The Japan-U.S. Alliance as an Indispensable Element of Japan’s National Security Policy
The Japan-U.S. Alliance is one of the three pillars of Japan’s national security strategy. It has been an indispensable element of Japan’s policy for decades. Even Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba’s controversial article “Establishing the Asian NATO” concludes with his resolve to “actively contribute to the peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific nations based on the Japan-U.S. Alliance.”[1] While the national security policy remains a sensitive political issue in Japan, the bilateral alliance was maintained even when the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was out of power and more liberal parties, such as the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), took power in Japan’s politics. The relationship has remained strong and has even become more robust, notwithstanding the widespread “amorphous anti-Americanism lite or anti-American mood”, which is missing in standard public opinion polls in Japan.[2]
The Japan-U.S. Alliance has vital importance for Japan’s national security because Northeast Asia, where Japan is located, is a densely militarized region with three nuclear and authoritarian powers, e.g., Russia, China and North Korea. Its own nuclearization would be a non-starter because Japan lacks strategic depth to absorb massive nuclear attacks. It is the only reasonable and realistic option for Japan to enhance the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrence by cementing the alliance relationship with the U.S.
The bilateral relationship has been mature, buttressed by the long history of more than two centuries, starting even before Commodore Perry’s expedition to Japan in 1853-1854. In fact, the Japan-U.S. relationship is a multi-layered relationship, including business-to-business, military-to-military, and people-to-people. It is not just a personal tie between any specific political leaders of the two countries.
It continues to be in the national interest of Japan to keep the U.S. engaged in and committed to Japan’s security and regional stability. A robust tie between the two countries will continue to benefit U.S. interests in Northeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific.
While the U.S. role is critical for the regional stability, it could not be achieved by the U.S. alone or just by the Japan-U.S. alliance cooperation. Partnerships with other like-minded countries, including but not limited to the other U.S. allies in the region, have to be strengthened and more networked with each other. It should not be construed as Japan’s hedging due to the so-called “decline” of the U.S. or as Japan’s drifting away from the bilateral alliance. Rather, it should be appraised as an instrument to promote the power of the bilateral alliance. Networking of partnerships and alliances is a must in order to maintain peace and stability in today’s interconnected world. The Japan-U.S. Alliance remains the core of the collaborative efforts.
Questions Regarding the U.S.
While security ties with the U.S. are of such importance for Japan’s security, it is easy to pose some serious questions regarding the U.S.’s orientation from the view-point of the Japanese public.
Has American democracy lost its firm foundations? In view of the fact that the candidate who did not accept his defeat in the 2020 presidential election and instigated his supporters to assault the Capitol was elected as the president again with a large majority, it is natural to have a grave concern about the health of American democracy. It is relevant to the Japan-U.S. Alliance because the alliance is based on shared values and principles which include democracy and the rule of law. It is relevant also to the credibility of the concept of the rules-based international order because this concept is modeled after the modern Western style of democracy, reflecting the Anglo-American legal culture including the principle of the rule of law. If American democracy deteriorates, it will directly affect the credibility of the world view that the U.S., Japan, and other like-minded countries have been trying to uphold.
There is another question. Will the U.S. still value alliances and partnerships? No country can achieve its national security all by itself in this globalized world. Alliances and partnerships are not burdens, but valuable assets for all partners. There is no such profession as a policeman in this decentralized world. The role of the U.S. in international security is that of “the fire fighter, rushing forward to put out political and military blazes.”[3] The world expects the U.S. to only be the role of a leading firefighter. It is a leader of the neighborhood watch or the vigilance group, and therefore mutual support among the members of the community is essentially important. Redefinition of burden sharing may be inevitable due to the change of security environment . But disregard for the importance of alliances and partnerships will cause deep chasms among friends and arouse xenophobic nationalism within partner countries, only pleasing adversaries.
