, as it is an attempt to synchronize and harmonize all the interaction taking place throughout the operational side of the alliance in the United States. Other relevant U.S. stakeholders are invited to sit in on meetings with Japan, as needed, and the results are briefed to other actors on the U.S. side. It is tedious and lends itself to information falling through the cracks, but taken together, the system makes for a complex process of routing products, requests, and information between the two militaries.

Communication and coordination channels at the level of PACOM and its components are similarly decentralized. Like the Chairman, JCS, the PACOM Commander is a direct counterpart with Japan’s COS-JSO. The content of their communications focuses largely on regional issues at the strategic level but also operational issues in the PACOM AOR. Essentially, these are issues that exceed the scope of USFJ but not broader issues in other theaters. Each of the four component commands carry on separate interactions with Japan via their respective staff relationships (table 7). These relationships mirror the national-

---

113 The J2 also engages in constant communication, but as stated in the introduction, intelligence is outside the scope of this study.
level operational counterparts: PACFLT-Maritime Staff Office (MSO); PACAF-Air Staff Office (ASO); USARPAC-Ground Staff Office (GSO); and MARFORPAC-GSO. To highlight a crucial point: The GSO is facing two counterparts, the USARPAC and MARFORPAC. This has not always been the case. During the Cold War, when there were plans to fight together, the Chief of Staff of GSO looked primarily to the USARPAC Commander. With the Cold War over, and GSDF making efforts over the past decade to develop amphibious capabilities, MARFORPAC has increasingly become an equally important counterpart. As table 7 shows, the content of communications across these different dyads differs, with the exception of the USARPAC-GSO and MARFORPAC-GSO ties, which both are mostly operational in nature, although some strategic-level discussions do occur.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Content of Communications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PACOM Commander</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Office</td>
<td>Regional issues at strategic level; operational issues in AOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACFLT Commander</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Maritime Staff Office</td>
<td>Localized strategic, mostly operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACAF Commander</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Air Staff Office</td>
<td>Some strategic; mostly operational; integration of capabilities between the U.S. AF and ASDF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USARPAC Commander</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Ground Staff Office</td>
<td>Some strategic; mostly operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARFORPAC Commander</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Ground Staff Office</td>
<td>Some strategic; mostly operational</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What this means is that each component command carries out its own communication with its Japanese counterpart, from the commander level down through each staff directorate. PACOM has the authority, however, to direct how each of its components interacts with counterparts or what to do with counterparts. For example, every year PACOM publishes a Theater Campaign Order (TCO) that tells the components certain things they are required to do, like major exercises or flag officer engagements. When things are thought of after the TCO is published, PACOM publishes a TCO addendum called a fragmentary order (FRAGO). Additionally, once a year a Joint Senior Leaders Seminar is held where the PACOM Commander and his components attempt to synchronize all the work they are doing with Japan in the operational realm with U.S. policy to ensure that all the components are moving in the same direction.
Mirroring the way alliance management is handled at the PACOM level, in-Japan service components communicate and coordinate with their SDF counterparts in a decentralized manner (table 8). Like the Chairman, JCS and the PACOM Commander, the USFJ Commander’s primary counterpart is the COS-JSO. Their communications largely focus on regional issues at a strategic level and operational issues in the AOR with a focus on Japan. Organizationally, therefore, USFJ and JSO are also considered counterparts, although the USFJ Commander in his dual-hatted role as 5th AF Commander also conducts regular communication with the Chief of Staff, ASO, to discuss strategic issues. Importantly, the USFJ Commander communicates directly with the PACOM Commander, as he is the PACOM Commander’s representative in Japan commanding a PACOM-supporting sub-unified command. Unlike the PACOM Commander, who is not available to interact with the COS-JSO on a daily basis, the USFJ Commander is, acting as a conduit to PACOM. The PACOM Commander, or his staff, however, does not regularly communicate directly with in-Japan service component commanders or their staff (i.e., 7th Fleet, USARJ, III MEF, or 5th AF—although because USFJ Commander is dual-hatted, any contact is inherently also with the 5th AF commander), as USFJ does not have OPCON over these units. Like the U.S. Service Chiefs and the PACOM component commands, these in-Japan service components conduct regular communication with their SDF counterparts in the appropriate Staff Office, although the GSO interacts with both the Marines and Army. At this level, communications and coordination fall closer to the category of operational discussions. With all, the Chiefs of Staff hold regular communications with their counterpart through both VTCs and physical visits.

While the in-Japan service components conduct regular communication with the three SDF Staff Offices, these are not their only connections with the SDF. They also maintain structural relationships with commands where they discuss both operational and tactical issues. These relationships and content of communications are summarized in table 9. Different from the relationships mentioned thus far, the units below do not necessarily represent counterparts in the same way that the PACFLT Commander looks to the MSDF-MSO, for example. As such, it is more accurate to view these as critical relationships rather than counterparts.

The structural relationship between MSDF-U.S. Navy is the simplest relationship to understand. Primary maritime relationships are between the 7th Fleet Commander and CinCSDFleet. The relationship between ASDF and USFJ is more complex. Primary air counterparts are between the 5th AF Commander and the Air Defense Command Commander (although ties with other ASDF functional commanders also important). Because of the dual-hatted nature of the 5th AF/USFJ Commander, the 5th AF Vice Commander, who is a one-star general, is the Director, Pacific Air Forces Joint Air Component Coordination Element. In this capacity, he/she interacts with the ASDF’s Air Defense Command Commander regularly at the operational level through weekly scheduled meetings, along with additional consultations, as needed, based on events in the region and/or
other issues that might require further discussion. Because this sets up an asymmetric relationship between a U.S. one-star and a Japanese three-star, this is not a formally institutionalized relationship. Instead, each 5th AF Commander makes this decision on the basis of necessity given other primary duties he is responsible for as USFJ Commander.115

### Table 8. U.S. Forces in Japan-SDF Chief of Staff Operational Counterparts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Content of Communications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USFJ Commander</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Office</td>
<td>Regional issues at strategic level; Operational issues in AOR with focus on Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, 7th Fleet</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Maritime Staff Office</td>
<td>Largely operational focused on the defense of Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, 5th Air Force</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Air Staff Office</td>
<td>Component air coordination within Japan; integration of capabilities between the U.S. AF and ASDF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, U.S. Army Japan</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Ground Staff Office</td>
<td>Largely operational; some tactical; support to training exercises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III MEF Commander</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Ground Staff Office</td>
<td>Component ground coordination; integration of amphibious capabilities with the GSDF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The division of the GSDF into five regional armies also introduces complexity to the relationships as these regional commanders do not have *true* counterparts in the same sense of the one-on-one relationship that the MSDF and ASDF have with their in-Japan service component counterparts.116 I Corps (F) conducts regular contact with the five regional armies, which is aided by regular communication between the USARJ Commander, in his dual-hatted role as I Corps (F) Commander, and the Commanders of the five regional armies. III MEF does not have a dedicated GSDF command that it can call its true counterpart. Like USARJ, the III MEF Commander and commanders of the five regional armies do communicate but not as regularly as the communication between USARJ/I Corps (F) and the five regional armies. Because the GSDF’s Western Regional Army is focused on building amphibious capabilities and has a responsibility to defend Okinawa, the III MEF’s primary counterpart is the Western Regional Army, which is pushing for a closer relationship with

---

MARFORPAC. As evidence of this special relationship, the Marine Corps places a liaison officer in the GSDF at the Western Army HQ. One of the main motivations for the creation of the GCC was to establish an operational-level command between the regional headquarters and Ichigaya (MOD, JSO, GSO) and remedy the lack of a “true counterpart” between the GSDF armies and the Army/Marines in Japan.

Table 9. In-Japan Service Components-SDF Commands Critical Relationships.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Content of Communications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7th Fleet Commander</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Self Defense Fleet (CinCSDFleet)</td>
<td>Operational; tactical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Air Force Vice Commander</td>
<td>Air Defense Command Commander and other ASDF functional commanders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USARJ/ I Corps (F) Commander</td>
<td>5 GSDF Commanders of Regional Armies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III MEF Commander</td>
<td>5 GSDF Commanders of Regional Armies; Emphasis on Western Regional Army</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Joint

Formalized Meetings

The alliance is not short of formalized joint meetings. There are four primary meetings held regularly with the objective being to ensure policy consistency between the allies. These are: the Security Consultative Committee (SCC, also called 2+2 Meeting), Security Subcommittee (SSC), the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC), and the Alliance Management Meeting (AMM).

- SCC/2+2 meetings: High level meetings, second only to official summits between executives. Taking place almost annually, these meetings have as participants the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defense and the U.S. Secretary of...

117 III MEF interacts with the Northern and Northeast Regional Armies when it conducts exercises in areas close to these regional headquarters. Yet, because these Armies are not pursuing amphibious capabilities, the interaction is much more limited when compared with the deep connections between III MEF and the Western Regional Army.


120 The last 2+2 was held in April 2015. Prior to that, the last one was held in October 2013.
Defense and Secretary of State. The purpose of these meetings is largely to discuss national security issues to promote policy understanding between the governments and strengthen cooperative relations.

- **SSC**: One level down in the hierarchy. These meetings are working-level meetings generally at the Director General level (DG NAAB in MOFA, DG of the Bureau of Defense Policy in MOD) in Japan and the Assistant Secretary level in the United States (ASD, APSA; EAP A/S). The purpose of these meetings is to exchange views on security issues of mutual concern to both countries. The meetings are held irregularly.

