This report is part of Amb. Mitchell and Ms. Mitchell’s participation in the Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA’s U.S.-Japan Research Exchange (UJREX) program, which brought them to Tokyo in October 2025 to interview policy practitioners and experts in the Japanese government, non-profits, and the private sector, and learn how Japan has been responding to threats of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI). During their stay in Tokyo, the fellows also had the opportunity to give a lecture on their findings and analysis on FIMI to a group of Diet members in the Liberal Democratic Party’s Research Commission on info-Communications Strategy.
Key Findings
Based on our study trip to Japan, this paper identifies the following key findings:
- Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) is a Nascent but Rapidly Escalating Threat in Japan: While Japanese attention to FIMI was minimal prior to 2023, foreign information campaigns related to Okinawa/Ryukyus, the Fukushima treated water discharge, and according to some, the July 2025 upper house election have elevated the issue onto the national security agenda.
- Awareness and appreciation remain uneven: Complacency about Japan’s natural resilience to external influence has led many Japanese citizens, including politicians, to dismiss its relevance. Lack of attention remains a problem but is slowly changing.
- Structural Responses are Fragile: The government-wide coordination body established by the Ishiba government in September 2025 is a critical step forward, but, as one interlocutor put it, it is “just being born.” Its survival will depend on the Takaichi administration’s willingness to prioritize cognitive security and the development of Japan’s intelligence capability alongside infrastructure protection.
- Japan is a “Soft Target”: The erosion of the language barrier via artificial intelligence (AI), combined with a trusting population, and limited institutional capacity, organizational maturity, public awareness, and dedicated personnel, makes Japan uniquely vulnerable to future FIMI campaigns.
FIMI — the intentional, coordinated, and deceptive use of information by foreign states or non-state actors to undermine public trust, interfere with democratic processes, and generally advance their geopolitical interests has become an urgent threat to open, democratic societies worldwide. Japan is no exception.
Benefiting from the scope, speed, and reach of digital platforms, authoritarian actors are taking standard-issue propaganda campaigns to another level by not only promoting and spreading biased, self-interested narratives but also applying subversive techniques to undermine the very integrity of their information sources. As such, FIMI transcends even disinformation — the spread of false information with the intention to deceive — by actively manipulating media channels themselves to create and spread fabricated content, artificially amplify false narratives, and discredit reliable information sources to create confusion, deepen societal divisions, and shape a target country’s politics and values.
And the advent of AI will only make this challenge exponentially more severe over time.[1]
Most nations have been slow to meet the challenge. For decades, Tokyo regarded disinformation as a problem for others, a vulnerability afflicting the fractured electorates of the West rather than a direct threat to Japan’s more polite, consensus-driven politics.[2] This prevailing assumption of immunity stemmed from Japan’s centuries-long experience with Chinese influence operations and what many considered to be a natural (“accidental”) resilience against external threats due to Japan’s deeply ingrained societal trust and formidable linguistic firewall.[3] Policymakers confidently asserted that their intricate writing system, comprising hiragana, katakana, and kanji, combined with the nation’s highly contextual cultural nuances, served as an effective barrier to entry, ensuring that foreign influence operations were immediately identifiable by their linguistic clumsiness or unnatural phrasing, thereby keeping the country uniquely insulated from the rising tide of FIMI.[4]
This complacency has begun to erode. The field research we conducted in Tokyo in November 2025 reveals that elite views of FIMI are undergoing a fundamental, if nascent, shift. Until recently, Japanese authorities largely treated information manipulation as a “public affairs” matter: a diplomatic nuisance to be managed by press secretaries. Beginning in 2023, a distinct shift occurred. Within the corridors of Kasumigaseki, FIMI was reclassified as a priority worthy of mention in the National Security Strategy, albeit framed narrowly as “information warfare through spread of disinformation.”
Nonetheless, a cognitive gap persists at the political level. The political leadership in Nagatacho remains generally dismissive toward the threat. As one senior Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) figure candidly admitted during recent consultations, “almost none” of their colleagues recognize the severity of the challenge from foreign influence operations. This complacency rests on the dangerous assumption that the nation remains naturally immune to such tactics.
This paper outlines the rapidly evolving threat landscape in Japan, nascent efforts to address the threat, internal (bureaucratic) constraints against action, and recommendations to meet the growing challenge.
The Wake-up Call: Fukushima
If the illusion of Japanese immunity to information warfare was eroding slowly over the past decade, it was shattered decisively in August 2023. The catalyst was the release of Advanced Liquid Processing System (ALPS)-treated water from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. Tokyo anticipated diplomatic friction; what it encountered instead was a full-spectrum cognitive assault.[5]
For the first time, Japanese officials watched as China deployed a synchronized, multi-platform information campaign that overwhelmed Japan’s traditional crisis communication channels. Beijing utilized information arbitrage, flooding social media platforms with terrifying (and scientifically baseless) imagery of “nuclear-contaminated water.”[6] This was not merely a dispute over environmental policy; it was a campaign designed to inflict harm on the Japanese seafood industry and damage Tokyo’s reputation internationally.[7]
This episode forced a rapid operational shift within Kasumigaseki. Prior to 2023, disinformation was largely managed as a relatively minor matter of public affairs best addressed from the MOFA press podium. However, the sheer velocity of the Fukushima campaign demonstrated that the Japanese government’s public affairs tools were insufficient against modern forms of weaponized narratives. The 2024 Diplomatic Bluebook explicitly acknowledges this reality, citing Fukushima as a definitive case of “disinformation” that necessitated a response under the December 2022 national security strategy.[8] Consequently, the defense against FIMI has moved from the periphery of public relations to the center of the National Security Council’s agenda, validating the 2022 strategic assessment that the “boundary between military and non-military fields is no longer clear-cut.”[9]
The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) Fukushima campaign, therefore, has been called Japan’s information “wake-up call.” But Fukushima was a relatively straightforward and overt PRC propaganda campaign that Japan was able to ultimately deflect through an extended public affairs campaign that successfully leveraged scientific fact, coordinated talking points, and an aggressive multilingual (including Chinese language) offensive on social media. But not every foreign information operation will be so overt, traceable, and publicly refutable through scientific evidence.