There is one more question. Has the U.S. revived territorial ambitions? The U.S. is not hesitant to use its military might if necessary for its national interests. It is not hesitant even to topple regimes of other sovereign countries but did so without territorial ambitions. Then, how should we interpret U.S. President Donald Trump’s desire to reassert U.S. control over the Panama Canal, by military means if necessary, and his desire to purchase Greenland without ruling out the use of military or economic coercion? It is uncertain whether he is making serious proposals or just using rhetorical flourishes to attract media attention or provoke dealmaking.[4] But his behaviors seriously hurt the credibility of the U.S. as a champion of the international norm for territorial integrity. It looks like Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s assertive operations in the East and South China Seas to try to alter the status quo by force and coercion. President Trump’s actions and statements on the Panama Canal and Greenland will undermine the principled basis of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.
Where has the principle of the rule of law gone? Even the Japan-U.S. Joint Statement of February 10, 2017, had a passage: “The two leaders underscored the importance of maintaining international order based upon the rule of law.” This was the outcome of the first official meeting between President Trump and former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. The expression “the rule of law” is missing in the most recent United States-Japan Joint Leaders’ Statement of February 7, 2025, between President Trump and Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba. In the 2025 joint statement, the two leaders “affirmed their determination to pursue a new golden age for U.S.-Japan relations that upholds a free and open Indo-Pacific and brings peace and prosperity to a violent and disorderly world” without explicit reference to the principle of the rule of law. This principle has the following three points: first, opposition to the influence of arbitrary power; second, equality before the law; and third, respect for the rights of community members.[5] All these points are important tools to reprimand China’s assertive activities in East Asia. While China does not respect this principle, exemplified by its claim of the nine-dash line in the South China Sea, China’s President Xi Jinping said before the 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in October 2017 that China must be fully committed to promoting rule of law, though it is modified as “socialist rule of law with Chinese characteristics.” More recently, China committed to “an international order based on the rule of law and international law” in the Joint Declaration of the Ninth ROK-Japan-China Trilateral Summit in May 2027.[6] Lack of the specific reference to this important principle in the 2025 Japan-U.S. Joint Leaders’ Statement may weaken diplomatic pressure on China, as well as the credibility of the U.S.
However, we do not have to be too pessimistic. Dr. Koji Murata, a renowned Japanese expert on U.S. politics, argues, “We must avoid making self-fulfilling prophesies. Even if we cannot help being pessimistic in the short term, we need to hold an optimistic attitude in the long term,” referring to the famous words of Winston Churchill, “You can always count on Americans to do the right thing—after they’ve tried everything else.”[7] It is a well-known fact that Americans often make mistakes, but that they always come back by correcting themselves. That is the resilience of the U.S. It is wrong to ignore the American power for course correction.
Dr. Murata also argues, “Trump’s victory in the presidential election under the Biden administration is the best evidence against the vulgar discourses that the 2020 election was stolen. Since the incumbent president in power (Biden) could not steal the election this time, it would have been impossible at all for the Democratic candidate Biden to steal the election under the Trump administration four years ago. The American democratic system is functioning.”[8]
According to an opinion poll conducted by Pew Research Center, the U.S. public has become significantly more likely to say limiting the power and influence of China is a top priority for the U.S.’s long-term foreign policy (49 percent in 2024, which is +17 percentage points since 2018), and increased their emphasis on limiting the power and influence of Russia, particularly in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine (50 percent in 2024, which is +8 percentage points since 2018). Only 24 percent of Americans prioritize reducing military commitments overseas (-6 percentage points since 2018) in the U.S.’s long-term foreign policy.[9]
According to another poll conducted by Chicago Council on Global Affairs, U.S. public support for an active U.S. role in the world hit a near-record low in 2024,[10] but the same poll shows that the American public takes a positive view of alliances; nearly two-thirds (64 percent) think they benefit both the U.S. and its allies (51 percent) or mostly benefit the U.S. (13 percent).[11] The Chicago Council concludes that majorities continue to recognize the importance of both alliances and superior military power in relation to U.S. national security, and also that Americans, overall, do not want a radical change to U.S. foreign policy and support remains strong for the core pillars of U.S. foreign policy.[12]
The first Trump administration was tough on China, and the U.S. Government remained so under the Biden administration. The second Trump administration is keeping its tough position on China. Meanwhile, a Pew Research Center survey shows that 81 percent of U.S. adults see China unfavorably today, including 43 percent who hold a very unfavorable opinion.[13] The statement of U.S. Steel’s CEO on then-President Joe Biden’s order to block Nippon Steel’s proposed acquisition of U.S. Steel, “He (Biden) insulted Japan, a vital economic and national security ally, and put American competitiveness at risk. The Chinese Communist Party leaders in Beijing are “dancing in the streets”[14] may be viewed as an example of American expression on the value of the alliance and on the threat perception regarding China. Meanwhile, Japan regards China as the country which presents “an unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge in ensuring the peace and security of Japan and the peace and stability of the international community, as well as in strengthening the international order based on the rule of law” according to its National Security Strategy of 2022. Thus, the two countries’ views on China overlap with each other. Their common view on China will continue to be a basis of their alliance cooperation.