- **SDC**: The mission of the SDC is to draft and implement the U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines. Like the SSC, the meetings are held irregularly. Participants from Japan include the DG NAAB in MOFA, the DG of the Bureau of Defense Policy in MOD, and representatives from the JSO. Participants from the United States include Assistant Secretaries of State and Defense (ASD, APSA; EAP A/S), the USFJ Commander, as well as representatives from the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, Joint Staff, and PACOM. SDC-Deputies meetings are also held at the DDG/Deputy Assistant Secretary level.

- **AMM**: More than any other meeting, the AMM (formally called the “Mini-SSC”) is the “real workhorse of the entire alliance management regime.”\(^{121}\) Acting as the clearinghouse for alliance management that shapes the agenda for SCC and SSC meetings, it comprises numerous lines of work that straddle multiple organizations within MOD and MOFA on the Japanese side and the DOD and DOS on the U.S. side. Participants generally include the DDG of NAAB in MOFA, the DDG of the Bureau of Defense Policy in MOD, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Japan and Korean Affairs and the DASD for East Asia in the United States. The USFJ Deputy Commander and the USFJ J5 are also sometimes included. In-Japan service components are invited, although they do not always send representatives. There is no rigid schedule of AMM meetings, but it usually works out to approximately once quarterly and lasts about one day. The outcomes of this meeting are put into a report that subsequently moves up the hierarchy.

**Joint Committee**

In addition to these alliance meetings is the Joint Committee (JC), the principal interface between U.S. military forces in Japan and the Japanese government that acts as the primary interagency coordination mechanism between the governments for coordinating military affairs.\(^{122}\) Issues related to implementation of the SOFA are adjudicated by it. The JC is chaired on the U.S. side by the Deputy Commander, USFJ with the Minister for Political  

---

\(^{121}\) Anonymous BB, E-mail message to author, March 10, 2017.

\(^{122}\) Information provided in undated document entitled *Alliance Framework: Communication Framework, Forums, and Mechanisms*. Anonymous VV, E-mail message to author, December 1, 2016.
Affairs at the U.S. Embassy serving as the Senior Deputy. Each U.S. military service is represented as well. The Japanese side is chaired by the DG of NAAB in MOFA. There are no SDF personnel assigned as permanent members of the JC, but they do observe on occasion. The JC comprises seven subcommittees that meet regularly. Numerous other subcommittees, panels, and working groups addressing a broad spectrum of issues meet as required. Two in particular require mention. The ATOP (co-led by the USFJ J5 and the U.S. Embassy Political-Military Unit Chief and their counterparts on the Japanese side), which meets quarterly, is charged with executing, managing, and controlling all base realignment initiatives related to DPRI. The Alliance Transformation Implementation Panel provides recommendations to the Facilities Subcommittee on matters related to alliance transformation projects (for example, new construction, reconstruction, relocation, and renovation of buildings and structures funded by the GOJ).

Alliance Coordination Mechanism

In the 2015 review of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, the allies agreed to establish an Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM) as a means to “strengthen policy and operational coordination related to activities conducted by the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces in all phases from peacetime to contingencies.” The ACM was meant to correct the flaws of the Bilateral Coordination Mechanism (BCM) that was established in 1997 but unutilized, particularly in the response to the March 11, 2011, disasters due to the fact that the triggering mechanism was designed to be a contingency, not a natural disaster. It also neglected an interagency emphasis. The objective of this new structure was to not only lower the triggering mechanism for its usage but to aid interagency coordination through information sharing and the development and maintenance of common situational awareness.

In the time since the ACM was created, considerable work has been done on fleshing out the conceptualization. It has even been utilized to follow and respond to North Korea’s nuclear test in January 2016, the April 2016 earthquake in Kumamoto, and the “swarming” of Chinese vessels around the Senkaku Islands in August 2016. While the ACM is considered “standing” at all times and expected to function on a continuous basis without needing a triggering event for actors to utilize it, it does not physically exist. Instead, it is

123 Training Relocation Subcommittee (J3 lead); Frequency Subcommittee (J6 lead); Civil Aeronautics Subcommittee (J3 lead with 5th AF assist); Environmental Subcommittee (J4 lead); Criminal Jurisdiction Subcommittee (SJA lead with J5); Labor Subcommittee (J1 lead); and a Facilities Subcommittee (J4 lead).
completely virtual, with an Executive Secretary at USFJ who sets up phone bridges and meeting times. These meetings are conducted by secure VTC, phone, and e-mail. This is by design. The ACM was not designed to be a physical or permanently manned organization. After all, the members who participate in the ACM have other important jobs to fill on a daily basis.

Still, the overall structure of the ACM is clear: there are three layers. The top layer focuses on policy, the mid layer on joint operations, and the lower layer on tactics. There are no set numbers assigned to these layers; rather, membership is largely determined by the task. This allows the ACM to flex in times of crisis both vertically (up the escalation ladder) and horizontally (across to other ministries/departments). The details of these layers are provided below.126

- **Policy layer:** Consists of the Alliance Cooperation Group (ACG), which includes largely representatives from Japan’s Cabinet Secretariat, MOFA, MOD’s IB, and SDF (if needed) as well as representatives from the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo and USFJ and, as needed, representatives from US-NSC, DOD, DOS, PACOM, and the JCS. The ACG’s main duty is that of coordinating security policy.
  
  o Three sub-groups in the ACG: Director General-level (ACG-DG) sub-group (DASDs and above); a Director-level (ACG-D) sub-group (O6 level, like the Director for OSD’s Japan Desk, USFJ’s J5, and PACOM’s Chief, Northeast Asia Policy Division J51) and an Executive Secretariat-level (ACG-ES) sub-group that consists of action officers. Military representatives are also at the table of these discussions, to include PACOM, USFJ, and JCS from the United States and the JSO and three SDF services from Japan. Who exactly attends depends on the situation and who else is attending. Of the three layers, this layer is the most concrete, as it is already functioning (i.e., meetings have already taken place), albeit most activity focuses on the ACG-D and ACG-ES sub-groups.

- **Operations layer:** Consists of the Bilateral Operations Coordination Center (BOCC), which includes military personnel from Japan’s JSO and three services as well as USFJ augmented by PACOM and component command members. The purpose of the BOCC is to coordinate and conduct bilateral operations between the SDF and the U.S. military. Building off of the BCM, the physical coordination space for the BOCC is in the Bilateral Joint Operations Coordination Center (BJOCC) at Yokota. Although it is not manned permanently, it is resourced and regularly maintained by USFJ.

- **Tactical level:** Consists of uniformed military personnel in three Component Coordination Centers (CCCs) to reflect the three services in Japan and each service of

---

the U.S. military. While there is no firm rule on where the units come from, most would be drawn from units already in the PACOM AOR. This makes USFJ and PACOM/USFJ components heavily involved. The Component Coordination Center-Air (CCC-A) includes staff from PACAF, the 5th AF, and ASDF. The Component Coordination Center-Maritime (CCC-M) includes staff from PACFLT, 7th Fleet, Naval Forces Japan, and MSDF. Finally, the Component Coordination Center-Ground (CCC-G) includes staff from USARPAC, USARJ, MARFORPAC, III MEF, and the GSDF.

Unlike every alliance structure outlined above, the ACM is the newest. While the uppermost layer—the ACG—has been utilized, bringing together representatives from both sides of the alliance, the lower layers of the ACM focusing on military interactions have not. Prior analogues of the current BOCC and CCCs have existed for over a decade under the previous BCM, such as a naval component coordination cell at Funakoshi and an air component coordination cell at Yokota. What this means is that the structural interactions at the lower levels of the ACM—as established in the 2015 Guidelines—exist largely in theory, not practice. If a situation gets serious, it is expected that the allies will depend on the ACM to carry out VTCs between all the relevant military headquarters and civilian offices, including committing personnel to the tactical level’s CCCs. If a situation devolves into something really serious, such as war, it is expected that a physical space for the ACM would also be established at the NSS, similar to the BJOCC at Yokota that was utilized to respond to the March 11, 2011, earthquake and tsunami. Through escalation ladders, the ACM will scale up in size and seniority, depending on the severity. When something begins to emerge, personnel from throughout various military commands will devote more attention to the ACM and less to their daily jobs. At this point, commands make decisions to send personnel to fill physical spaces in the BOCC and CCCs with counterparts.

Findings

Understanding what the discrete structures look like and how they communicate and coordinate provides insight into whether the current alliance management structures are optimized for efficiency. This research found that while there are positive aspects of the existing structures of communication and coordination, they are not optimized to manage today’s alliance relations. As shown in this section, while the additions of the J-NSC and ACM are critical improvements for alliance handlers, there are challenges inherent in the existing system that should be addressed. The challenges posed, however, differ in terms of their applicability to situations of peacetime versus those of crisis and conflict. Below, I present five challenges in the existing alliance structures of communication and coordination that are most relevant for peacetime situations. Following this, I present three additional challenges that are most relevant for crisis and conflict scenarios.