The Myth of Immunity: Japan’s Historical Cognitive Defense
Throughout the Cold War and the early post-Cold War era, Japan’s information environment was remarkably stable, even insulated. The kisha club (press club) system ensured a homogenized, if sometimes stifling, media narrative.[10] The dominance of television (NHK and key commercial broadcasters) created a shared reality for the vast majority of citizens. Unlike in the United States, where the media landscape has fractured into partisan echo chambers, Japan has maintained a relatively unified public discourse where fringe narratives struggle to gain traction.[11] Most Japanese citizens continue to obtain their news from traditional sources, including legacy newspapers and news wires (Yomiuri, Asahi, Nikkei Shimbuns, Jiji Press, etc.). Early attempts by foreign actors to penetrate Japanese social media were often marked by unnatural phrasing, simplified Chinese characters incompatible with Japanese kanji, or cultural tone-deafness that immediately identified the content as foreign.
Nonetheless, while Japan has focused its national security resources on building up its military hardware and infrastructure, securing its physical borders and hardening power grids against cyber-attacks, like others (including the United States), it has failed to build the cognitive immune system required for the digital age. There has been no concerted effort to teach digital media literacy in schools to prepare the next generation for algorithmic manipulation.[12] There are only three fact-checking organizations in Japan certified by the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN), and a paucity of information-monitoring civic organizations like Japan Nexus Intelligence. Few are well-resourced, hamstrung by a weak philanthropic sector and limited government funding. The absence of a robust network of civic tech organizations to partner with the Japanese government and other public institutions to monitor and respond to future information challenges will become a source of vulnerability going forward.
The Structure of the Threat: Flood and Fracture
The modern FIMI threat is not a monolith; it is a multifaceted assault. While multiple actors operate in the Indo-Pacific information space, Tokyo faces two primary FIMI adversaries, the PRC and the Russian Federation, each employing a unique operational logic.
The Russian Federation: The Strategy of “Fracture” and Political Arson
According to those monitoring FIMI in the country, until recently, there were more FIMI attacks coming from Russia than China. If China’s goal is to surgically undermine the U.S.-Japan alliance, Russia’s goal has been to promote self-interested narratives and set the political house on fire, a strategy of “fracture” designed to dismantle democratic consensus by exploiting societal fault lines.[13]
Interlocutors described Russian operations as “more harmful” in the short term because they target the fundamental machinery of democracy.[14] During the July 2025 election, Russian operations appeared to be designed largely to sow societal discord, division, and confusion. Interlocutors described a flood of “nihilistic” narratives: claims that the voting system was rigged, that all politicians are puppets of the United States, and that democracy itself is a failed experiment.[15] This mirrored election-season tactics seen in Europe and the United States,[16] but their arrival in Japan shocked the political class. Russia-sourced accounts also appeared to amplify themes favored by the populist right-wing Sansei-to (Sansei Party), including its anti-globalist, anti-vaccine, “Japan First” campaign platform. While there is no evidence of direct collusion between Russia and Sansei-to — and the party has denied any ties to Russia — many within the mainstream media and political elite have noted the alignment of narratives.[17]
The Russian operation also had a specific policy goal: disrupting the Ministry of Finance’s consensus on national security funding by amplifying narratives that portrayed defense spending as “wasteful” and Ukraine assistance as “money laundering” that stole resources from Japanese pensioners.[18] Narratives spread on X and Telegram portrayed Japan’s financial assistance to Kyiv as a direct cause of inflation and domestic economic hardship, exploiting “inflation fatigue.”[19] Russian state media outlets like Sputnik Japan labeled the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) a “hotbed for bribery,” aiming to make it politically toxic for the Ministry of Finance to allocate funds for national security or overseas aid.[20] The velocity of these operations has intensified through technological adaptation. Nikkei Asia reports that reposts of Russian state-affiliated content on X tripled in 2024, with posting schedules optimized for Japanese morning commutes.[21]
More alarmingly, Russian “LLM [large language model] grooming,” where high-volume content mills like Pravda Nihon churn out thousands of articles daily to “infect” the training data of AI models, has reportedly reached Japan.[22] This strategy ensures that future automated information tools will regurgitate pro-Kremlin narratives as objective fact, embedding a long-term structural vulnerability into Japan’s information environment.
The PRC: Okinawa and the Doctrine of the “Flood”
China’s information operations in Japan have evolved from simple, if aggressive, propaganda into a sophisticated, long-term strategy of “volume and saturation” focused on specific geopolitical objectives. As assessed by Japan’s National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has fully integrated “cognitive domain operations” (ninchi ryoiki) into its military strategy against Tokyo.[23] This doctrine operationalizes artificial intelligence not merely to persuade, but to “control the brain” of the adversary’s population by overwhelming the information environment. NIDS analysts emphasize that this marks a critical shift: Beijing is no longer relying on clumsy external messaging but is instead utilizing generative AI to bypass Japan’s linguistic firewall, effectively “flooding” the zone with native-level synthetic content to paralyze Japanese decision-making during crises.