Current Achievement
In fact, the current U.S. president is not what the U.S. is all about. Having said so, the first official meeting between President Trump and Prime Minister Ishiba successfully set a new basis for alliance cooperation in their United States–Japan Joint Leaders’ Statement. A narrow majority of the Japanese public gave a favorable review of the meeting in two recent opinion polls conducted in Japan.[15]
While the United States–Japan Joint Leaders’ Statement does not refer to the principle of the rule of law as noted above and lacks any statement on opposition to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, different from the Joint Leaders’ Statement “Global Partners for the Future” of April 2024 between then-President Biden and then-Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, it has laid out a solid foundation for alliance cooperation in the coming years in the following significant ways:
First of all, the two leaders affirmed their commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), which is the core principle of Japan’s international security cooperation that includes Japan–U.S. Alliance cooperation. Their commitment to this vision shows the continuity of the alliance’s trajectory. Also, one of the basic principles of the FOIP vision, at least from the Japanese perspective, is the rule of law. Even without explicit reference to this principle in the joint statement, it can be reasonably said that the joint statement has the core principle of the rules-based order in it.
Second, credibility of U.S. extended deterrence continues to be ensured as a matter of declaratory policy. The most relevant part of the joint statement is “The United States underscored its unwavering commitment to the defense of Japan, using its range of capabilities, including nuclear capabilities.” The previous joint statement of April 2024 between Biden and Kishida had an almost identical sentence: “President Biden reiterated the unwavering commitment of the United States to the defense of Japan under Article V of the [Security) Treaty, using its full range of capabilities, including nuclear capabilities.” The continued U.S. commitment to hold out the nuclear umbrella to Japan is critically important for the peace and stability of Northeast Asia.
Third, the two leaders declared their intention “to advance multilayered and aligned cooperation among like-minded countries, including Japan-Australia-India-U.S. (Quad), Japan-U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan-U.S.-Australia, and Japan-U.S.-Philippines.” These mini-laterals will strengthen the U.S.-centered alliance network in the Indo-Pacific region and contribute to the realization of a free and open Indo-Pacific. Having as many friends as possible is simply good.
Fourth, the two leaders’ strong opposition to China’s attempts to try to alter the status quo by force or coercion in the East and South China Seas is clearly stated. The statement is not new, but as China is more assertive physically and verbally particularly in the South China Sea, the joint statement conveys a strong message toward China.
China is good at manipulating legal technicalities for their own benefits, such as their unilateral claim of historic rights in the South China Sea. Therefore, Japan and the United States must remain vigilant and keep opposing with one voice. China was relatively silent about the notorious nine-dash line claim for a while after the ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration of July 2016 probably because it caused heavy international reprimand. But as China noticed the forgetfulness of the international community, it began to speak up again and even expand the claim, adding another dash to the east of Taiwan.
Fifth, related to the fourth point, the joint statement’s reference to Taiwan is significant. The passage “The two leaders emphasized the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as an indispensable element of security and prosperity for the international community. They encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues” is not new. But the joint statement inserted new language soon after this passage: “[the two leaders] opposed any attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force or coercion.” As the military balance across the Taiwan Strait is being tilted toward the Chinese side and China’s pressure on Taiwan has been increasing particularly since the inauguration of Taiwan’s new president, the newly inserted language may make a difference.