Positive Aspects

National Security Council

There is widespread agreement on both sides of the alliance that the establishment of the J-NSC is a positive development for communications, particularly in non-crisis phases. In the words of one U.S. official, Japan’s “NSC has become massively important.”\(^{128}\) Two or three decades ago, MOFA led most security-related issues because the MOD was still the Japan Defense Agency. For some, MOFA “looked down on” the defense establishment and instead wanted to monopolize security policy.\(^{129}\) Strengthening MOFA’s power was the weak decision-making capability of the Prime Minister’s office. The Prime Minister often had to rely on the whims of his agencies to share information which, in turn, made decision-making difficult and served as an impediment to bilateral decision-making. The Prime Minister was unable to act quickly without first gaining the necessary information from relevant agencies. Over its short existence, the J-NSC has secured an important position in Japan, given its ability to break down walls preventing information sharing between agencies and provide oversight on important issues. This has strengthened the Prime Minister vis-à-vis government ministries, like MOFA. Importantly, the J-NSC has become a great asset in communications with the United States via its direct relationship with the US-NSC, providing a direct channel of information flow between the allies’ executive branches. Using the J-NSC as a separate tool

\(^{128}\) Anonymous PP, Interview with author, September 7, 2016.
from MOFA aids the Prime Minister, as he is able to force interagency coordination and push for quick responses to national security issues. Not all MOFA officials agree, as the organization is seen as a potential rival. This is not unique to Japan. The US-NSC is sometimes seen as a rival to the DOS and other parts of the federal government.

Alliance Coordination Mechanism

Like the J-NSC, the ACM is a positive development for the alliance. This is because coordination, communication, and information sharing between Washington and Tokyo have improved since its establishment, particularly in gray zone activities that are still considered a peacetime situation. Importantly, the ACM does not need an agreement to activate it, as was the case with the previous BCM. Because the ACM can expand both vertically and horizontally, the structure is flexible and scalable to meet any scenario. Already it has proven capable of ramping up to meet threatening situations, like North Korea missile provocations, as the allies successfully were able to conduct information sharing in real time to meet a situation that had the potential to develop into a crisis or conflict scenario. At the same time, because the ACM is new, no one expects it to be a perfect organization. As shown below, there are a few areas where problems exist.

U.S. Forces, Japan

USFJ’s main purpose, as PACOM’s representative, is to perform the vital task of communicating and coordinating with GOJ on anything regarding U.S. forces in Japan. A positive actor in maintaining effective communication between the militaries, USFJ staff has direct contact with both Japan and PACOM. USFJ plays a key role in PACOM’s efforts at theater-wide force posture initiatives, provides joint training and interoperability, maintains the SOFA, and creates the conditions for access. This is an enormous asset to have. Not only does its presence ensure a U.S. understanding of what is happening in Japan, but it also ensures smooth implementation of DOD policies and PACOM directives.

While almost all interviewees expressed a positive evaluation for the administrative role USFJ plays in peacetime situations, this research uncovered pockets of skepticism on both sides of the Pacific about USFJ’s utility in a crisis or conflict situation. For example, one retired senior officer noted that Japan “respects Yokota and brings issues to USFJ, but they simply send these to Hawaii.” As such, USFJ is “not necessary.” This skepticism was rooted in

---

132 Anonymous VV, E-mail message to author, February 10, 2017.
134 Ibid.
four factors: (1) USFJ lacks OPCON of military units in Japan; (2) USFJ would likely not receive OPCON in a contingency; (3) if urgent responses are required, PACOM will be needed; and (4) if a JTF is needed, III MEF or 7th Fleet would most likely be designated the commander. Because it is unclear what role the USFJ would play in such situations, some respondents questioned the value of the USFJ. This led to three suggestions that were generally shared by those critical of USFJ in both the United States and Japan: operationalization of the command, downgrading it to a two-star billet, or shrinking the command dramatically to a small, permanently detached group solely in charge of administrative functions and located in Ichigaya. A brief summary of these three options is in Appendix 3.

The author disagrees with this negative characterization of USFJ. Because USFJ plays an extremely valuable role in daily communication with the Japanese government, the author believes the USFJ stands out as a positive organizational structure enabling communication and coordination on critical issues. These criticisms demonstrate a fundamental misunderstanding of USFJ, particularly its role in situations that escalate beyond a peacetime state. They also assume that PACOM is happy to take on issues that are USFJ's responsibilities, overlooking the fact that PACOM has many other responsibilities it should be prioritizing.

USFJ has an invaluable and irreplaceable role. USFJ's strength is that it facilitates coordination and communication with Japan, as it is the best administrative unit that knows where communications should be directed with the GOJ. The USFJ Commander is a good translator of the Japanese situation to PACOM and knows the domestic force deployment situation better than PACOM. This is vital on-the-ground situational awareness for PACOM that is not limited to peacetime situations.

While USFJ is not responsible for warfighting or operational command, it is responsible for a tremendous amount of activity that warfighters would depend on. Depending on the point on the escalation ladder, forces would flow into the region. The pivot point for any conflict in the region, regardless of the intensity, would be Japan. This is primarily because U.S. forces are not constrained to Japan. U.S. bases in Japan are premised on the assumption that they will be sent somewhere else. This is in contrast to U.S. forces in South Korea, where the force management construct is that the United States is there to defend South Korea and committed to maintaining existing troop numbers on the peninsula. The crucial job that USFJ would have to perform for a regional contingency involving the Korean Peninsula or Taiwan is securing GOJ permission for the use of individual ports and bases and informing the GOJ which American units and equipment are arriving. Additionally, any commander tasked with leading an operation in the region would face numerous “downstream” functions that are required for the U.S. forces deploying out of Japan into the region. This commander would
not have the established relationships or knowledge of how to make any of this happen or have a staff knowledgeable enough to do so. These functions include: 135

- Deploying guards to bases.
- Ensuring coordination between MOD and U.S. bases and between U.S. bases and local communities.
- Communicating with hospitals and prefectural governments to ensure proper treatment of wounded U.S. soldiers in Japanese hospitals.
- Coordinating with GOJ regarding any influx of radars, ships or airplanes, missile defense gear, or an additional carrier task force.
- Coordinating logistics to support the warfighter’s units, such as moving fuel around Japan to ensure it gets where it is most needed.

USFJ is uniquely situated to handle these tasks to establish the operational framework to support any regional warfighting effort precisely because that is what it was established to do. This makes USFJ one of the most critical structures to facilitate communication and coordination in the alliance.

---

Challenges in Peacetime Situations

1. Multiplicity of U.S. Operational Actors

The multiplicity of operational commands and headquarters on the U.S. side remains a mammoth, complicated structure for the Japanese. One senior U.S. officer likened this situation to a saloon in the Wild West, where allies—like Japan—enter and can ask any number of actors for assistance while simultaneously being asked questions, all without any of the actors knowing what the other is doing.\(^{136}\) To understand this, consider Japan’s COS-JSO. The individual in this position has three very different U.S. counterparts: the Chairman, JCS; the PACOM Commander; and the USFJ Commander. These three individuals exist in three different geographical locations, have different roles and responsibilities, and hold different authorities. It is natural that seams exist in the communication Japan’s COS-JSO is having with each of these U.S. counterparts. While staffs on the U.S. side work hard to coordinate among relevant stakeholders, information is not always shared. Such a situation will not be critical for the alliance in most peacetime situations, but the current structure gives rise to two very different dynamics in alliance communication and coordination.

Confusing

This research found that a substantial number of SDF personnel find the multiplicity of U.S. operational actors to be confusing at times. In turn, this leads to frustration in Japan. For any directorate in one of the three SDF service staff offices, counterparts exist in USFJ, in-Japan service components, PACOM, PACOM components, and the JCS. This has the tendency to “overwhelm Japan” because these multiple components and directorates do not always communicate with each other.\(^{137}\) Not only are there problems communicating and coordinating among and between staffs of these commands, but these problems extend to communicating and coordinating with the civilian leadership in the DOD as well as the Embassy and DOS. In addition to using electronic communication and phone calls, representatives from these various offices and headquarters make visits to Japan.

This results in a large number of actors where the sheer volume of communication confuses Japanese stakeholders due to a lack of communication and/or poor transmission of information among U.S. actors. “Sometimes [the alliance] gets lucky and it all works.”\(^{138}\)

\(^{136}\) Anonymous D, Interview with author, June 29, 2016.
\(^{137}\) Anonymous H, Interview with author, June 30, 2016.
\(^{138}\) Ibid.
Often, however, the fact that no one coordinates the U.S. side has a tendency to confuse counterparts in Japan. This confusion gets exponentially worse when these actors, through lack of coordination, fail to have the same position on an issue.\(^{139}\)

Taking advantage

A second dynamic found in this research, identified by both U.S. and Japanese respondents, is that some on the Japanese side have learned how to take advantage of the problems of communication on the U.S. side. Japanese SDF officers often go to their most direct counterpart first but have options to move to others if they receive a negative response.\(^{140}\) Knowing that there are a large number of actors who could still say yes, and who do not communicate well with their own U.S. counterparts, SDF officers frequently “knock on doors until someone says yes.”\(^{141}\) This could mean a component commander, the PACOM Commander, or even the Chairman, JCS. Who they ask depends on the nature of the request and whether that person will give them what they want. As one senior U.S. officer quipped, “whoever gets them the most, they’ll go with that person.”\(^{142}\) Sometimes these Japanese actors reach out to other actors without informing anyone that they have already received negative responses elsewhere.\(^{143}\) “They play mom versus dad on us,” quipped one former U.S. official.\(^{144}\) The Japanese actors are not being malicious. Rather, “Japan plays this to their advantage”\(^{145}\) because it is simply “the [U.S.] system is such, so of course you’ll do it.”\(^{146}\)

2. Multiplicity of Japanese Policymakers

As shown above, Japanese policymakers far outnumber those in the United States. This is because Japan is but one ally among many for the United States, whereas the United States is Japan’s only ally. Therefore, Japan has a reason to devote attention to various aspects of the relationship. Because the United States does not have this manpower, alliance management falls largely upon two offices in D.C. While this finite set of contact points is efficient in its simplicity, from the Japanese perspective it is not efficient in handling an increasingly complex array of communication and coordination on complicated issues.