The primary target of this cognitive assault is the U.S.-Japan alliance, with Okinawa serving as the principal vector in recent years. Home to roughly 70 percent of U.S. military facilities in Japan, Okinawa is the linchpin of the alliance’s deterrence posture regarding Taiwan, making it — as expert analyst Kyoko Kuwahara has documented — a strategic focal point of PRC cognitive warfare involving a sophisticated campaign to exacerbate historical resentment between Okinawa and “mainland” Japan.[24] PRC-aligned narratives increasingly promote the concept of “indigenous rights” for Okinawans (“Ryukyuans”), subtly and sometimes overtly seeking to create societal division to complicate coordination during a crisis, including U.S. base usage.[25]
These operations are not blunt force propaganda; they exploit genuine grievances over base operations, noise pollution, crime, etc. Chinese networks amplify these issues through bot networks and co-opted local influencers to portray the central government in Tokyo as indifferent, colonial, and subservient to Washington.[26]
Furthermore, these operations are increasingly using AI to create “avatar” influencers, synthetic personas that look and sound Japanese, to spread these narratives on TikTok and YouTube Shorts.[27] These avatars, often designed to look like relatable young locals using regional dialects (uchinaguchi), recite scripts that frame the U.S. military presence not as a security guarantee, but as an occupying force. This manipulation aims to fracture society, cause disarray, and foment unrest by making pro-alliance voices feel politically isolated or intimidated in an attempt to neutralize the island’s utility to U.S. and Japanese forces without the need for kinetic action.
Russia-China Collusion?
While there is no “smoking gun” evidence of direct China-Russia FIMI collusion, such as joint task forces or shared command structures, there is undeniable evidence of mutual learning and a functional echo chamber.[28] The two countries effectively launder one another’s propaganda: Russian networks have been observed amplifying Chinese narratives regarding Fukushima’s treated water, for instance, while Chinese networks amplify Russian narratives concerning “Western imperialism” and Ukraine.[29] This mutual amplification creates a “hall of mirrors” effect, in which the volume of attacks intensifies and attribution becomes increasingly difficult. Officials note that it is often impossible to prove whether a specific narrative originated from a foreign intelligence service or from domestic actors unwittingly echoing foreign talking points.[30]
Domestic Vulnerabilities: The “Soft Target”
A recurring theme in Tokyo is the perception that Japan has transformed into a “soft target” for cognitive warfare.[31] This vulnerability is not monolithic but stems from a triad of distinct factors: the technological erosion of the language barrier, the unique centralization of the Japanese digital ecosystem, and a cultural “naivete” regarding foreign malice.[32]
The AI Revolution and the Language Barrier
The “Galapagos” effect of the Japanese language, once cited as a natural firewall, is effectively dead.[33] Generative AI tools have democratized the ability to produce high-quality, culturally nuanced Japanese text, allowing adversaries to bypass the linguistic complexities that previously acted as a barrier to entry. Interlocutors noted that FIMI content is now growing rapidly in both quantity and quality, with fewer of the linguistic “tells” that previously identified foreign actors.[34]
“Spreading false information is not hard among Japanese anymore,” one expert noted. Adversaries can now generate thousands of unique, grammatically perfect comments to flood a news article or a social media post, creating a false impression of public consensus (astroturfing) that is indistinguishable from genuine discourse.[35] Crucially, these AI tools can now mimic regional dialects and internet slang (netto surangu), making the content feel authentically Japanese and stripping away the “foreignness” that used to alert users to danger.[36]
Platform Vulnerabilities and Ownership Risks
While traditional news sources remain the most trusted in Japan, young people are increasingly turning to online sources, including X, for their news. The loosening of content moderation standards on X under its current ownership has made it a fertile ground for disinformation and FIMI. Bot networks that would have been purged in previous eras now operate with relative impunity, amplifying divisive hashtags.[37] And X in turn provides content for YouTube and TikTok, creating a potential vicious (dis)information cycle for the unwitting.
Complicating this landscape is the ownership structure of key platforms. Yahoo! Japan remains a dominant internet news aggregator also favored by young people, while the messaging app LINE is ubiquitous, used by both government officials and citizens.[38] Both are owned by LY Corporation, a subsidiary of Softbank,[39] toward which several interlocutors conveyed suspicion due to its historical ties to China and the perceived vulnerability of its data infrastructure.[40] This centralization of information flow, where a single privately-owned app (LINE) holds the private communications of up to three-quarters of the population, including sensitive municipal data, creates a massive single point of failure that adversaries could target for data exfiltration or psychological manipulation.
The Awareness Factor
Perhaps most concerning is the psychological vulnerability of the domestic audience. Several interlocutors and outside commentators have described the Japanese public as “naïve” regarding the harsh realities of geopolitical competition.[41] Having lived in a high-trust society with a relatively disciplined media environment, Japanese citizens are prone to trusting what they read.
Unlike Taiwanese citizens, who face a daily barrage of Chinese propaganda and have developed a healthy skepticism, or Baltic citizens who are inoculated against Russian narratives, Japanese citizens have not yet experienced a catastrophic FIMI crisis that would raise awareness of the threat. This lack of awareness means that, should disinformation penetrate the initial defenses, it may spread rapidly because users will assume it is true.[42] The skepticism muscles of the Japanese body politic have atrophied from disuse, arguably rendering it uniquely susceptible to emotional manipulation.