It is also noteworthy that the two leaders “expressed support for Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations.” This support is not new for the U.S. or Japan. Even the seven countries of the G7 expressed their support in the Apulia G7 Leaders’ Communiqué in June 2024.[16] However, support for Taiwan’s international participation is expressed for the first time in the Japan-U.S. bilateral joint leaders’ statements. This specific statement has great significance as Taiwan’s international breathing space is becoming narrower and narrower even though Taiwan’s contribution to the peace and prosperity of the international community is increasing.
Finally, the joint statement’s expression of “their serious concerns over and the need to address North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs” is also important. North Korea’s nuclearization is a typical example of horizontal proliferation. Proliferation of nuclear weapons must be thwarted no matter what because it undermines nuclear deterrence. North Korea already abandoned its commitment to denuclearization and is expanding its nuclear force. North Korea even suggested proactive use of nuclear weapons. Also, the Russian invasion of Ukraine sets a very bad example for North Korea as Russia invaded the country which abandoned nuclear weapons by the Budapest Memorandum of 1994. Moreover, Russia and North Korea concluded the Treaty on the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in June 2024. The treaty elevated the bilateral tie to the level of alliance. North Korea has been sending its troops to Ukraine to assist Russian forces. In return, North Korea is getting money, food, oil and battlefield experience. This adds another global meaning to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In light of these situations, it is becoming a bigger challenge for the international community to keep pressuring North Korea. Therefore, both bilateral alliance cooperation between Japan and the U.S. and robust trilateral partnership of Japan, the U.S., and South Korea are indispensable in order to address those North Korean challenges, as indicated in the joint statement.
Agenda for the Future
Mr. Shigeru Yoshida, the prime minister at the time of Japan’s re-independence in the early 1950s, wrote in his memoir later that he had thought that national defense all by itself would be a laughable and outdated idea in light of the intensified confrontation with the communist bloc and highly accumulated stockpile of armaments.[17] His view applies even today in Northeast Asia.
According to the same memoir, when he visited Europe in 1954, he said to the leaders of Italy, “There are some people in Japan who say that the American forces stationed in Japan should be withdrawn. This view is obviously just the same as a part of Soviet and Chinese harassment tactics against Japan. It is as if the thief told the policeman to go away because he could not rob in front of the policeman. Japan cannot accept such a policy to sever the Japan-U.S. relationship.”[18]
He is right, but it is not easy to maintain the alliance relationship. Probably, maintenance of a stable and robust alliance is a challenging job for any country which depends on alliance with other sovereign states. Probably, not easy even for NATO members although the North Atlantic Alliance is often called the most successful and strongest alliance in history. It is because dependence on foreign countries for the protection of national sovereignty will easily provoke fanatic views based on nationalism.
Additionally, there is a challenge unique to the Japan-U.S. Alliance. It is the asymmetrical nature of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. In general, the alliance is for mutual defense, but the Japan-U.S. Alliance is different. If Japan is invaded, the U.S. is obliged to come to Japan’s rescue, but not vice versa. It is what is prescribed in Article 5 of the Security Treaty. Instead, Japan has an obligation to provide military bases to the U.S. in accordance with Article 6 of the treaty. The U.S. obligation to come to rescue Japan and the Japanese obligation to provide bases to the U.S. are balanced but not identical. The asymmetrical nature is mainly because of Japan’s restriction on the use of force set forth by the Constitution of Japan.
Here is a big issue: The asymmetrical alliance is difficult to manage. The U.S. side may complain that the deal is unfair because Japan will not help the U.S. in the event of a third country’s invasion of the U.S. even though the U.S. must help Japan in the event of a third country’s invasion of Japan. This is exactly what Donald Trump said during his presidential campaign in 2016 and in his first term. On the other hand, the Japan side may complain differently, saying that in order to obtain American help in a once-in-a-lifetime or less probable contingency, they have to suffer a variety of serious problems caused by U.S. military presence such as accidents, crimes, and noise almost every day, day and night. Both side are dissatisfied.
In order to overcome this difficult situation, the following two objectives must be met: first, Japan must assume greater roles for national and international security; and second, Japan must make more efforts to reduce negative impacts of U.S. presence in Japan. Both are challenging jobs, but attainable.