---

\(^{139}\) Anonymous L, Interview with author, July 5, 2016.

\(^{140}\) While none of the anecdotes the author heard were classified, specified examples are best not to be made public in order to avoid indirectly identifying interviewees.


\(^{142}\) Anonymous G, Interview with author, June 30, 2016.

\(^{143}\) Anonymous L, Interview with author, July 5, 2016.

\(^{144}\) Anonymous VV, Interview with author, November 23, 2016.

\(^{145}\) Anonymous A, Interview with author, June 8, 2016.

\(^{146}\) Anonymous Q, Interview with author, July 25, 2016.
While the majority of Japanese respondents recognized the efforts made by the two Japan Desks in recent years, some of them expressed concern that the smaller manpower of these two Japan Desks translates into a reduced level of attention devoted to Japan-related issues. As one Japanese official complained, “we’d like to see more attention to the Asia-Pacific region.”\(^{147}\) This is because there is a sense of frustration that the smaller number of officials working alliance issues in the United States naturally results in delays.\(^{148}\) Additionally, Japanese respondents noted that when they try to discuss issues directly with other offices in Washington, there is a tendency for other U.S. offices to direct these communications back to the two Japan Desks.\(^{149}\) This tendency to be directed back to the Japan Desks leads to a view among some Japanese respondents that these desks are trying to control all interaction with Japan. Not everyone interviewed for this project shares this view. In fact, the majority of Japanese respondents expressed a sentiment of admiration for the Japan Desks “handling a wide range of alliance issues by such a small team.”\(^{150}\) They had never heard, observed, or experienced the Japan Desks as attempting to control communication with MOFA or MOD offices.

A final view, shared by the fewest respondents, is the opinion the Japan Desks at DOS and OSD occasionally act as gatekeepers in their agencies to Japanese offices wanting to discuss issues outside the realm of the alliance, such as nuclear missile defense. For these individuals, MOFA and MOD have an interest in expanding their contacts to other desks in DOS and DOD making decisions on functional issues so as to reduce their dependency on the two Japan Desks. Their hope is, by relying less on the two offices, they can promote quicker communication and coordination with the United States and expand the number of stakeholders in Japan-supported policies. As one individual stated, more contact with non-Japan Desks would afford Japanese officials the opportunity to explain Japanese interests on specific issues to “educate these other [DOD/DOS] offices” to “convince” them on decisions more agreeable to Japan since “Japan Desks don’t have [a] full understanding of all issues.”\(^{151}\)

3. Running Problems up to the Highest Decision-Maker

Washington and Tokyo are close allies, but this does not mean they agree on everything. Past disagreements over the Futenma Replacement Facility and revisions to the Status of Forces Agreement are good examples of how contentious some issues can be. Other times, frustration emerges from the process by which communication and coordination are done within the alliance. Specifically, sometimes Japanese alliance managers push up issues to the very top of the decision-making hierarchy in Japan (such as the Prime Minister and senior leadership) or

---

\(^{147}\) Anonymous BB, Interview with author, July 27, 2016.

\(^{148}\) Anonymous GG, E-mail message to author, December 19, 2016.

\(^{149}\) Anonymous U, Interview with author, December 27, 2016.

\(^{150}\) Anonymous GG, E-mail message to author, December 19, 2016.

\(^{151}\) Anonymous TT, Interview with author, November 21, 2016.
try to do so in the United States (such as the PACOM Commander and senior leadership in DOD or DOS). Understandably, it is not prevalent everywhere. Having a U.S. AF three-star general and a Japanese ASDF three-star general located together in Yokota, for example, makes instant communication easy.\(^\text{152}\) This research revealed a shared opinion by alliance managers on both sides of the Pacific that, generally speaking, running problems up to the highest decision-maker is more frequent than not.

From the U.S. perspective, there is a chain of command in place that starts all alliance management issues at the desk officer level and works their way up. Many of the issues that Japan raises should be taken care of at the working level, as they are in the United States.\(^\text{153}\) This works well for Americans because alliance managers at these lower levels generally feel they are in agreement on issues and communicate frequently, thereby ensuring common knowledge across offices. From the U.S. perspective, the reason why their Japanese counterparts run things up to higher levels is because they sense otherwise they will get an answer they do not like—or get the “slightest whiff of a no” for something they want.\(^\text{154}\) Responses by Japanese interviewed for this research reveal that their rationale to go high has less to do with expected responses and more because action at lower levels sometimes takes weeks or months due to “too many stops to the top” of the military chain of command.\(^\text{155}\) The same occurs on the policymaking side because of the time it takes “to rely on a single window/channel at the Japan desks in DOS and DOD.”\(^\text{156}\) Concerns over time are compounded by other reasons that include U.S. officials sometimes being quite defensive and negotiations becoming counterproductive\(^\text{157}\) as well as vague American answers to specific requests.\(^\text{158}\) Going directly to higher levels is seen as the best means to push forward toward a quick decision. As one Japanese interviewee stated, “I will start with someone who is influential,” understanding that this sometimes angers the United States.\(^\text{159}\)

The result of pushing issues to the top domestically or in context of the alliance is the same for many of the U.S. respondents: complicated bilateral communications and coordination. In the case of a decision pushed to the top domestically, a decision by the Prime Minister on a sticky issue immediately shuts down all room for negotiation.\(^\text{160}\) In the case of a decision pushed to the top of leadership in the United States, it generates confusion among U.S. officials. This is particularly true for staff forced to play defense on an issue with a commander or senior civilian who said yes—without knowing the full background of that issue—and now is forced into having to think who is right, “the Japanese counterpart or his

\(^{152}\) Anonymous WW, Interview with author, December 13, 2016.
\(^{153}\) Anonymous PP, Interview with author, September 7, 2016.
\(^{154}\) Anonymous T, Interview with author, July 26, 2016.
\(^{155}\) Anonymous CC, Interview with author, July 27, 2016.
\(^{156}\) Anonymous TT, Interview with author, November 21, 2016.
\(^{157}\) Anonymous U, Interview with author, July 26, 2016.
\(^{158}\) Anonymous KK, Interview with author, July 29, 2016.
\(^{159}\) Anonymous CC, Interview with author, July 27, 2016.
\(^{160}\) Anonymous L, Interview with author, July 5, 2016.
own staff.” Decisions that are not well thought out and are not more right than wrong hurt the alliance.

Both sides recognize the problem. One U.S. officer noted that “when the focus isn’t on Asia by senior leaders, things get harder with making decisions.” This translates into defensive actions because the U.S. side gets nervous about taking initiatives that may upset senior leaders. Japanese respondents recognize the negative view of Japan’s behavior. One senior MOD official quipped that he sensed “there was no atmosphere to support this,” referring to direct contact with higher authorities in the United States. Going one step further, he also acknowledged that “PACOM people show reluctance” when Japanese counterparts engage in this type of behavior. Yet, despite this mutual understanding, the practice continues.

4. Over-Utilization of ACM for Questionable Peacetime Purposes

Most American respondents familiar with the ACM regret that while it has been used for a few real-world events since it was first established, Japan has tended to over-utilize it for pop-up issues that are of questionable value—from an alliance standpoint. Even Japanese respondents familiar with the ACM believe that in handling even the smallest of issues, ACM members “need to see each other more than we do.” This is because it is believed that more face time translates into better communication and understanding on all issues. Americans familiar with this disagree, believing that many of these lower-priority issues can be addressed through e-mails, not necessarily face time. Without a doubt, it is a positive development that Japan wants to rely on the ACM as much as it does, given that it synchs up the allies and enables them to discuss things frankly. That said, the split in views between Japanese and American respondents reveals a disagreement on how to use it. While the ACM was created to coordinate issues that involve the SDF and U.S. military from peacetime to an emergency, and all gray zones in between, when it comes to specific events, responses indicate that there is no common understanding on ACM usage. Importantly, while basic guidelines exist for how the ACM should work, standard operating procedures (SOPs) have yet to be finalized. At the time of writing (March 2017), although SOPs for the ACG and BOCC appear to be close to completion and awaiting signature, more work is necessary on the SOPs for the three CCCs.