The Government Response: Structure and Bureaucracy
The Japanese government’s response to FIMI is characterized by a tension between ambitious political vision and entrenched bureaucratic realities. The transition from the administration of Shigeru Ishiba to Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has created a moment of operational uncertainty regarding these nascent defenses.
The Push for Coordination
The legislative groundwork was laid in May 2025 with the enactment of the Active Cyber Defense Act, shifting Japan toward a proactive strategy that empowers law enforcement and the military to conduct preemptive operations.[43] In July 2025, Masaaki Taira, an LDP parliamentarian with a deep understanding of technology policy, was appointed as “digital minister” to oversee the newly established National Cybersecurity Office (NCO).
The most significant structural development for FIMI occurred in the final month of the Ishiba administration. In September 2025, the government announced a new government-wide counter-FIMI response structure to coordinate counter-disinformation efforts. Placed under the auspices of the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary, this body was designed to break down the traditional silos between relevant ministries and agencies.[44]
The structure brings together representatives from, inter alia:
- The National Security Secretariat: To provide strategic direction.
- The Cabinet Public Affairs Office: To coordinate overall public affairs messaging.
- The National Cybersecurity Office: A new body to coordinate police and the Japan Self-Defense Force cyber-defense.
- Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office (CIRO): For threat intelligence.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs: To handle international messaging.
- Ministry of Defense: To monitor foreign-sourced information attacks and take the lead in developing a strategic concept for “integrated information warfare.”
- Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications: To combat domestic-sourced mis/disinformation.
- Other relevant ministries and agencies.[45]
Former Minister Taira remains a driving force within his party, advocating greater attention to counter-FIMI activity. But as one official described it, the structure established under his watch is “just being born” and requires strong political capital to survive the notoriously territorial Japanese bureaucracy. Without constant pressure from the Kantei (Prime Minister’s office), these inter-agency meetings risk becoming pro-forma exercises with no real operational authority.
Japanese interlocutors emphasized that Japan’s counter-information warfare policy is conceived, oriented, and organized around defensive operations, i.e., to defend against foreign information attacks, rather than “offensive” operations aimed at undermining the information integrity of others. The policy preference is also to “debunk” or “de-platform” false information after it has spread — a reactive game of whack-a-mole that may be insufficient to meet the challenge. There is a palpable reluctance to engage even in aggressive “prebunking,” i.e., inoculating the public against an anticipated mis/disinformation campaign before it begins, rooted in Japan’s pacifist legal framework and a diplomatic culture that forswears confrontation.
Bureaucratic Trenches
Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has signaled a desire to further centralize intelligence authority.[46] In late October 2025, she instructed Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara to review the establishment of a “national intelligence secretariat” to upgrade CIRO. This aligns with pressure from coalition partner Ishin no Kai (Japan Innovation Party), which successfully included a clause in the coalition agreement to establish an “external intelligence agency” by 2027. Privately, they are also encouraging more attention to the cognitive warfare challenge.
However, experts worry that Takaichi’s focus remains primarily on physical cybersecurity (protecting utilities and infrastructure via the NCO) and information security (secrecy and clearance), rather than the cognitive challenge of FIMI. While a new division has been established within the MOD’s Intelligence Division focused on Information Warfare, the broader integration of intelligence, policy, and public affairs remains nascent.[47] There is a concern that the administration views “security” in Cold War terms, protecting secrets and hardening cables, rather than in modern terms, protecting the public mind from manipulation.[48] The nuances of narrative warfare may be lost in the drive for a traditional “spy agency.”
Meanwhile, the bureaucratic hurdles to effective coordination remain immense. A regulatory and legal structure under which the Japanese government may conduct information operations does not exist. Traditionally, MOFA, MOD, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, among others, do not coordinate their activity. Culturally, the Japanese intelligence community promotes a strict firewall between intelligence gathering and public communication. CIRO and the Public Security Intelligence Agency (PSIA) are traditionally secretive, prioritizing the protection of sources above all else.[49] Yet, effective counter-FIMI work requires the rapid declassification and public release of threat intelligence, as seen in the U.S. “prebunking” of the invasion of Ukraine.[50] Getting a CIRO analyst to share raw data with a MOFA press officer for a public statement is culturally anathema.[51]
Even just within MOD, different branches of the military maintain distinct concepts of information warfare.[52] The JSDF, like other militaries around the world, has traditionally understood information warfare in tactical terms — that is, the interplay of information security and tactical military operations — rather than strategic terms, encompassing the broader cognitive domain of FIMI. Only a single two-star (general officer) billet is dedicated to cybersecurity, and not the cognitive dimension, thus offering little incentive within the JSDF to address cyber issues.
There is also a severe human capital crisis.[53] The government struggles to staff counter-FIMI efforts with qualified professionals due to uncompetitive salaries compared to the private tech sector. The NSS, CIRO, and National Cybersecurity Office, for instance, are staffed almost entirely by detailees from other ministries who rotate out regularly, preventing the accumulation of institutional knowledge.[54] The government cannot compete with the salaries offered by private tech giants like Google or Softbank for top-tier tech engineers, data scientists, and researchers, leaving the nation’s cyber and cognitive defenses manned by rotating generalists rather than career specialists.
Civil Society and the Private Sector: A Missing Link?