In order to enhance Japan’s roles in security, Japan must have enough capability to assume greater roles and also strong will to use force if necessary for such purposes. In this respect, the joint statement’s reference to “Japan’s 2015 Legislation for Peace and Security, which enables U.S.-Japan Alliance deterrence and response capabilities” and to “Japan’s commitment, underpinned by a favorable trend of its defense budget increase, to building capabilities by FY 2027 to consolidate its primary responsibility for defending Japan, and building on this significant foundation, to fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities beyond FY 2027” is noteworthy.
In order to reduce negative impacts of U.S. force presence in Japan, Japan must make more efforts, for example, by relocating U.S. bases from busy business districts to less populated areas but without undermining military capabilities. In this respect, the joint statement’s reference to “the vital importance of the steady implementation of the realignment of the U.S. forces in Japan” should not be taken lightly. However, reduction of the negative impacts must not be a self-objective. Japan must provide a more dependable stationing and operating environment for the U.S. forces. Otherwise, Japan’s value will not increase in the eyes of the Americans.
In both efforts, close U.S. cooperation with Japan is a must. The said joint statement established a solid groundwork for this. It is important to put the substance of the statement into real practice immediately.
For this purpose, candid, frequent, and deep discussion between the two countries by sharing enough information and intelligence is increasingly important in order to compare notes of their threat perceptions, particularly on China, Russia, and North Korea.
Also, it is indispensable for the two countries to broaden their channels of communication and cooperation and make them more robust. The Japan-U.S. Alliance is a time-tested institutional relationship, but it should not be taken for granted. Military-to-military ties are the very basis of the alliance, but the alliance is much more than the military ties. It must be more multilayered, and each layer must be more active and intertwined with each other.
Alliances generate mutual benefits. Partners are not adversaries. Adversaries are elsewhere outside of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. The two countries should not lose sight of these points.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping issued their joint leaders’ statement three weeks before the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, in which they stated, “the new inter-State relations between Russia and China are superior to political and military alliances of the Cold War era.” Their view of Western alliances is wrong. They were redefined in the early days of the post-Cold War era one way or another. The Japan-U.S. Alliance, too. The view that dependence on the alliance relationship for security is Cold War-minded is exactly a Cold War-minded view. But if the promoters of the alliance do not keep aligning it to the requirements of the changing world, such a wrong narrative will keep spreading and undermine the basis of our own security.
Japan is a maritime nation as defined in its National Security Strategy. Both Japan and the U.S. grew up on the water and keep growing on the water. In this sense, the Japan-U.S. Alliance is a maritime alliance. The Indo-Pacific is a vast seascape, and the sea connects the two countries. East Asia is at the forefront of today’s great power rivalry, where the big land power of China and the great sea power of the U.S. are facing each other. The buffer between these two powers is becoming narrower, particularly due to China’s maritime expansion. This trend is making the region unstable and dangerous. In order to address this serious situation, Japan and the U.S. must not spare their efforts to sustain the bilateral maritime alliance.
Mr. Hideshi Tokuchi wrote in his personal capacity. The views and interpretations expressed by the author are solely his own.
Mr. Hideshi Tokuchi joined Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA (Sasakawa USA) in September 2016 following a 36-year career of service to the government of Japan, most recently as the nation’s first-ever vice-minister of defense for international affairs. Tokuchi joined the Japanese Defense Agency (the predecessor of the Ministry of Defense) in 1979 as a civilian and retired from public service on October 1, 2015, after completing several senior assignments at the Ministry of Defense, including as director-general of the Operations Bureau, of the Personnel and Education Bureau, of the Finance and Equipment Bureau, and of the Defense Policy Bureau. During most of his service, Tokuchi focused on Japan-U.S. defense cooperation, security-related legislation and defense buildup programs of Japan. From July 1995 through November 1996, Tokuchi was stationed in Washington, DC to study the Asia policy of the U.S. in the post-Cold War era as a visiting senior research fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) of the U.S. National Defense University (NDU).
In addition to his position at Sasakawa USA, Tokuchi additionally holds several positions in other academic and research institutions in Tokyo: President of Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS); visiting fellow at the Institute of International Relations of Sophia University; senior research advisor at the Nakasone Peace Institute(NPI). He has been teaching security-related issues at a few universities in Japan as well. On these capacities, he continues his research work on the alliance relationship between Japan and the U.S. Tokuchi received his bachelor of laws degree from the University of Tokyo in 1979 and received a master of arts in law and diplomacy (M.A.L.D.) degree at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1986.