---

164 While none of the anecdotes the author heard were classified, specified examples are best not to be made public in order to avoid indirectly identifying interviewees.
165 Anonymous OO, Interview with author, July 29, 2016.
5. Information Sharing

For any alliance to communicate effectively, transparency is necessary. In other words, information sharing is key. The Abe administration’s Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets that passed the Diet on December 6, 2013, was seen as an effort to get serious about protecting classified information, but the United States remains wary of sharing classified information with Japan. Due to an ongoing lack of trust in the Japanese ability to protect classified information, the U.S. default for classified information is “secret–no foreign.” This remains a source of frustration for all Japanese alliance managers interviewed for this research who are familiar with information-sharing issues. From their perspective, it is confusing as to why the United States calls Japan its most trusted security ally in the region with which it shares formal intelligence sharing structures (e.g., GSOMIA) similar to allies like Australia and Canada, yet the United States consistently demonstrates that it considers these countries more trustworthy by the amount of classified intelligence it shares with them. Although a strictly minority opinion in the context of this research, one Japanese respondent questioned whether an ethnic or language bias or even continued animosity lingering from WWII were to blame.\(^{167}\) From the U.S. perspective, while the secrecy laws helped, Japanese leakage of classified information remains a problem. They “simply don’t keep secrets,” lamented one senior U.S. civilian.\(^{168}\) Reflecting a similar sentiment, one senior U.S. military official believed that “If we release information releasable-to-Japan, we assume it will get out into the public.”\(^{169}\) Related, there is an uncertainty in the United States whether intelligence from the United States will be shared among all relevant stakeholders in Japan or remain “stove-piped” in any one ministry. There is a view that Japanese ministries sometimes use U.S. intelligence as a source of power in domestic debates—and therefore hold on to intelligence—rather than as a way to inform decision-making.\(^{170}\) In turn, this reduces the motivation for the United States to share intelligence. While U.S. trust of Japan has increased, particularly after the 2013 legislation, getting to a level of trust that allows information sharing on a level the United States does with other allies will take time. Information sharing, however, is not a one-way street. There are challenges with Japan sharing its intelligence with the United States, leading to the view that Japan “takes” but does not “share” its intelligence.\(^{171}\) Challenges on both sides hamper effective communication and cooperation between the allies on sensitive topics.

\(^{167}\) Anonymous TT, Interview with author, November 21, 2016.
\(^{168}\) Anonymous L, Interview with author, July 5, 2016.
\(^{169}\) Anonymous F, Interview with author, June 29, 2016.
\(^{171}\) Ibid.
Challenges in Crisis and Conflict Situations

1. Language Differences

The primary language with which the allies communicate remains English, which imposes constraints on Japan. For MOFA or non-SDF, MOD officials, there has always been a stream of talented people who speak English. The situation is different amongst the operational commands and staffs. In the past, while SDF officers rarely spoke English, particularly senior officers, today many officers do. The United States, however, lacks a large number of Japanese speakers for reasons of simply being a global force and officers being promoted via non-Japan-related operations (mostly non-Asian-related). Understandably, this does not pose a critical challenge in peacetime situations. Interpreters are used largely without problems in commands and during exercises and training. Generally speaking, however, while the United States has both permanent interpreter positions within its organizations (e.g., USFJ and in-Japan service components) and brings additional interpreters on board for exercises and operations, the Japanese side does not always dedicate the same commitment of resourcing to interpreters. Instead, officials rely on their own capabilities which, while they are improving, are not always fluent.

In a real-world contingency, the difference in language at a tactical level is a critical variable affecting communication and coordination between the allies. This is because there are no interpreters assisting them. In most operations, because of the extensive training conducted between the United States and Japan, language differences will not matter because the two militaries have clear understandings of their missions and train together on a combined Operation Plan. They “speak the same language of military.” 172 Anticipated situations make things easier. The concern revealed in this research, however, is when a situation arises for which the allies have not exercised or planned or when the assets from different services in Japan and the United States come into contact with each other in the field of battle for which possibly no joint training has ever been conducted. It is at this interface that clarity of communications becomes paramount. After all, “ad hoc maneuvers become so difficult if the guys on the ground can’t talk to each other.” 173 Extending this line of thinking even further, it is just as difficult—if not more so—for those units in the air and at sea.

172 Anonymous RR, Interview with author, November 17, 2016.
173 Anonymous UU, Interview with author, November 22, 2016.
2. Lack of Self-Defense Force Unity

The creation of the JSO in 2006 was a positive step forward in promoting jointness among the SDF. Yet more needs to be done. A common recognition by both American and Japanese respondents was that Japan’s three SDF services do not do jointness well. Japan has made strides in working toward greater jointness among its own services. This includes the looming restructuring of the GSDF to include a GCC to sit on top of the five regional armies. But officers in both countries lament that progress is too slow. Even with the introduction of a JSO and a growing willingness to fall under commanders of other services, officers admit that underneath the COS-JSO exist “highly siloed services.”

To be fair, inter-service cooperation is difficult for any country. In the United States, it took failures and military pressure, coupled with the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, to force jointness among the services. Although the SDF’s U.S. counterparts both in Japan and in Hawaii have long wanted better coordination and communication among the three SDF services, it was not until the recent upgrades in the alliance that the need for these services to make a more concerted push to work together has been brought into sharp focus.

This is because the lack of unity on the Japanese side interferes with the alliance’s ability to coordinate and communicate in combined operations. In peacetime, the United States has had to search for workarounds for interfacing with the SDF because the individual services are often not on the same page. This puts pressure on the United States because its military personnel have to double their efforts to communicate and coordinate with their SDF counterparts as the SDF does not do a good job talking among itself. Given Japan’s worsening security environment, the United States needs closer cooperation with Japan on a host of issues, like cyber, missile defense, maritime security, and non-traditional security challenges. For this to occur, the militaries from both countries need to work seamlessly together. Not having the SDF work well together calls this ability into question.

3. Alliance Coordination Mechanism’s Ability to Handle a Crisis

Another issue has to do with the ACM’s viability in a scenario other than peacetime. Aside from being used to respond to North Korean missile provocations, the “swarming” of Chinese ships, or the earthquake in Kumamoto, the ACM has not been called upon to do more than share information. A concern expressed by some respondents familiar with the ACM is how it would function in a crisis that evolves from a steady state situation and all the intervening steps in between. The ACM lacks a robust communication mechanism and the integration of instantaneous shared information. For example, while the allies enjoy use of the Combined

---

174. Prior to this was the Joint Staff Council, which was created in July 1954.
Enterprise Regional Information Exchange-Japan (CENTRIX-J) network throughout the alliance, it is only deployed in a few nodes within Japan.\(^{177}\)

Also pertinent to operational coordination is the fact that no joint manning documents exist for all the CCCs. While it is true that assumptions made in developing a Joint Manning Document rarely live up to what is needed in a real-world crisis, decisions on what is needed or where the people will come from to man all three cells have yet to be completed (progress differs by service). What is known is that the respective services would largely be drawn from U.S. units in the region (i.e., components). Until these are completed for all three CCCs, if a contingency erupts, most manning decisions would be made ad hoc. This extends to lack of clarity where a JTF commander would “plug in” to this ACM if assigned to a regional crisis by PACOM, although most likely a JTF would plug in where it operationally makes the most sense.

Finally, a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies argues that although the ACM was created to improve operational coordination, it “lacks the command and control elements necessary for a rapid combined and joint response to potential crises or conflicts.”\(^{178}\) If this critique refers to the mechanisms and people to generate and distribute orders on the battlefield, then the critique is misguided. This is because the purpose of the ACM was never meant to be a command and control mechanism to be inserted between JTF commanders. Instead, it is meant to focus more on policy and operational coordination. As such, if the critique is meant to highlight the lack of communication systems or the lack of data link feeds or intelligence feeds, then the critique is fair given the paucity of CENTRIX-J terminals mentioned above.

\(^{177}\) CENTRIX allows the U.S. to be brought into a secure e-mail environment with other allies and partners, similar to the SIPR network in the U.S. In the case of Japan, the system is called CENTRIX-J.

Recommendations

Both U.S. and Japan Relevant

1. Encourage Language Training Via Formal Training and More Co-Location of Uniformed Personnel.

It was noted above that the cadre of English speakers in Japan’s SDF is larger than Japanese speakers in the U.S. military. While this does not pose a critical challenge in peacetime, it does in crisis and conflict situations. Using English as an element to evaluate SDF officers for promotion or requiring the TOEIC exam to enter the Japanese Staff Colleges is crucial for ensuring English-language training of Japanese SDF personnel. This occurs now and should continue to ensure that SDF officers have a working level of English to be able to communicate with their American counterparts in all situations relevant to their missions. At the same time, while it is unrealistic to expect programs promoting widespread Japanese language acquisition among U.S. officers, increasing the number of Japan Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) who can speak Japanese in all services is critical. These efforts on both sides are crucial steps toward ensuring more bilingual service members in the alliance. This should be augmented by a commitment to hiring trained interpreters in all commands. All too often there are vast differences in the quality of the interpretation among Japanese and American commands that result in misunderstandings. If shortfalls persist, the allies should consider bringing retired officers and enlisted personnel back on duty to fill critical interpreter positions.

In addition to these direct efforts to increase language skills, the allies should focus on increasing the number of co-located uniform personnel on both sides of the alliance as a long-term, indirect means to improve language skills. The author has argued in another venue for the need to co-locate personnel.\(^{179}\) Currently, the allies have asymmetric numbers of Foreign Liaison Officer (FLO) exchanges. While the exact numbers are not publicly shared, the United States has approximately nine FLOs in Japan compared with approximately thirty Japanese FLOs at in-Japan service components, nine at PACOM and its components, and no more than ten on the U.S. mainland in various headquarters, such as SOCOM. FLOs are important means by which the two countries’ militaries facilitate communications. Senior officers on both sides of the alliance who remember times when FLOs did not exist in today’s numbers were unanimous in the view that communication between the allies “has greatly improved” since liaisons have increased.\(^{180}\) For the host country, FLOs are used as a resource.