In resilient democracies like Taiwan or Finland, civil society serves as the primary cognitive immune system against FIMI.[55] In Japan, however, this sector remains under-resourced and structurally disconnected from the state.
While public broadcaster NHK is the largest entity conducting fact-checking, it is hamstrung by its own mandate.[56] Legal requirements for strict neutrality make the broadcaster hesitant to aggressively call out foreign actors or label narratives as “disinformation” without overwhelming proof, by which time the narrative has often already achieved viral saturation.[57] Furthermore, restrictions on publishing content on commercial internet platforms limit NHK’s reach among younger demographics, who primarily consume information via TikTok or YouTube rather than terrestrial television.[58]
Independent NGOs face a similar operational paralysis, driven by a severe funding drought.[59] Unlike in the West, philanthropic giving for national security initiatives is virtually non-existent in Japan. Direct government funding is also problematic; a deep-seated mistrust exists between the state and many within academia, rooted in historical memories of pre-war state propaganda.[60] This historical trauma makes journalists and academics reluctant to collaborate on “cognitive warfare” initiatives, fearing a compromise of their independence. Furthermore, civil society organizations and researchers tend to operate in silos at best and, at worst, consider each other more as competitors than collaborators due to limited government funding.
Consequently, the “whole-of-society” defense championed by security experts remains largely theoretical. Without cultivating, resourcing, and empowering researchers (data scientists, social scientists, etc.) and activists (civic tech NGOs, etc.) as partners to patrol the digital commons, the national information space will remain dangerously exposed to manipulation.
International Cooperation: Looking Outward
Recognizing its internal limitations, Japan is actively looking outward for models and partners to bolster its cognitive defenses.[61] Within the Indo-Pacific region, Australia has emerged as a key mentor in this domain. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) has partnered with Japanese entities at the non-governmental level, sharing methodologies for tracking PRC influence operations.[62] Japanese officials are particularly eager to learn from Australia’s counter-foreign interference task force model, which successfully mitigated external meddling in its own elections.[63]
Similarly, Japanese civil society is looking to Taiwan, specifically groups like Doublethink Lab, as the gold standard for resilience in the region. The Taiwanese model of decentralized, volunteer-led fact-checking (such as Cofacts) offers a roadmap for engaging the public in defense of the information space. Official cooperation with the EU remains largely rhetorical so far despite encouraging joint statements of intent.[64] Canada has likewise shown significant energy at the official level, pushing for the adoption of G7 norms on FIMI.[65]
The critical missing piece is the United States. Japanese interlocutors emphasized the need for a “good U.S. partner” to help operationalize their nascent structures and support international resilience. However, the Trump II Administration has substantially dismantled America’s counter-FIMI infrastructure, defending it as a protection of free speech and anti-censorship.[66] The absence of the United States is a substantial headwind to Japan’s nascent counter-FIMI work, but one that should not prevent Tokyo from cooperating with others within the United States and elsewhere in its own interest.
Recommendations
To move from awareness to action, the Government of Japan and its domestic and international partners should prioritize the following strategic shifts:
- Increase awareness: FIMI threats are only going to grow and become more impactful on national sovereignty and security as people consume more and more of their information from digital sources. Japanese officials and citizens alike need to become more aware of the looming challenge, not only to domestic but also international perspectives on issues of interest to Japan, such as the U.S.-Japan alliance. It will require precisely defining terms such as “FIMI,” “disinformation,” and “information warfare,” distinguishing them from normal differences of opinion and democratic political debate, and eschewing politically charged phrases like “fake news” when describing the challenge. To that end, digital literacy campaigns should be expanded to support this effort.
- Operationalize the New Whole-of-Government Structure: Prime Minister Takaichi should ensure the nascent cross-ministry counter-disinformation/FIMI body, established in the Prime Minister’s Office under her predecessor, remains operational, meets regularly, and has the authority to compel information sharing. It must avoid becoming merely a forum for discussion but serve as an operational hub for counter-FIMI work with a clear mandate.
- Build “Whole-of-Society” Alliances: In addition to breaking down traditional bureaucratic stovepipes, the Japanese government should build cooperative mechanisms with non-state counter-FIMI actors — such as civil society organizations, think tanks, media companies, and academics — including supporting their activities in ways that will not damage their institutional integrity or independence. The GOJ might consider creating an unclassified database of threat indicators, such as IP addresses and suspicious behavioral patterns, which non-state actors could access as a way to bridge the persistent trust gap between government and non-government entities.
- Include in “war-gaming”: Japan and its strategic partners, including the United States, should integrate realistic cognitive attack scenarios into traditional wargaming as an essential component of future warfare. Eventually, entire wargames could focus on the foreign disinformation challenge to ensure effective whole-of-government — and whole-of-society — coordination.
- Shift Emphasis from Debunking to Prebunking: Just as traditional security requires shaping the international environment to deter adversaries and prevent crises from emerging, Japanese authorities should prioritize anticipating adversary information attacks and shaping the narrative environment accordingly before attacks emerge and take root. That includes narratives related to the U.S.-Japan alliance, democracy, Taiwan, Okinawa, and Ukraine. Prebunking — and debunking, which will remain important — will require an appetite for enhanced government transparency and public affairs work, and entities that understand how to navigate the digital information sphere and implement communication strategies effectively. Whole-of-society (and international) partnerships will assist such efforts.