Expertise: Japan-U.S. defense cooperation; Japanese security legislation; Japanese international security cooperation; Japanese national security policy
[1] Shigeru Ishiba, “Establishing the Asian NATO,” Hudson Institute, September 27, 2024, https://www.hudson.org/politics-government/shigeru-ishiba-japans-new-security-era-future-japans-foreign-policy#:~:text=Japan%2DUS%20alliance.-,%E6%97%A5%E6%9C%AC%E3%81%AE%E5%A4%96%E4%BA%A4%E6%94%BF%E7%AD%96%E3%81%AE%E5%B0%86%E6%9D%A5,-%E3%82%A2%E3%82%B8%E3%82%A2%E7%89%88NATO.
[2] Toshihiro Nakayama, “Postwar Japan and ‘Anti-Americanism Lite,’” English-Speaking Union of Japan, October 25, 2010, https://www.esuj.gr.jp/jitow/314_index_detail.php.
[3] Robert Scalapino, “The American Response to a Changing Asia,” National Defense University, March 1999, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/pacific99/SCALAPIMO.html.
[4] Steve Contorno, “Trump is teasing US expansion into Panama, Greenland and Canada,” CNN, December 23, 2024, https://edition.cnn.com/2024/12/23/politics/trump-us-expansion-panama-canada-greenland/index.html.
[5] “Speech by H.E. Judge Rosalyn Higgins, President of the International Court of Justice, at the United Nations University on ‘The ICJ and the Rule of Law,’” United Nations University, April 11, 2007, https://archive.unu.edu/events/files/2007/20070411_Higgins_speech.pdf.
[6] “Joint Declaration of the Ninth ROK-Japan-China Trilateral Summit,” May 27, 2024, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/100675229.pdf.
[7] Koji Murata, “The “FEAR” Returned – The Meaning of Trump’s Reinstatement,” Security Studies, 6, no. 4, (January 2025) 109.
[8] Ibid., 106-107.
[9] Jacob Poushter and Laura Clancy, “What Are Americans’ Top Foreign Policy Priorities?” Pew Research Center, April 23, 2024, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2024/04/23/—what-are-americans-top-foreign-policy-priorities/.
[10] Dina Smeltz et al., “America’s Foreign Policy Future: Public Opinion and the 2024 Election: Results of the 2024 Chicago Council Survey of American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy,” The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2024, 8, https://globalaffairs.org/sites/default/files/2024-12/2024%20CCS%20Overall%20Report_v2.pdf.
[11] Ibid., 18.
[12] Ibid., 6.
[13] Christine Huang, Laura Silver and Laura Clancy, “Americans Remain Critical of China,” Pew Research Center, May 1, 2024, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2024/05/01/—americans-remain-critical-of-china/.
[14] “Statement from David B. Burritt, U.S. Steel President and CEO, on Today’s Order by President Biden,” United States Steel, January 3, 2025, https://www.ussteel.com/newsroom/-/blogs/statement-from-david-b-burritt-u-s-steel-president-and-ceo-on-today-s-order-by-president-biden-.
[15] 50 percent (affirmative) to 35 percent (negative) in Asahi Shimbun poll, Hiroyoshi Osaki, “Survey: Ishiba Cabinet approval rating rises after Trump summit,” Asahi Shimbun, February 17, 2025, https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/15628962. 50.1 percent (affirmative) to 42.7 percent (negative) in Kyodo News poll, “50.1% of Japanese give high marks to Ishiba-Trump summit: Kyodo poll,” Kyodo News, February 16, 2025, https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2025/02/3a1bf4ace2c2-urgent-501-of-japanese-give-high-marks-to-ishiba-trump-summit-kyodo-poll.html?phrase=opinion&words=.
[16] The Communiqué says, “We support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations, including in the World Health Assembly and WHO technical meetings, as a member where statehood is not a prerequisite and as an observer or guest where it is.”
[17] Shigeru Yoshida, Kaiso 10-nen [Ten years of reminiscence] 1, Chuo-Koron-sha, 1998, 204.
[18] Ibid., 246.
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