\(^{180}\) Anonymous NN, Interview with author, July 29, 2016.
to get information about their ally’s responses to issues and policies and to gain better insight into domestic views. They are also a communications channel to funnel information back to their home capital regarding the host country.

Having FLOs not only supports greater bilingual language use in the alliance but helps create shared perspectives and mutual understanding, build personal networks, and aid trust building. All this facilitates communication. Having them placed throughout the alliance addresses all aspects of language concerns: (1) expose officers to their ally’s military culture and forms of communications; (2) foster understandings of these cultures and communications through an understanding of how their ally makes decisions; and (3) train officers in both countries in critical language skills by being forced to use the host nation’s language in their daily routines. It is for this reason that gaps in FLOs should be filled.

Although exact numbers are unknown, Japanese FLOs already work at USFJ, in-Japan service components, PACOM, PACOM’s component commands, and various headquarters on the U.S. mainland. While this suggests Japanese FLOs are quite extensive, and probably do not need to be increased, if there are mission-specific headquarters that could assist Japanese capabilities, like ballistic missile defense or amphibious warfare doctrine, Japanese FLOs should be placed there to ensure a benefit to the alliance apart from simply adding another liaison. This should be mirrored by an increase in Japanese-speaking U.S. FAOs as FLOs in Japan. While there are U.S. FLOs in each of the GSDF’s regional armies, the MSO, and GSO, there are none in the ASO, JSO, the MSDF’s Self-Defense Fleet, or the ASDF’s Air Defense Command. American FLOs should be placed in these offices. It is hoped that increasing the number of FLOs in both countries would help today’s junior to mid-level officers and senior enlisted build the familiarity that is required to execute current operations while building future language and communication skills critical to the alliance.

2. Improve Elements of the ACM

There is no need to make the ACM a standing physical structure akin to the Combined Forces Command found in South Korea, where personnel from both countries are permanently headquartered. Neither the SDF nor the U.S. military can afford the money or the space to deploy people to Tokyo to wait for something to happen possibly years from now. Further, the ACM is not a military body, so it would be staffed by civilians. Improvements that are needed for the ACM are relatively easy fixes. They just require the bureaucratic and political effort to see them through to their completion.

To address the crisis and conflict scenario challenges, alliance managers need to place a high priority on creating joint manning documents and building out a more robust communication mechanism. As noted above, because not all the CCCs have joint manning documents, should a crisis erupt, it is expected that component commands responsible for manning the CCC would find themselves making a lot of ad hoc decisions. Because time is
critical in meeting challenges, particularly those that rapidly move up the escalation scale, the allies need to minimize the amount of uncertainty in their structural relations by prioritizing the completion of a joint manning document for those headquarters expected to send personnel to the CCCs. Resources need to be dedicated to fleshing out the specifics of the ACM, and this should begin with determining who will fill what seat should a crisis erupt.

A similar priority that should be addressed immediately is building out a more robust communication mechanism. Alliance coordination requires a secure bilateral information-sharing system to reliably and quickly move sensitive data. Currently, the most built-out of these is CENTRIX-J, but, as mentioned above, the system is not deployed to its fullest, particularly in Japan. The system should be either expanded or replaced with something larger and better tailored to alliance requirements. If the ACM is to be utilized in all situations from peacetime to contingency, it needs a more robust communication mechanism that is placed in many more offices throughout the alliance system. CENTRIX-J’s limited availability throughout the alliance system has to do with simple priorities. The community that wants this technology in both Japan and the United States is small. As such, bureaucratic impediments tend to dominate. Since people at the top do not have a need for it, they find no utility in allocating critical resources to it. Those who need it, largely the desk officers, are not influential enough to demand its installation, particularly since some of the resources would be for terminals that would sit dormant until a crisis emerges.\textsuperscript{181} Alliance managers need to put CENTRIX-J at the top of their priorities.

Finally, while credit needs to be given to alliance managers for how far the ACM has come since its inception in 2015, finalizing the SOPs needs to be prioritized. This will help the alliance by explicitly clarifying things like who gets to call meetings and when, for what, and who can attend meetings for specific topics.\textsuperscript{182} Once all sets of SOPs are completed and signed, these should immediately be included in bilateral exercises.

3. Review current security practices and restrictions of classified intelligence

Classified information sharing between the United States and Japan has been difficult and a source of tension for many years. The intelligence services of both countries routinely compare finished analytical judgments on common potential threats such as North Korea, China, and many other issues. In addition, the U.S. armed forces and the SDF routinely exchange classified operational information in order to operate together. The much larger American intelligence collection agencies, especially the National Security Agency and the National Geospatial Agency, however, do not routinely provide intelligence reports to Japan through

\begin{footnotes}
\item \textsuperscript{181} Anonymous M, Interview with author, November 15, 2016.
\item \textsuperscript{182} Anonymous M, Interview with author, July 5, 2016.
\end{footnotes}
their automated classification and dissemination systems. Most of their products are classified “NOFORN” (No Foreign Nationals), which prevents their distribution to Japan.

With tensions and threats increasing in East Asia, it is time for the U.S. Director of National Intelligence and Japan’s Director of the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office, to commission a study by their offices to improve U.S.-Japan intelligence sharing. The study should cover current practices and restrictions, the mission objectives for intelligence sharing, and the actions required by both sides to make improvements, and it should recommend an action plan.

For Japan’s part, despite the changes in the Secrecy Law, there is a lack of confidence among Americans in Japanese officials’ ability to handle classified information. Arguably, this problem will resolve itself in time as Japanese civilian and SDF organizations engrain in their officials a stronger ethos of secrecy and the laws are enforced when someone is caught in violation. Toward this end, they should increase their information security practices, such as establishing a security cadre in these organizations. As time passes and they prove more capable of handling classified information, they will earn the trust of their American counterparts. In turn, “when you trust, more flow of information happens.” Additionally, Japanese actors need to do a better job at internally sharing U.S. intelligence among all relevant stakeholders. Given the increasing role the J-NSC is playing in national security affairs, the NSS should make a concerted effort to distribute intelligence across ministries and ensure the United States is aware of it.

U.S. Relevant

1. More and Better Communication Among U.S. Military Actors

As much as the U.S. side tries to communicate and coordinate across staff offices, it is undeniable that information falls through the cracks. U.S. respondents for this research acknowledged that the staff directorates in PACOM do not communicate well with each other or across the component commands. This leads to confusion on the U.S. side when things are implemented that others thought had been denied as well as confusion on the Japanese side when different actors are saying different things. To address this, all actors on the U.S. side needs to improve their internal communications up and down the command structure and across commands.

Because a new communication channel to take the lead in centralizing communication on the U.S. side would add a layer of complexity to an already complex situation, the United States should focus on improvements to the current structure. Desk

---

183 Anonymous A, Interview with author, June 8, 2016.
officers throughout the directorates need to do a better job at communication with other American stakeholders on decisions regarding Japan. There needs to be much greater cognizance of the importance of simple communications, particularly on hot topic issues. If the United States wants to stop the Japanese from “playing mom versus dad” on them, alliance managers “have to make sure everyone on the U.S. side is on the same sheet of music.”\footnote{Anonymous VV, Interview with author, November 23, 2016.} As a means of creating better habits of communication, commanders should include communication in exercises as a way to practice these critical habits. They can do this by creating training objectives in exercises to grade people on how they communicate with other stakeholders. In so doing, U.S. alliance handlers can learn greater discipline in keeping all relevant stakeholders informed on the U.S. side.

2. Specify Communication and Coordination Channels

Encouraging greater communication among U.S. stakeholders is not the only means by which to address the challenges outlined above stemming from asymmetry in military-military relations. Problems stemming from the multiplicity of operational actors in the United States are a function of unclear processes and the rapid influx of communication and information from multiple sources.

In the short term, a course on the directives, regulations, communication channels, authorities, and responsibilities within the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship may be useful. This is because the relationship is so complicated, as demonstrated in this report. More damaging is the fact that staff turnover in the United States, especially among military officers, means there is very little institutional knowledge in the alliance.

In the long term, understanding that the multiplicity of actors is a problem that will not disappear due to the structure of the U.S. military, the United States should consider dividing responsibilities more efficiently between US-NSC, OSD, Joint Staff, PACOM, and USFJ as a means for everyone to work on the issues important to their own organizations. For example, in the wide array of alliance issues, there are some issues more appropriate for PACOM and its components rather than USFJ and the in-Japan service components and vice versa. For issues relevant only inside Japan, USFJ should handle communication and coordination. For issues in the PACOM AOR, like a humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operation, it is appropriate for PACOM and its components to take the lead. If an issue arises that goes beyond the PACOM AOR, then the Joint Staff should step in.

It is a vast simplification of the division of labor, no doubt, but the point is to simplify the avenues of communication. Doing so has the potential to help PACOM alliance handlers the most, as they are becoming overwhelmed by the increasing number of issues and requests coming from Japan. The challenge, however, is that it requires discipline on the Japanese part
to not go to PACOM first, components second, and USFJ last. It also requires discipline by
the United States to push their Japanese counterparts back into the proper channel of
communication, should they deviate. This option does not change any communication or
coordination structures, per se. It simply directs communication and coordination into
specified channels that may or may not be different from existing channels. Assuming that
U.S. alliance handlers across all levels direct communications to the proper channels, over time
it is expected that the Japanese could be socialized into these new channels. Two other options,
dismissed as unworkable, are presented in Appendix 2.