- Aggressively Pursue International Cooperation: Given the common threat faced by democratic nations in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond, Japan should further develop and expand its international partnerships to address the FIMI challenge. Track 2 (non-governmental) and 1.5-level (government and non-governmental) initiatives, including with U.S. entities despite questions about the Trump Administration’s FIMI policy, should continue to be pursued and expanded where possible to share lessons learned, best practices, and common approaches for countering PRC and Russian tactics and narratives. International networks should be built not only among government officials but with and among researchers, civil society organizations, activists, and government officials alike from democratic nations around the world to monitor and respond to malign activity and compare notes on common narratives advanced by FIMI actors. Just as those malign actors are learning and building upon, if not colluding with one another, counter-FIMI forces must likewise join together in common cause and coordinated effort.
A final note: Implicit in the recommendations and commentary above is a warning for Japanese leaders to act urgently and creatively but with care. Underemphasizing the information challenge risks leaving Japan vulnerable to security threats at home and abroad. But overreacting to the challenge could also be counterproductive by increasing domestic political polarization and civic mistrust, providing Japan’s adversaries with greater opportunities to conduct effective FIMI operations inside the country. Counter-FIMI initiatives, for instance, must never be weaponized politically at home or serve as an excuse to gain political advantage or curb speech essential in a robust democratic society. To avoid a backlash and accusations of partisanship or censorship, authorities should be careful at all times to provide as much transparency and concrete evidence as possible when making a FIMI-related assertion, particularly when it affects a domestic entity, and ensure its information policies are subject to reasonable oversight and accountability to ensure they are implemented in ways that conform with democratic norms.
In the end, building civic trust, maintaining national unity, and creating a sense of common purpose will be the most effective method of building and sustaining resilience against the unique security challenge posed by information manipulation in the digital age.
Amb. Derek Mitchell and Ms. Min Mitchell wrote in their personal capacity. The views and interpretations expressed by the authors are solely their own.
Amb. Derek Mitchell is a senior adviser to the President and Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. Between 2018 and 2023, Amb. Mitchell was president of the National Democratic Institute, a U.S.-based non-profit, non-government organization dedicated to supporting democratic development worldwide. From 2011-16, he served as U.S. special envoy and then ambassador to Burma (Myanmar), the first in 22 years, during a historic period in the country’s nascent democratic transition. From 2009-11, Amb. Mitchell oversaw the Obama Administration Defense Department’s Asia policy as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs and acting Assistant Secretary. Mitchell had previously served at Defense as Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asian and Pacific Affairs during the Clinton Administration, and from 2001 to 2009 served as senior fellow for Asia in CSIS’s International Security Program, where he founded the Center’s Southeast Asia Program.
Ms. Min Mitchell is an accomplished media executive and veteran journalist with a distinguished career in global news, digital innovation, and multilingual content production. She recently served as acting president and CEO of the Frontline Media Fund (FMF), a non-federal entity funded by the United States for Global Media (USAGM), and Executive Director of Global News Service (GNS). From 2022 to 2024, Ms. Mitchell served as Executive Editor of Radio Free Asia (RFA), where she led editorial operations for the organization’s nine language services and its online affiliate, BenarNews. Her tenure was marked by numerous accolades, including three National Edward R. Murrow Awards. As RFA’s Managing Director for East Asia from 2017 to 2021, Ms. Mitchell played a key role in expanding RFA’s East Asia programming, including overseeing RFA’s Uyghur Service as they broke the story of China’s mass detention of Uyghur Muslims in 2017.
[1] James P. Rubin and Darjan Vujica, “AI Is Supercharging Disinformation Warfare,” Foreign Affairs, November 19, 2025.
[2] Christopher B. Johnstone and Leah Klaas, Combating Disinformation, July 8, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/combating-disinformation.
[3] Devin Stewart, China’s Influence in Japan: Everywhere Yet Nowhere in Particular, July 23, 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-influence-japan-everywhere-yet-nowhere-particular; Tetsuro Kobayashi and Maiko Ichihara, “Japan’s Accidental Resilience in the Disinformation Age,” The Japan Times, May 9, 2024, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/commentary/2024/05/09/japan/japan-disinformation-age/.
[4] Kyoko Kuwahara, “Japan’s Struggle Against Disinformation,” Macdonald-Laurier Institute, March 27, 2025, https://macdonaldlaurier.ca/japans-struggle-against-disinformation-kyoko-kuwahara-for-inside-policy/.
[5] Derek Cai, “Fukushima: China’s anger at Japan is fueled by disinformation,” BBC News, September 2, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-66667291; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Diplomatic Bluebook 2024 (2024), https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2024/pdf/pdfs/2024_all.pdf.
[6] Albert Zhang, “Japan Targeted by Chinese Propaganda and Covert Online Campaign,” The Strategist, June 8, 2023, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/japan-targeted-by-chinese-propaganda-and-covert-online-campaign/.
[7] Jeffrey W. Hornung and Mina Pollmann, Equipping the Japan-U.S. Alliance to Handle China’s Disinformation Operations (2024), https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2024/07/equipping-the-japan-us-alliance-to-handle-chinas-disinformation.html.
[8] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Diplomatic Bluebook 2024.
[9] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, National Security Strategy of Japan, December 2022.
[10] Pak Hung Au and Keiichi Kawai, “Media Capture and Information Monopolization in Japan,” The Japanese Economic Review 63, no. 1 (2012): 131–47, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5876.2011.00538.x.
[11] Tetsuro Kobayashi et al., “Is Partisan Selective Exposure an American Peculiarity? A Comparative Study of News Browsing Behaviors in the United States, Japan, and Hong Kong,” Communication Research, SAGE Publications Inc, October 10, 2024, 00936502241289109, https://doi.org/10.1177/00936502241289109.