Japan Relevant

1. Encourage Greater Understanding of Intra-agency Processes in
the Departments of State and Defense

Japanese policymakers need to better understand the limitations on the U.S. side. While U.S.
policymakers are well aware of the importance the United States plays in Japanese strategic
thinking, the United States is a global power with a global strategy. Japan is not always the
priority in Washington, or even Hawaii, but it does not mean that Japan is valued any less.
There is a small community of individuals, primarily in the Japan Desks in DOS and OSD,
who have a Japan-specific portfolio responsible for all aspects of the U.S.-Japan relationship.
This is different than in Japan, where the entire national security system is focused on the
United States—either directly or indirectly—with legions of people in functionally focused
divisions and bureaus that are working on very specific aspects of the alliance relationship. The
United States cannot match this. Nor will it ever, as the United States is a global force with
global interests. As such, it is unrealistic to argue for structural change in the DOS and DOD
to provide greater attention to Japan.

Still, challenges identified in this report stem from this asymmetry among
policymaking organizations. While the research found that some believe the Japan Desks’
tendency to control any and all communication from Japan unnecessarily slowed down
decision-making, a small group of Japanese felt that these same Japan Desks occasionally act
as gatekeepers to MOFA/MOD officials who are interested in communicating with offices
outside of the Japan Desks on non-alliance issues. These charges against the Japan Desks,
while no doubt firmly believed by those interviewed, are nevertheless difficult to substantiate.
It also goes without saying that neither Japan Desk has the ability to control who Japanese
officials are talking to at DOS or DOD.185

In an effort to address this misunderstanding of the role played by the Japan Desks,
this report encourages a greater understanding of intra-agency processes in both the DOS and

DOD. There was agreement among Japanese officials that the Japan Desks try to get involved in communications, no matter what the issue. For example, in response to the MOD discussing capacity building assistance in Southeast Asia with PACOM, OSD’s Japan Desk wanted to be involved and proposed creating a new format to integrate it under the ACM. Yet, what gets misinterpreted as a desire for control is their desire to “keep track of many goings-on on various alliance fronts.” Broadly speaking, their purpose is to know the entire universe of Japan-related engagement. If they are doing their jobs correctly, they will “play diligently their role of focal point.” If others are doing their jobs correctly, they will keep the Japan Desks involved on Japan-related issues. This may be misperceived as controlling, or even gatekeeping, but it is to ensure the alliance-relevant offices know about any developments so as to understand “the many lines of bilateral efforts that are happening in our alliance.” In efforts outside of typical alliance-related issues, keeping the Japan Desks involved helps “make the process smooth” by “accelerating…bureaucratic slow consideration[s].” Also, if something related to Japan needs to go up to higher-level decision-makers, it needs to go through the desks, thereby warranting the necessity to keep them in the loop. Tokyo can assist them in their responsibilities. A synchronization and prioritization of effort on the Japanese side would help these Japan Desks respond to a coherent set of information feeds and requests.

2. Encourage Jointness in Japan’s Self-Defense Forces, by Law if Necessary

Understanding that jointness is a command and control issue for the SDF and an issue that challenges communication and coordination between the allies on combined operations, it is critical for Japan to take steps to address it.

One relatively easy avenue is to follow up on elements in the 2015 security legislation and U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines. Given that new overseas missions are elements included in these documents, Tokyo should pursue new overseas missions as a forcing function to dispatch teams that include all three SDF services. Such new missions envisioned in the security legislation lean toward the necessity of joint teams.

Another idea, with slightly more difficulty, would be to entrust defense planning and programing to the JSO. While the JSO’s ten years of experience in joint training has proven to push the three services closer together, there is still work to be done. If the JSO is given the ability to provide input in the defense buildup, it would ensure a joint approach to the SDF

186 Anonymous II, E-mail message to author, December 22, 2016.
187 Anonymous BB, E-mail message to author, January 5, 2017.
188 Anonymous OO, E-mail message to author, December 19, 2016.
189 Anonymous BB, E-mail message to author, January 5, 2017.
190 Anonymous GG, E-mail message to author, December 26, 2016.
from the planning and programming stage. This is expected to be difficult simply because each SDF service has maintained its own control over defense buildup plans and, heretofore, successfully minimized the JSO’s role. Each service fights to retain its own power in these critical decisions. Yet, moving forward, the SDF cannot meet today’s regional challenges through service-by-service planning. The sooner they realize this and entrust planning and programming to the JSO, the sooner the SDF can take more important steps to greater jointness.

If resistance continues over the long-term, then Japan should consider a Goldwater-Nichols Act Japanese Version to force each service to give up some of its authority to the COS-JSO. This would be difficult. Each service would fight it and try to retain their current authorities and power. Moreover, MOD policymakers are likely to resist given that, in most people’s thinking, the legislation that created the JSO in 2006 is seen as something akin to Japan’s Goldwater-Nichols Act. Most importantly, there are no big lessons of failure to motivate such a change. But given that the SDF has been talking about jointness for years, and the fact that its efforts have been proceeding slowly, if Japan is interested in having its SDF work cohesively as one likeminded force to ensure smooth combined operations with the United States, then a Goldwater-Nichols Act may be the best answer.

---

194 Time is spent essentially on drawing up lessons learned, reviewing them, developing ideas, writing up a new law, and then getting the political capital to pass it over the expected resistance of each SDF service.
Conclusions

The passage of the Security Legislation and the issuance of the Defense Guidelines opened up new opportunities for cooperation that were not options in the past. This is because these changes brought with them relaxation and/or changes in laws that encourage the allies toward even greater frank and direct conversations on policy, plans, and operations.\textsuperscript{195} This results in better communications and coordination as the range of possibilities are much more open. At the same time, the U.S. side has come to expect that Japan will be much more forward leaning on security issues than it has been in the past.

These changes have resulted in the U.S.-Japan alliance becoming the strongest it has ever been. This is important because central to successful U.S. engagement in the Asia-Pacific region will be Japan, as both a force multiplier and platform for U.S. power projection. With the alliance being in peak condition, it was a prime opportunity to take stock of how well it operates. This report sought to examine the structural linkages in the U.S.-Japan alliance, aiming to answer the central question: Are the existing structures of communication and coordination optimized for managing alliance relations? The research found that while there are positive aspects of the existing structures of communication and coordination, they are not optimized for managing alliance relations.

Since Shinzo Abe returned to the premiership in 2012, the allies have pursued an active agenda that has resulted in greater roles and missions for Japan and a better-functioning alliance. The alliance is no longer a one-sided relationship as it was in the past. Today, it is much more a relationship of confident equals. While none of the challenges found in this research revealed fundamental weaknesses in alliance management, they showed that despite alliance ties being the strongest they have ever been, there are still areas for improvement. This is not meant in any way to detract from the good work alliance handlers have performed in recent years to bring security ties to their present state. Identifying a small number of challenges reinforces the fact that the alliance management structure is not suffering from any fundamental issues. In the spirit of movement toward an ever stronger and better-functioning alliance, it is hoped that this report can play a constructive role.

\textsuperscript{195} Anonymous E, Interview with author, June 29, 2016; Anonymous J, Interview with author, June 30, 2016.
Appendix A: Research Methodology

The scope of this research is limited to the means by which policymakers and operational actors communicate with one another regarding national security issues in the U.S.-Japan alliance. It does not include a focus on military command and control structures, although aspects of command and control appear in this report. It also does not include the broader set of issues with which the alliance engages, such as energy, space, science and technology, and economics. This was deliberate to narrow the research to a finite set of actors and issues. Instead, this project focuses solely on civilian government agencies responsible for national security issues, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, and National Security Council in Japan and the Department of State, Department of Defense, and National Security Council in the United States. Additionally, the project focuses on the military commands and staff that serve to implement these policies. This includes the different service branches of both the U.S. military and Japanese Self-Defense Forces located at different headquarters in Washington, D.C.; Hawaii; and Japan.

This research does not include the Coast Guards of either country or their intelligence communities. This too is deliberate. While Coast Guards play an important role in each country’s security, they were excluded given their domestic focus and little interaction with the other country. This is not to imply the Coast Guards of both countries do not interact. They do, such as through the North Pacific Coast Guard Agencies Forum, but their interaction is not as structured or deep as the military connections in the alliance. Likewise, while the author acknowledges the importance that intelligence communities play and the complex networks of communication between these communities, uncovering what these agencies substantively do with one another and who they talk to on a daily basis proved difficult from a research perspective. Unlike the extensive interviews conducted with actors from the foreign policy and security establishments, the intelligence communities in both countries were reluctant to meet with the author. As such, the author abandoned this variable as an element of the study.

The focus of the study is on the structure of the alliance and the efficiency with which alliance handlers communicate. As shown above, scholars have tackled various aspects of this structure over the years, but none have brought both sides together to show how alliance managers function on a daily basis and how they could work together in a contingency. Organizational charts of individual agencies or commands are helpful to provide an understanding how that specific organization is structured, but these charts do not explain
divisions of responsibilities within organizations and relationships among organizations between countries or provide any insight into counterparts and the content of communications. In other words, a simple organizational chart analysis does not provide an understanding of how the alliance works.

This is not to say organizational charts are meaningless. Quite the contrary, the author began this research with an examination of organizational charts of the various civilian departments/ministries and military commands to obtain an understanding of the universe of possible actors. These primary sources were limited in their information, however, as they could not provide any insight into understanding office responsibilities, linkages with counterparts, and frustrations in bilateral communication. Given this challenge, the author decided to speak to individuals in these organizational units as primary sources to better understand bilateral interactions and, in turn, provide careful descriptions of the interaction.

The author conducted interviews due to the nature of the research question. Although the analysis focuses on structural linkages, structural linkages alone only tell connections between offices. The author did not know enough \textit{a priori} about all the organizations managing the alliance to judge effectiveness or identify potential challenges in bilateral relations. Therefore, it was necessary to go beyond descriptions and explanations of the complex realities of these linkages and include descriptions of specific behaviors and individual experiences and opinions on possible structural impediments blocking effective communication. This is effective in identifying intangible factors not shown in organizational charts, such as cultural norms and language factors. As such, the research problem demanded a thorough examination of the perspectives of those operating within the relevant alliance structures. Toward this end, the author relied solely on in-depth interviews with primary sources to collect data on individuals’ perspectives and experiences.

In total, the author conducted fifty-two interviews with relevant civilian officials and military officers in Washington, D.C.; Hawaii; and Japan. Of this fifty-two, twenty-three were American and twenty-nine were Japanese. Because this group includes predominately current senior officials and active military officers on both sides of the alliance, including senior commanders, the author conducted all of these interviews with the promise of not identifying the source. Even among the eight retired officials interviewed, five of them had retired within the past year and thus, still desired for the interview to be conducted off-record. As such, while interviewees are heavily quoted throughout the report, they were alphabetically coded and referred to as Anonymous A, for example. This is to protect the identity of all those interviewed, particularly because of the nature of some of the responses. All of the interviews were conducted by the author.

Because the research depends heavily on primary source interviews, the author recognizes concerns over problems of inference and proof in participation observation. Although not “participating” in the daily life of the people interviewed, these interviews gathered data from members of a group of individuals under study. This is because the purpose
of the interviews was to talk directly to participants to better understand their daily activities with their counterparts and how they behave across a range of situations in order to discover their interpretations of how the alliance is managed. In the process of conducting interviews, such observational research produced a tremendous amount of rich, detailed descriptions. The challenge the author faced was how to discern credible responses.

In preparing for research, the author created a list of questions that was used as a core set of questions asked of every interviewee. Some information gathered was repeated by a large number of discrete interviewees. Because such information was confirmed by many different sources, it was deemed credible and treated as typical and widespread behavior. When information was gathered that was unique, the author would include it in questions with subsequent interviewees as a means to confirm or falsify it. If the author was able to triangulate support for such information from at least two other discrete sources (usually one American, one Japanese), then the author tended to treat the information as credible and representative of typical and widespread behavior. If the author could not triangulate support for a comment, it was not dismissed as valueless, but if used in the report, it was identified as simply an individual’s or a small group’s comment rather than typical or widespread.
Appendix B: Unworkable Options to Deal with Multiplicity of U.S. Operational Actors

Components Delegate a Lead Directorate

Understanding that an increasing number of SDF staffs are communicating and coordinating with PACOM and its components, and this is something out of U.S. power to control, one idea is for PACOM to have each of its components delegate a key lead to interact with their Japanese counterparts to minimize the number of dyads interfacing across the spectrum. This would reduce what one senior U.S. officer called the “spray” of requests coming from the various staff offices and headquarters. Operationally, it would mean that most communication and coordination, including formal requests, would be narrowed down to four, with the 5 Directorate in each component command being the most likely recipient of this responsibility. The problem with this idea is its impracticability. It is simply impossible to have one office within each command handle all the communication and coordination with Japan. After all, would the GSDF G3 want to talk to the G5 at USARPAC or the J5 at PACOM? It would actually cause more confusion and complicate communications and coordination because people with different knowledge backgrounds would be forced to communicate with one another. One official, critical of this option, said “this would be the funnel of information death.”

Delegate One Lead Component Command

Another option is to designate a lead coordinating authority from one of PACOM’s components to funnel formal communication and coordination between the allies, similar to MARFORPAC’s role in the Philippines, for example. One lead coordinating authority

---

196 Anonymous D, Interview with author, June 29, 2016.
provides integrated, centralized communication with Japan, thereby simplifying communication. Given that the dominating geographical feature of the region is the Pacific Ocean—hence a maritime theater—PACFLT would likely be the lead coordinating authority. This option, as the most drastic of the three options, understandably is the most problematic.

- It would minimize USFJ’s role in Japan as the main interlocutor with JSO because the USFJ Commander would undoubtedly say he is the lead coordinating authority.
- It would require discipline by each PACOM component to change their approach to Japan by funneling communication and coordination directly through PACFLT.
- It would give PACFLT a new dimension of responsibilities that would overburden its staff already tasked with PACFLT-specific duties.

The example of MARFORPAC and the Philippines works precisely because the main role of the United States is largely security assistance. In Japan, a country with roughly 50,000 forces, all four services represented, and three three-star flag officers, this option is not workable due to the sheer volume of interaction between U.S. forces and Japan’s SDF.
Appendix C: Unworkable Changes to USFJ

Operationalization

Many respondents liked the idea of operationalizing USFJ. Indeed, of all the possible options I dismiss here, operationalizing USFJ is the hardest to disregard. Holding certain authorities in Hawaii worked when Japan was a sanctuary location from which the United States could operate with impunity. Today, if Japan is attacked, it makes operational sense for USFJ to have the authority to direct action on the ground until PACOM can designate an operational unit to respond. The problem, however, stems from what this change in authorities requires. Because operationalization requires organizing, training, and equipping another three-star command, the changes promise to be expensive, and in today's fiscal realities, there are no resources for this. Similarly, it would demand a significant increase in manpower, but it is unclear from where these forces could be drawn. Another issue to consider is what the mission would be for an operationalized USFJ command. Most of the contingencies that planners envision are for combat outside of Japan, such as the Korean Peninsula or the South China Sea. In this case, however, it is not necessary to operationalize USFJ when the 7th Fleet and III MEF are already authorized as JTF-capable commands.

Downgrade to Two-Star Command

A second option would be to keep USFJ in its current form and function as PACOM's representative doing administrative work with GOJ but to downgrade it to a two-star command. The logic is that a three-star command is not necessary for work that can be accomplished by a two-star. One problem with this is that of symbolism. If PACOM's top representative in Japan is a two-star while Navy and Marines maintain three-stars, it sends a strong message to Japan's JSO—which USFJ mainly communicates with—that it is not highly valued, particularly if the Commander for USFK/Combined Forces Command/UN Command remains headed by a four-star. Also, a two-star would not be able to deal at the right level with the SDF. If the downgrade to a two-star is accompanied by a similar downgrade in capacity, this leads to a second problem. If the capacity of USFJ staff is reduced, it does not mean that the responsibilities disappear. Quite the contrary, the question then becomes who picks up those responsibilities. Both the Navy and Marine three-star commands
focus on missions beyond the defense of Japan, so it is difficult to expect these commands to take over these administrative duties. If not them, then who?

**Shrink USFJ and Move to Ichigaya:**

The third option is to drastically shrink USFJ from its current form to a small, permanently detached group assigned with administrative duties and move this onto the grounds of MOD to ensure quick access between USFJ-MOD officials. In so doing, the dual-hatted nature of the USFJ Commander could be eliminated and the 5th AF commander could exist separately as a three-star. The problem with this option is an accentuation of the problems in option 2; namely, if the current capacity of USFJ staff is reduced, who picks up those responsibilities? With USFJ staff at approximately 180 people, if this gets drastically reduced, the bandwidth to engage Japan and assist any U.S. warfighting commander operating out of Japan becomes significantly reduced. The four in-Japan service components cannot operate without having someone in charge. USFJ’s “administrative requirements are much bigger than most realize” and will need to be taken care.\(^\text{198}\) As such, this option is not suggested.

\(^{198}\) Ibid.
Dr. Jeffrey W. Hornung is a political scientist at the RAND Corporation. He specializes in Japanese security and foreign policies, East Asian security issues, and U.S. foreign and defense policies in the Asia-Pacific region, including its alliances. Hornung joined RAND in April 2017. He was the Fellow for the Security and Foreign Affairs Program at Sasakawa USA from 2015 until 2017.

From 2010–2015, Hornung worked as an Associate Professor for the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, a Department of Defense executive education facility in Honolulu, Hawaii. Prior to that, Hornung served as a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Ohio State University’s East Asian Studies Center, a research assistant at George Washington University’s “Memory and Reconciliation in the Asia-Pacific” project, and also worked for a member of the Japanese Diet during the 2001 House of Councillors election.

Hornung has written about Japanese security and foreign policy issues for numerous media, policy, and academic outlets. He is also co-editor of the forthcoming Routledge book *Chinese-Japanese Competition and the East Asian Security Complex: Vying for Influence* (Spring 2017).

Hornung received his Ph.D. in political science from the George Washington University. He also holds an MA in international relations with a concentration in Japan Studies from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a BA in political science and international affairs from Marquette University. During 2005–2006, Hornung was also a visiting scholar at the University of Tokyo where he conducted his doctoral research as a Fulbright Fellow.