[12] Kobayashi and Ichihara, “Japan’s Accidental Resilience in the Disinformation Age.”
[13] EU DisinfoLab Nicolas Hénin, Towards a European Redefinition of Foreign Interference (2023).
[14] Heather A. Conley et al., Countering Russian & Chinese Influence Activities, July 1, 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/countering-russian-chinese-influence-activities-0; Anton Liagusha and Dmytro Iarovyi, “Memes, Freedom, and Resilience to Information Disorders: Information Warfare between Democracies and Autocracies,” Social Sciences & Humanities Open 11 (January 2025): 101247, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssaho.2024.101247.
[15] Tamás Matura, “Sino-Russian Convergence in Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference: A Global Threat to the US and Its Allies,” CEPA, June 30, 2025, https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/sino-russian-convergence-in-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference/.
[16] “Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election,” U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, August 18, 2020. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/2020/08/18/publications-report-select-committee-intelligence-united-states-senate-russian-active-measures/. Oana Popescu-Zamfir, “Russian Interference: Coming Soon To An Election Near You,” Carnegie Endowment for International Policy, Strategic Europe, February 13, 2025, https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/strategic-europe/2025/02/russian-interference-coming-soon-to-an-election-near-you?lang=en.
[17] Jullosuke Kobara, “‘Japanese First’ party rocked by suspicions of Russian interference,” Nikkei Asia, July 17, 2025, https://asia.nikkei.com/politics/japan-election/japanese-first-party-rocked-by-suspicions-of-russian-interference
[18] Olena Kalashnikova and Fabian Schäfer, “Russian State-Controlled Propaganda and Its Proxies: Pro-Russian Political Actors in Japan,” Asia-Pacific Journal 22, no. 3 (2024): e6, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1557466024029073.
[19] Erik Isaksson, “Enabling Japanese Support for Ukraine: The General Security Trajectory, Domestic Politics, and the Economy,” The European Institute of Japanese Studies, October 2025, https://www.hhs.se/contentassets/e733d6c4bbf04d1084fa5ca728b6bcec/eijs-policy-brief-october-2025.pdf; Kalashnikova and Schäfer, “Russian State-Controlled Propaganda and Its Proxies.”
[20] The Yomiuri Shimbun, Russian State Media, Diplomatic Offices Drastically Increase Japanese-Language Content as Kremlin Wages Information War, October 8, 2025, https://japannews.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/defense-security/20251008-285336/.
[21] Nippon.Com, “Japan’s Upper House Election Reveals How Russian Influence Operations Infecting AI with Flood of Propaganda, Stoking Divisions.”
[22] Maiko Ichihara, “Japan’s Upper House Election Reveals How Russian Influence Operations Infecting AI with Flood of Propaganda, Stoking Divisions.” Nippon.Com, October 27, 2025. https://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/d01170/.
[23] Yamaguchi, Shinji et al., China Security Report 2024: China’s Quest for Control of the Cognitive Domain (National Institute for Defense Studies, 2022), https://www.nids.mod.go.jp/publication/chinareport/pdf/china_report_EN_web_2023_A01.pdf.
[24] Kyoko Kuwahara, “Foreign Influence Operations in Japan since the second Abe government,” Commentary, Macdonald-Laurier Institute, April 2023, https://macdonaldlaurier.ca/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/220230424_Foreign_interference_Kuwahara_COMMENTARY_FWeb.pdf
[25] Maiko Ichihara, “China’s ‘Malinformation’ Comes for Okinawa,” The Diplomat, March 20, 2025, https://thediplomat.com/2025/03/chinas-malinformation-comes-for-okinawa/; Yuichiro Kanematsu and Nikkei staff writer, “Social Media Fuel Pro-Okinawa Independence Disinformation Blitz,” Nikkei Asia, https://asia.nikkei.com/spotlight/cybersecurity/social-media-fuel-pro-okinawa-independence-disinformation-blitz.
[26] Julia Janicki, “Foreign Narratives Proliferate among Japanese X Communities,” DFRLab, December 18, 2024, https://dfrlab.org/2024/12/18/foreign-narratives-proliferate-among-japanese-x-communities/.
[27] Microsoft Threat Intelligence, East Asia Threat Actors Employ Unique Methods (2024).
[28] Johnstone and Klaas, Combating Disinformation.
[29] “China’s State Media and Government Officials Are Backing Russia on Ukraine,” German Marshall Fund, Alliance for Security Democracy, March 13, 2022, https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/chinas-state-media-and-government-officials-are-backing-russia-on-ukraine-war/
[30] Nicolas Hénin, Towards a European Redefinition of Foreign Interference.
[31] KYODO NEWS, Japan Election Interference Concerns (2025); Belouizdad, “Japan’s Struggle Against Disinformation”; Kobayashi and Ichihara, “Japan’s Accidental Resilience in the Disinformation Age”; “Cognitive Warfare: Maneuvering in the Human Dimension,” U.S. Naval Institute, April 14, 2023, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/april/cognitive-warfare-maneuvering-human-dimension.
[32] Stewart, China’s Influence in Japan.
[33] Kuwahara, “Japan’s Struggle Against Disinformation.”
[34] National Technology Security Coalition, “Microsoft: Same Targets, New Playbooks – East Asia Threat Actors Employ Unique Methods,” https://ntsc.org/blog/microsoft-same-targets-new-playbooks-east-asia-threat-actors-employ-unique-methods/.
[35] MOFA Japan, Diplomatic Bluebook 2025 (2025).
[36] Kanematsu and writer, “Social Media Fuel Pro-Okinawa Independence Disinformation Blitz”; “Disaster and Disinformation: Spotting Fake News to Save Lives,” Nippon.Com, July 11, 2025, https://www.nippon.com/en/japan-topics/bg900565/.
[37] European External Action Service, 3rd EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats (European Union, 2025), https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/3rd-eeas-report-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats-0_en.
[38] Yasuomi Sawa and Reiko Saisho, Japan Media Landscape 2024 (2024).
[39] SoftBank Corp. Integrated Report 2025, n.d.
[40] Seungtae Han, “Would LINE Become Another TikTok?,” Internet Governance Project, June 4, 2024, https://www.internetgovernance.org/2024/06/04/would-line-become-another-tiktok/.
[41] Stewart, China’s Influence in Japan.
[42] Kyoko Kuwahara, “Disinformation Threats during a Taiwan Contingency and Countermeasures,” The Japan Institute of International Affairs, https://www.jiia.or.jp/en/column/2022/03/security-fy2021-01.html.
[43] “Japan’s New Active Cyber Defense Law: A Strategic Evolution in National Cybersecurity,” https://www.centerforcybersecuritypolicy.org/insights-and-research/japans-new-active-cyber-defense-law-a-strategic-evolution-in-national-cybersecurity.
[44] Authors’ Field Notes, Tokyo, November 2025.
[45] Ibid.
[46] The Yomiuri Shimbun, Govt Considers New Bureau to Strengthen Gathering of Intelligence from Japan and Abroad, October 24, 2025, https://japannews.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/politics-government/20251024-288355/.
[47] “National Defense Strategy, Defense Buildup Program,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page1we_000082.html.
[48] Authors’ Field Notes, Tokyo, November 2025.
[49] Yoshiki Kobayashi, “Integrating Japan’s Intelligence Community: Analyzing the Effectiveness of the Director of Cabinet Intelligence as a Coordinating Body,” Intelligence and National Security 38, no. 7 (2023): 1151–70, https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2023.2228044.
[50] Kuwahara, “Japan’s Struggle Against Disinformation”; Alfred Marleku, “Public Intelligence as a Strategic Tool: The Role of Real-Time Intelligence Disclosure in the Ukraine War,” Security and Defence Quarterly 50, no. 2 (2025): 50–65, https://doi.org/10.35467/sdq/205566; “Countering Disinformation Effectively: An Evidence-Based Policy Guide,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/01/countering-disinformation-effectively-an-evidence-based-policy-guide?lang=en.
[51] Kobayashi Yoshiki, “Re-Assessing the Organizational Characteristics of Japan’s Intelligence Community and Its Social and Political Backgrounds,” n.d., https://meiji.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/2000001/files/mjgs_8_1.pdf.
[52] Authors’ Field Notes, Tokyo, November 2025.
[53] Yohei Kobayashi and Makoto Tsujiguchi, Transforming Japan’s Bureaucratic System: Opportunity Amidst Crisis, December 5, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/transforming-japans-bureaucratic-system-opportunity-amidst-crisis.
[54] Authors’ Field Notes, Tokyo, November 2025.
[55] ROC Navy Commander Jeremy (yen-ming) Chen, Taiwan Cognitive Warfare and US-Taiwan Relations (2025).
[56] Jessica Brandt et al., Disinformation Impact on Democracy in Asia (Foreign Policy at Brookings, n.d.).
[57] Stewart, China’s Influence in Japan.
[58] Newman et al., Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2025.
[59] The United States-Japan Foundation, “Giving in Japan Today and Tomorrow,” https://us-jf.org/en/trends-and-trendsetters/giving-in-japan-today-and-tomorrow-1-legal-status-isnt-just-a-technicality.
[60] Kobayashi, “Integrating Japan’s Intelligence Community.”
[61] MOFA Japan, Diplomatic Bluebook 2025.
[62] “ASPI and JNI Establish Strategic Partnership to Counter State-Sponsored Information Operations and Hybrid Threats in the Indo-Pacific,” ASPI, n.d., https://www.aspi.org.au/news/aspi-and-jni-establish-strategic-partnership-to-counter-state-sponsored-information-operations-and-hybrid-threats-in-the-indo-pacific/.
[63] “Developing a Shared Australia–Japan Agenda for Economic Security,” https://www.ussc.edu.au/developing-a-shared-australia-japan-agenda-for-economic-security; “Countering Foreign Interference,” Department of Home Affairs Website, https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about-us/our-portfolios/national-security/countering-foreign-interference.
[64] “Security and Defense Partnership between the European Union and Japan,” November 1, 2024, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2024/EU-Japan%20Security%20and%20Defence%20Partnership.pdf
[65] Kuwahara, “Japan’s Struggle Against Disinformation.”
[66] “United States Champions Free Expression, Ceases Censorship Frameworks,” State Department Press Statement, September 17, 2025, https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/09/united-states-champions-free-expression-ceases-censorship-frameworks. The Biden administration had signed a “Memorandum of Cooperation With Japan on Countering Foreign Information Manipulation” in December 2023, that appears now to be a dead letter, https://2021-2025.state.gov/u-s-signs-memorandum-of-cooperation-with-japan-on-countering-foreign-information-manipulation/.
